Tag: διοικητικό συμβούλιο ανωνύμων εταιρειών

  • General Assembly of the SA: The Highest Corporate Body

    General Assembly of the SA: The Highest Corporate Body

    The Board of Directors is in fact of fundamental importance for SAs (Read: The Board of Directors of the SA: Operation, Power, Members).

    Introducing the chapter on General Assembly of SAs, (GA), we will be focusing in the particular importance and value of the highest body of the SA and of course the limitations of its power.

    General Assembly of SAs: The scope of its decisions and powers

    The General Assembly is established by law (: art. 116 law 4548/2018-as previously in force) art. 33 of Codified Law. 2190/1920) as the highest body” of the SA (see Explanatory Report on art. 116, paragraph a, Law 4548/2018). The hierarchical organization of the SA is therefore demonstrated, at the highest level of which the General Assembly is located. It constitutes a collective body, the members of which are, exclusively, the shareholders of the company (in practice: owners of the SA and bearers of the financial risk of its activity).

    The characterization of the General Assembly as the highest body of the SA derives from and is consistent with the nature of the responsibilities granted to it and recognized by the law: The General Assembly “…is entitled to decide on every corporate matter” (: art. 116).

    The General Assembly of the SA has the power and authority, among other things, to elect (and freely recall) the Board of Directors (and the auditors) of the SA. To also exercise control and supervision over the activity of said bodies and persons – who are accountable for the actions of the respective management period. After the end of each corporate year, it approves (or not) their overall management. Therefore, the Board of Directors of the SA functions, in principle, as an executive body of the decisive will of the General Assembly (more precisely: of the majority of shareholders).

    It would not be an exaggeration to note that the General Assembly is responsible for taking the most important (in terms of importance and gravity) decisions regarding the existence, activity and course of the company. Even regarding its dissolution. In fact, regarding certain decisions, its responsibility is exclusive (especially art. 117 – for which our next article).

    Participants and decisions

    The decisions of the General Assembly are, of course, made by the shareholders. Directly linked to the shareholder status is the right to appear (in person or by proxy) and actively participate in its meetings. Shareholders have the opportunity to request information – on the occasion of an upcoming meeting or during the work of the General Assembly. During its conduct, in fact, they have the right to take the floor and ask questions – in the framework predetermined by law. The ultimate purpose of all individual rights of this nature is, in principle, the creation of the necessary conditions for the documented exercise of the right to vote for each of the items on the agenda. It is assumed, of course, that they hold the right to vote either as full owners of their shares or, for example, as usufructuary or pledged creditors. During voting, it is not possible for them to participate, automatically, when they are deprived of the right to vote (e.g., holders of non-voting preference shares).

    In order for the decisions of the General Assembly to produce legal results, the quorum and majority percentages must be met for the adoption of each decision, as provided for in the law and the articles of association. The voting of an individual shareholder (but not the sole or majority shareholder) has no consequences. It simply contributes to the formation of the corporate will, as expressed by the General Assembly. The decisions of the General Assembly, of course, are binding on all shareholders, regardless of whether they abstain, are absent or disagree (art. 116, sub. b).

    The action of the General Assembly (in contrast to the permanent nature of the Board of Directors) is periodic. The body meets – but also exists to take decisions according to the law and its articles of association – only when convened for this purpose. Its convening is sometimes mandatory (:ordinary General Assembly) and sometimes when it is deemed necessary by the circumstances (:extraordinary General Assembly). It is important to provide the shareholders with the opportunity to participate in decision-making without necessarily holding a meeting or even by simply signing the relevant minutes (see art. 135 and art. 136 respectively).

    Separation of Powers Board of Directors & General Assembly of SA

    The management of the SA belongs, first of all, to the Board of Directors. The General Assembly, however, has the ability/power to intervene in the relevant competence of the Board of Directors. However, different views have been developed regarding the extent of this intervention. According to the prevailing (and correct) view, the General Assembly has broad and general competence. Furthermore, (art. 116 and 86) margins for (positive or negative) intervention by the General Assembly in the work of the Board of Directors are recognized.

    It is important, however, to note that the GM’s power of intervention cannot lead to arbitrary usurpation of powers that have been assigned to other corporate bodies. In this context, the complete removal of the Board of Directors’ (legally derived) managerial power is excluded (after all, this would result in the Board of Directors being irresponsible ). But what is the point of such a choice by the GM? It would be simpler for it to choose (and elect) a new Board of Directors, which it would express and which would operate according to its directions (that and its substitute bodies)…

    It is possible to limit the scope of the power of the Board of Directors on the basis of a statutory (and, therefore, general) provision. However, the limitation of the obligations of the members of the Board of Directors, as well as the alteration of their liability regime, are not issues that are amenable to statutory regulation. Any limitation of the duties of the Board of Directors is, however, tolerated by a specific-relevant decision of the General Assembly. Such a decision, usually, will concern a specific act (or unit of competences) of the Board of Directors. Regardless, however, of any theoretical concerns, the influence of the decisions of the Board of Directors should be considered, as a rule, a given, as the majority shareholders are the ones who elect – and maintain in power – the members of the Board of Directors. They, in turn (the members of the Board of Directors), express and defend the interests of the majority shareholders, which, as a rule, they promote. Sometimes even before the corporate equivalents.

    It is possible that the articles of association require prior information and/or consent or (ex post) approval of the General Assembly for the performance of specific management actions by the Board of Directors or substitute bodies. Especially when decisions are to be taken that by their nature create risks for the company (such as the transfer/sale of significant assets). It is accepted, and rightly so, that the General Assembly is not only entitled but also obliged to intervene in defense of the interests of the shareholders (Greek Commercial Code 2263/2003).

    The decision-making by the General Assembly beyond the limits of its authority does not create any obligation of compliance or commitment towards the Board of Directors. Of course, given the fluidity of the relevant limits, the scope for shareholder intervention must be assessed on a case-by-case basis and always in accordance with the prevailing circumstances. Greater freedom of intervention by the General Assembly in matters of corporate organization is recognized, provided that it is an unlisted company. On the contrary, in listed companies, given the asymmetry of interests between the General Assembly and the Board of Directors, the involvement of the General Assembly is understood in decisions that (in terms of subject matter and importance) escape the current management of the Board of Directors.

    Binding Force of General Assembly Decisions – Conditions

    The decisions of the General Assembly produce, according to the aforementioned, binding results and develop legal consequences for all shareholders of the SA. And this, regardless of whether the shareholders participated or not in the crucial meeting (and/or vote). Regardless, in fact, of whether they voted for or against.

    Binding force, however, is produced by the legal decisions of the General Assembly. Legality is examined at two levels: (a) compliance with the legal decision-making process and (b) compliance of the content of the decision taken with the law and the statutes.

    In particular, the General Assembly takes valid decisions if it has been convened, constituted and decided in accordance with the legal forms and the (possibly existing more specific) statutory provisions. In the event that a relevant defect is found, the decision will be voidable. This practically means that it will produce, normally, legal effects, until it is voided by a final court decision (: art. 137).

    As for its content, in the event that the decision taken contradicts the law and/or the statutes, it will be invalid (art. 138 – however, the possibility of curing the invalidity is provided for under §4 of the same article).

    Shareholders – as already mentioned – have the possibility to make a decision without a meeting. Either remotely at the General Assembly using electronic means (art. 135) or through the countersigning of minutes without a meeting (art. 136). Similarly, the decisions of the previous paragraph are also binding on dissenting shareholders. However, in the case of countersigning of minutes, for the decision to be valid, it is required that it bear the signatures of all shareholders.

    Finally, in the event that more than one class of shares has been issued in the SA, for the legal adoption of certain decisions by the General Assembly (e.g. to increase or decrease the share capital), relevant approval is required from the special meeting of the class of shareholders affected by the specific decision. Similarly, a decision of the special meeting is required to be taken by the shareholders representing preferred shares upon a decision of the company to abolish or limit their privilege (art. 38 §7).

    There is no doubt that the General Assembly of a company is the highest body of the company. However, this does not mean that it can abolish or replace its other bodies. It also does not mean that it can operate without rules. Moreover, its operation and decisions are subject to judicial review for their legality. We must be particularly careful in this regard at all stages: convening, conducting, decisions. However, for its exclusive competence, decisions, in our next article.

     

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 14th, 2024).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Responsibility of Board Members: Insurance Contributions, Customs Violations, Bankruptcy Code, Infidelity & “Laundering”

    Responsibility of Board Members: Insurance Contributions, Customs Violations, Bankruptcy Code, Infidelity & “Laundering”

    In a series of our previous articles, we explored the responsibility of the members of the Board of Directors of an SA. Specifically, we looked int the internal (intra-company) liability of the members of the Board of Directors for their actions or omissions, which risk the company’s property (art. 102-108, law 4548/2018). Also, with the “external” responsibility of the directors of the SA for the direct damage to shareholders or third parties due to their (illegal and culpable) actions. In addition, with the liability of the aforementioned persons vis-à-vis corporate creditors due to causing or delaying the bankruptcy or from tax violations of the SA. In the present article we will examine the other responsibilities (civil, administrative, criminal) that may be borne by the administrators of the SA from custom-related violations of the SA and non-payment of insurance contributions. Also, from the potential disloyalty of the managers of the legal entity at the expense of the latter, as well as from the criminal provisions of the bankruptcy code. And all this in the light of the provisions for money laundering from criminal activities.

     

    Liability From Non-Payment of Insurance Contributions

    Joint and several liability of the administrators of the SA, with the latter, is established regarding the (non)payment of insurance contributions.

    In particular, legal representatives, presidents, administrators, managing directors, authorized management and liquidators of legal persons and legal entities (as defined in art. 3 of Law 4174/2013) are personally, jointly and severally liable for the payment of insurance contributions, additional fees, surcharges and other charges owed by the legal persons and legal entities to the Social Security Institutions, regardless of the time of their certification. In this case, in order to establish its liability, the conditions for joint and several liability in fiscal offenses must also be met [see art. 31 Law 4321/2015, as amended by Law 4646/2019 (Article 66 of which was amended pursuant to Article 31 Law 4701/2020), and e-EFKA Circular 62/21].

    Specifically, in order to establish the said liability of the above persons, the following conditions must be met cumulatively:

    (a) The aforementioned persons must have had the above qualities during the time of operation of the legal entity or at the time of its dissolution or merger or during its liquidation.

    (b) The debts became overdue during the term of office of the above persons (subject to the law regarding the time of reduction of the debts when any tax is imposed following an audit by a tax authority and the cases subject to settlement). If, therefore, a debt becomes overdue in the following year from the one to which it relates, then the person who exercises the administration of the SA when the debt became overdue is responsible. In other words, the person who was in charge of the SA at the time the disputed debt was incurred is not liable.

    (c) The debts were not paid or attributed to the State due to the fault of the above persons-administrators (with the explicit clarification, however, that the burden of proof for the eventual non-existence of culpability is borne by the specific persons). In the event that the above persons are responsible (as discussed above), their culpability is also presumed. Unless these show a lack of culpability. The reformation of the institutional framework related to the issue aims at the assumption of responsibilities by persons who actually exercised management during the critical time of the creation of the tax debt. That is, by persons who had the ability to act in the name and on behalf of the legal entity and fulfill its obligations.

    Furthermore, the provision of article 1 §1 and 2 of Law 86/1967 is still in force, which criminalizes – subject to conditions – the non-payment of employer contributions as well as the withholding and non-return of employee contributions. The relevant sanctions are also not insignificant (: a prison sentence of at least 3 months and a cumulative fine of at least 10,000 drachmas and a prison sentence of at least 6 months and a cumulative fine of at least 10,000 drachmas, respectively). At the same time, according to §7 para. a’ of the same article, as perpetrators for employers who are not natural persons, of the relevant offences, the following are considered with regard to national SAs: the presidents of the Board of Directors, the managing directors or authorized or co-acting advisors, the administrators, the general managers or directors and in general any person entrusted either directly by law or by private will or by court order to the administration or management thereof. If all the above persons are missing, the members of the boards of directors of these companies are considered as perpetrators, as long as they actually temporarily or permanently exercise one of the aforementioned duties.

     

    Liability for Customs Violations

    Liability of the administrators of the SA may be established (also) due to customs violations.

    Specifically, based on the provisions of the Customs Code (law 2960/2001), a customs debt is the obligation of any natural or legal person vis-à-vis the Customs Authority to pay all duties, taxes, including value added tax (VAT), and the other rights of the State, which correspond to goods and burden them according to the relevant provisions.

    For the payment of the customs debt, the following are personally and jointly and severally responsible for the payment of the customs debt: the presidents of the Board of Directors, the managing directors or authorized or advisors acting jointly, the administrators, the general managers or directors, and in general, any person authorized, either directly by the law, either by private will or by court order in their administration or management. If all the above persons are missing, the members of the boards of directors of these companies are considered to be perpetrators, if they actually temporarily or permanently exercise one of the aforementioned duties, as well as the SA liquidators, at the time of their dissolution or merger, regardless of the time of attestation of the debt (articles 29 and 153 of paragraph a of Law 2960/2001).

    The same, aforementioned, persons are considered perpetrators or, as the case may be, accomplices of the offenses of smuggling and, as a result, are exposed to the relevant (not insignificant) criminal sanctions (: in its basic form, imprisonment of at least 6 months – art. 157).

     

    Liability Under Criminal Provisions of the Bankruptcy Code

    The Bankruptcy Code (law 4738/2020) includes a series of provisions (arts. 197-203 of the Bankruptcy Code) that provide for the criminal liability of managers, members of the administration and directors of legal entities to which any bankruptcy is referred, as long as these persons have fulfilled the prescribed in the said provisions unfair acts (art. 202 § 1 Bankruptcy Code). In particular, the persons in question may be held liable for the offences of: (a) bankruptcy (art. 197 Civil Code) and (b) favorable creditor treatment (art. 198 Civil Code).

    Furthermore, as expressly defined, administrators, members of management and directors of legal entities are punished with the penalties of §1 of the article on bankruptcy (: prison sentence of at least 2 years and a monetary penalty – no. 197 of the Civil Code), and in the case of receive of advance payments, higher than those provided for in the decision of the competent corporate body or in the statute of the legal entity (art. 202 § 2 Bankruptcy Code).

     

    Liability Under Criminal Code Provisions: The Crime of Infidelity

    The management of an SA and its members may be liable (also) under the provisions of the Criminal Code for the crime of infidelity (art. 390 law 4619/2019) when they knowingly cause certain damage to the property of another, who have, by law or legal action, the custody or management.

    Regarding administrative offenses against the property of a legal entity, this crime is committed by those who violate the rules of diligent management – of course also the members of the board of directors of the SA.

    The persons in question are punished with imprisonment and if the damage caused is particularly great, with imprisonment of at least three months and a monetary penalty. In the distinguished form of the crime, if the damage caused exceeds a total of one hundred and twenty thousand euros, imprisonment for up to ten years and a fine are imposed.

     

    Laundering of Proceeds of Criminal Activities

    It is pointed out, finally, that the above crimes of smuggling and non-payment of debts to the State are included in the “basic crimes” for establishing responsibility in terms of money laundering (law 4816/2021). In other words: the crime of legalization of illegal proceeds is concurrent, cumulatively (also) with the aforementioned crimes. The threatened penalties for the crime of money laundering are not at all negligible (: in its basic form, the wrongful act is punishable by imprisonment for up to 8 years and a fine from 300 to one thousand 1,000 daily units – no. 6).

     

    We have already established that the responsibilities of the members of the Board of Directors are extremely extensive. They derive from the provisions of the law on SAs and extend beyond it. The latter, in fact, seem more important. For obvious reasons, it seems that the provisions concerning the liability of the members of the Board of Directors and administrators of the SA for the non-payment of the latter’s insurance obligations seem to attract greater interest. The liability of the liable legal entity and its co-obligatory natural persons/managers is joint and several. Corresponding are the responsibilities of the administrators of the SA from violations of the Customs and Bankruptcy Code. But more important, for many reasons, are the relative criminal responsibilities of the managers-individuals involved. Of course, the responsibilities and penalties of the crime of infidelity. If we consider, in fact, that those responsible will be prosecuted, potentially (and cumulatively) for money laundering, we realize – in this case as well- that the relevant responsibilities are not at all simple. Neither negligible.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (September 17th, 2023).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Liability of Board Members: Tax Offenses

    Liability of Board Members: Tax Offenses

    In a series of our previous articles, we looked into the responsibility of the members of the Board of Directors of an SA. Specifically, we examined the internal (intra-company) liability of the members of the Board of Directors for their actions or omissions, which endanger the company’s property (art. 102-108, law 4548/2018). Also, with the “external” responsibility of the directors of the SA for the direct damage to shareholders or third parties due to their (illegal and culpable) action. In addition, the liability of the aforementioned persons towards corporate creditors due to causing or delaying the bankruptcy. In the present article we will look into the other responsibilities that may fall on the administrators of the SA from tax violations of the latter.

     

    Liability for Fiscal Violations

    Joint Liability of Managers of the SA

    The administrators of the SA are, subject to conditions, personally and jointly liable for the tax debts and obligations of the SA.

    Specifically, as expressly provided in article 50 Code of Fiscal Procedure (law 4987/2022), “Persons who are executive presidents, directors, general managers, administrators, managing directors, appointed to the administration and liquidators of legal persons and legal entities, as well as and the persons who in fact exercise the management or administration of a legal person or legal entity, are personally and jointly liable for the payment of income tax, withholding tax, any imputed tax, VAT. and ENFIA, owed by these legal persons and legal entities, regardless of the time of their certification, as well as for interest, fines, surcharges and any administrative monetary sanctions imposed on them… “.

    In order, however, to establish the said responsibility of the specific persons, the following conditions must be met cumulatively:

    (a) The aforementioned persons must have had the above qualities during the time of operation of the legal entity or at the time of its dissolution or merger or during its liquidation.

    (b) The debts became overdue during the term of office of the above persons (subject to the law regarding the time of reduction of the debts when any tax is imposed following an audit by a tax authority and the cases subject to regulation). If, therefore, a debt becomes overdue in the following year from the one to which it relates, then the person who exercises the administration of the SA when the debt became overdue is responsible. In other words, the person who was in charge of the SA at the time the disputed debt was incurred is not liable.

    (c) The debts were not paid or attributed to the State due to the fault of the above persons-administrators (with the explicit clarification, however, that the burden of proof for the eventual non-existence of culpability is borne by the specific persons).

    This is, therefore, non-genuine or illegitimate objective liability. This means that in the event that the above persons are held responsible (as discussed above), their culpability is also presumed. Unless these show a lack of culpability.

    Law 4987/2022, in continuation of Law 4646/2019, aims to correct the incorrect wording of the existing CFP regime. Based on the latter, it was usual for natural persons to be liable (also), who, although they participated in the management of the SA, did not, however, exercise management in reality.

    In this specific context, the Explanatory Report n. 4646/2019 states that under the previous regime, the additional joint and several liability of those exercising administration to legal persons or entities for the tax debts of the latter was structured in such a way that it could be imposed on persons who they had no participation in the administration. In other words, obligations were born to the above persons, simply because they happened to be in charge at the time of dissolution or merger of the company.

    Given the above, the reform of the institutional framework is aimed at the assumption of responsibilities by persons who actually exercised management during the critical time of generation of the tax debt. That is, by persons who had the ability to act in the name and on behalf of the legal entity and fulfill its obligations.

    Criminal Liability of Directors of the SA

    In order to prevent violations of the tax legislation by the liable legal entities, criminal sanctions are threatened against the managers (and) of the SA. The specific sanctions concern the offences: (a) tax evasion and (b) non-payment of confirmed debts to the State and the wider public sector.

    (a) With respect to the crimes of tax evasion:

    The crimes of tax evasion are standardized in article 66 KFD.

    Specifically, the crime of tax evasion is committed by anyone who intentionally conceals taxable income in order to avoid paying income tax, ENFIA or special real estate tax. Also, anyone who does not pay VAT, PKE, insurance premium tax and withheld and imputed taxes, fees and contributions (having completed the above actions as, specifically, described in the law).

    Based on the value of the violation, the crime takes either a misdemeanor or a felony form, leading to a different penalty (from at least two years in prison to imprisonment).

    The crime of tax evasion is also committed by anyone who issues false or fictitious tax information, as well as anyone who accepts fictitious tax information or falsifies such information, regardless of whether or not they are evading tax payment.

    Especially with regard to legal entities – and, in this case, SAs – the legislator determines the perpetrators (and accomplices) of the (above) crimes of tax evasion.

    Specifically, it is provided that as perpetrators in the AU countries, if by any act or omission they contributed to the commission of the above offences, the following are considered:, as well as in general any person mandated either directly by law or by private will or by court decision in the administration or management or representation thereof. If all the above persons are missing, the members of the boards of directors of these companies are considered as perpetrators, as long as they actually temporarily or permanently exercise one of the duties mentioned above. » (see art. 67 §1 CFP).

    Furthermore, it is provided that “the person who knowingly signs an inaccurate tax return as a proxy, as well as anyone who in any other way knowingly cooperates or offers direct assistance in the commission of these crimes, is punished as a direct accomplice ” (see art. 67 §3 CFP).

    While, finally, as perpetrators or participants of the above crimes, it is expressly provided that they are also considered “…those who actually exercise the powers and responsibilities that correspond to the roles and positions named in the KDF.” (see art. 67 §4 KFD).

    (b) Regarding the offense of non-payment of confirmed debts to the State and the wider public sector:

    The offense of non-payment of debts is committed by anyone who does not pay the debts certified to the Tax Administration to the State, legal entities under public law, businesses and organizations of the wider public sector for a period of time longer than four months (art. 25 § 1 Law 1882/1990).

    The commission of this offense is punishable by imprisonment. Its amount depends, also in this case, on the value of the debt.

    And with regard to the specific offence, the legislator expressly determines the persons against whom the relevant penalties are imposed in the cases of the nationals of the Republic. Specifically, as provided for “…the prescribed penalties…are imposed, in order: for domestic limited liability companies, to the presidents of the Board of Directors, to the managing directors or authorized or co-acting advisors or managers or general managers or directors thereof or to any person authorized or directly by the law either by private will or by judicial decision in the administration or management thereof, cumulatively or not.”.

    It is further provided that in the event that all the above persons are absent, the penalties are imposed against the members of the Board of Directors of these companies, as long as they actually exercise, temporarily or permanently, one of the above duties (art. 25 § 2 par. a) Law 1882/1990).

    For the above persons, the criminal prosecution is carried out for the debts to the State and third parties – except private individuals. The debts were confirmed at the time of acquisition of any of the above properties or were confirmed while they had the specific property (and this, regardless of whether they later rejected this property in any way or for any reason). Also, for the debts that were confirmed regardless of the dissolution or not of the SA, but were born or go back to the time they had this relevant status (art. 25 §3 law 1882/1990).

    It was clarified, in fact, by an explicit legislative regulation (:469PC) that “…in the application and in the table of debts, the debts arising from the non-execution of fines imposed by a criminal court are not included and are not calculated for the determination of the person’s responsibility the related surcharges, interest and other charges as well as the debts from the offenses standardized in article 66 of the Tax Procedure Code together with the related surcharges, interest and other charges”. The legislator, in other words, authentically removed the charge of violation of the principle of the prohibition of double jeopardy (ne bis in dem).

     

    Laundering of Proceeds of Criminal Activities

    It should be pointed out, however, that the above crime of tax evasion is included in some of the “basic crimes” for establishing liability in terms of money laundering (Law 4816/2021). In other words: the crime of legalization coincides, cumulatively, with the crime of tax evasion. The threatened penalties for the above offense of money laundering are not at all negligible (: the offense in its basic form is punishable by a prison sentence of up to 8 years and a cumulative fine of 300 to 1,000 daily units).

     

    The responsibilities of the board members are extremely extensive. They (also) derive from the provisions of the law on SAs. However, the other relevant regulations are probably the most important. Among them, the provisions concerning the liability of the members of the Board of Directors and administrators of the SA for the non-payment of the latter’s tax obligations are of great importance. The liability of the liable legal entity and the co-obligatory natural persons is joint and several. But more important, for many reasons, are the relative criminal responsibilities of the latter. If we consider, in fact, that those responsible will potentially be prosecuted for money laundering, we understand that the relevant responsibilities are not at all simple. Neither are they negligible.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (September 10th, 2023).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Responsibility of Board Members: Approval of Overall Management

    Responsibility of Board Members: Approval of Overall Management

    In our previous article, we were concerned with the intra-company (internal) responsibility of the managers of the SA. Is it possible to remove such responsibility with the approval by the General Assembly of the overall management of the administrators of the SA (art. 108 of law 4548/2018)? And, further, what is the possible or appropriate content of such an approval?

     

    The regulation

    According to the law (article 108 §1 paragraph a): “By decision of the general assembly, taken by open vote after the approval of the annual financial statements, the overall management that took place during the corresponding corporate year can be approved”.

    This arrangement deviates significantly from the previous legislative regime. The General Assembly does not “absolve”, as in the past, the Board of Directors “from all responsibility” (a provision that had created intractable legal problems, especially regarding the position of this “exemption” in the system of responsibility of the Board). The GA approves, on the contrary, the “overall management”, the governance, that is, of the company in general. It does not approve individual acts or omissions that have, possibly, damaged the company. The responsibility of the Board of Directors remains intact, and is judged based on the relevant provisions (especially articles 102 et seq. – see also Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on article 108).

    With such a decision, the General Assembly evaluates and (as a rule/custom), approves the way the company is managed by the Board during the monitored corporate year. It demonstrates, that is, with its approval, the satisfaction (or not) of the General Assembly with the way the SA was managed. It is, for this reason, also characterized as a “political decision” or a decision with “moral significance/value”).

    As in all its decisions, the General Assembly is not obliged to make a reasoned decision on the approval (or not) of the overall management. And, as such a (positive) decision is not binding for the General Assembly, it is possible to freely recall, after the fact, the members of the Board of Directors (art. 77 §2 section b’).

     

    Decision on Overall Management

    Objective

    The above decision of the General Assembly has as content the approval or not of the management of those who managed the SA during the past fiscal year. This evaluation can take the form of confirmation or, alternatively, of criticism of the business strategy and action of the Board. The negative decision of the General Assembly, in the last case, will demonstrate the unsuccessful, from a business perspective, management on the part of the administrators.

    Time of the Decision

    The GA decides on the issue of approval (or not) of the overall management after the approval of the annual financial statements. In this way, the shareholders have at their disposal a valid basis and sufficient, presumptively at least, information to make their decision in question.

    The shareholders’ meeting can take the relevant decision either at the regular General Assembly regarding the approval of the financial statements or at a later point in time (: extraordinary General Assembly). In the first case (necessarily) the issue of financial statements precedes the agenda.

    It is recalled that the latest point in time for the approval of the financial statements is, most commonly, September 10 of the year following the end of the corporate year – when the corporate year ends on December 31. Accordingly, March 10 when the corporate year ends on June 30 (art. 119 §1). However, there is no limitation in the law regarding the time of making the decision for the approval of the overall management.

    Persons Affected by the Decision

    The Board of Directors is responsible for the management of the company and, by extension, the management of the company’s assets. It is reasonable, therefore, for the decision of the General Assembly to concern the members of the Board. This does not mean that the decision names specific advisors but, on the contrary, it concerns the entire Board as a whole. It is not excluded, however, that the management of some members will be approved while the management of some others will not. The decision to approve the overall management also covers (art. 102 §5) any substitute bodies (art. 87).

    The relevant decision, however, does not concern the auditors of the company for whom an independent decision is made.

     

    Voting

    Procedure

    As the law expressly states, voting is public. This is justified by the nature of the relevant decision and the need for transparency.

    Under the previous legislative regime, the corresponding provision (art. 35 n. 2190/1920) provided for voting by roll call. This did not necessarily mean, however, that the relevant vote was overt. It was argued, then, that after the roll call, the respective shareholder voted by ballot. However, the new provision dispelled earlier doubts in favor of open voting.

    Finally, voting is special. The relevant provision already existed from the previous legislative regime and is still valid (although it is not explicitly provided for). This means that the management approval decision is discrete. It is, i.e., a separate agenda item from the approval of the financial statements, for which an independent decision is taken.

    Participation right

    The shareholders of the company participate, of course, in the voting of the General Assembly on the approval (or not) of the overall management. The participation of advisors as shareholders or shareholder representatives in said voting is not prohibited. They can, in principle, directly exercise their (potential) right to vote.

    However, according to a special regulation (art. 108 §2) the members of the Board of Directors are entitled to participate in this vote: (a) only with shares of which they are owners or (b) as representatives of shareholders, provided that they have received the relevant authorization with express and specific voting instructions.

    Therefore, advisors can be authorized to vote on behalf of (other) shareholders. The relevant authorization requires explicit and specific instructions. The purpose is to avoid serving the same interests of the members of the Board of Directors and securing a vote in favor of the overall management. Therefore, it is necessary not to leave room for the authorized-consultant to decide on the approval of the management.

    The same applies to the authorization (and participation in the relevant vote of the General Assembly) of the company’s employees. And this is because the latter could be influenced by the management due to the dependent nature of their work and their eventual participation in the management under evaluation. These persons can be either ordinary employees of the company or substitute bodies (therefore what was pointed out above applies to the members of the Board of Directors), who are called upon to exercise the right to vote of third-party shareholders.

    Legal Consequences

    The law distinguishes the decision to approve the overall management from the company’s waiver of its claims due to the responsibility of a member of the Board of Directors or its compromise . These actions of the company can take place “…only under the conditions of paragraph 7 of article 102”. As already, above, we established, regardless of the content of the decision of the General Assembly, the responsibility of the Board remains intact. It is judged according to the provisions on the responsibility of the members of the Board of Directors .

    In the above context, the only legal (but also practical) consequence of the approval of the overall management is its consideration in any lawsuit aimed at the restoration of the company’s damage caused by acts or omissions of members of the Board of Directors. The eventual approval of the overall management will be taken into account – if it was provided – when the issue of liability will be decided in court (see Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on article 108). In essence, the defendant member of the Board of Directors can invoke, in the relevant trial, prior approval of the overall management by the General Assembly. Although, of course, this is not, by itself, a reason for exonerating them from any responsibility. Similarly, any non-approval is not proof of any liability, nor is it a prerequisite for a relevant decision on the matter.

    In any case, it is possible that the General Assembly, despite the approval of the overall management, may later initiate claims against members of the Board. Although such an attitude may seem (and under certain conditions may be) abusive, the raising of claims by the company after a positive decision to approve the overall management may be justified. For the following, in particular, reasons: On the one hand, the shareholders may have become aware, at a time subsequent to the approval of the management, of the real facts that establish the responsibility of members of the Board of Directors. On the other hand, it is not excluded that the minority, representing 1/20 of the paid-up capital, seeks, as it has the right to, to establish liability against the members of the Board of Directors (art. 104 §1). A minority that, even if it had been formed at the time of approval of the management, could not have influenced the relevant voting and decision.

    Therefore, in order to take into account the approval of the overall management (and to consider the raising of claims against the members of the Board of Directors abusive), the General Assembly should receive sufficient, relevant, information and decide based on them.

    Finally, it should be pointed out that there is an open debate as to the time when the approval of the overall management can be taken into account. Part of the legal theory holds that consideration is possible only at the stage of the main trial for the compensation of the company by members of its Board of Directors – as, after all, the law provides. However, it seems more correct that such an approval can also be taken into account during the stages of investigating the feasibility of filing a corporate lawsuit (art. 105 §2 section c and 105 §6).

     

    Based on the previous law, the General Assemblies of the SA took decisions “on the exemption of the Board of Directors from all responsibility”. Such decisions and formalities no longer have any legal basis or legal value. The possibility provided by the law to approve the management of the members of the Board of Directors can, apart from its moral value, acquire particular importance in a trial for the restoration of the damage of the SA at the expense of a member/members of the Board. We should, therefore, be absolutely careful either as the providers of approval and/or as the applicants for its receipt.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (July 16th, 2023).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Ευθύνη Μελών ΔΣ: Λόγοι Απαλλαγής

    Ευθύνη Μελών ΔΣ: Λόγοι Απαλλαγής

    Σε προηγούμενή αρθρογραφία μας εξετάσαμε τους λόγους θεμελίωσης της ευθύνης των μελών του ΔΣ έναντι της ΑΕ, εξαιτίας πράξεων ή παραλείψεών τους, που συνιστούν παράβαση των καθηκόντων τους (102 §1 ν. 4548/2018). Διαπιστώσαμε εκεί πως ευθύνη δεν υφίσταται, εφόσον το μέλος ΔΣ «…αποδείξει ότι κατέβαλε κατά την άσκηση των καθηκόντων του την επιμέλεια του συνετού επιχειρηματία που δραστηριοποιείται σε παρόμοιες συνθήκες» (άρ. 102 §2). Θα μας απασχολήσουν, εδώ, οι συγκεκριμένοι λόγοι απαλλαγής των μελών του ΔΣ από την ευθύνη αυτή (άρ. 102 §4). Θα μας απασχολήσουν, επίσης, η δυνατότητα και προϋποθέσεις της ΑΕ να παραιτηθεί ή συμβιβαστεί, εφόσον θεμελιώνεται σχετική ευθύνη μέλους και γεννάται σχετική αξίωση της ΑΕ. Θα μας απασχολήσει, τέλος, η παραγραφή των συγκεκριμένων αξιώσεων.

     

    Απαλλαγή Μελών ΔΣ

    Ευθύνη μελών του ΔΣ δεν στοιχειοθετείται για πράξεις ή παραλείψεις που (α) στηρίζονται σε σύννομη απόφαση της ΓΣ ή (β) αφορούν εύλογη επιχειρηματική απόφαση (5626/2020 ΕφΑθ, ΤΝΠ ΝΟΜΟΣ). Εκτός από τους συγκεκριμένους λόγους, το δικαστήριο μπορεί να θεωρήσει ότι δεν υφίσταται ευθύνη στις περιπτώσεις πράξεων που έχει προηγηθεί σχετική εισήγηση ανεξάρτητου οργάνου ή επιτροπής που λειτουργεί στην εταιρεία σύμφωνα με το νόμο.

    Οι Κατ’ Ιδίαν Λόγοι Απαλλαγής

    Σύννομη Απόφαση Της ΓΣ

    Απαλλαγή από την ευθύνη των μελών του ΔΣ παρέχεται, από το νόμο, όταν η επίμαχη πράξη ή παράλειψη του μέλους στηρίζεται σε απόφαση της ΓΣ. Η γενική πρόβλεψη του νόμου (κατ΄ αντιστοιχία του προϊσχύσαντος καθεστώτος–άρ. 22α α.ν. 2190/1920) οδηγεί σε δυνητική διεύρυνση των αρμοδιοτήτων της ΓΣ. Το ΔΣ, δεδομένης της σχετικής πρόβλεψης, ενδέχεται (και μάλλον μοιάζει αναγκαίο) να οδηγήσει σωρεία αποφάσεων ενώπιον της ΓΣ, προκειμένου να μην υπέχει την ευθύνη που, ενδεχομένως, του αναλογεί.

    Σε κάθε περίπτωση, όμως, μια τέτοια απόφαση της ΓΣ πρέπει να είναι «σύννομη» (:νόμιμη). Ελαττωματική απόφαση της ΓΣ [άκυρη (εφόσον δεν έχει παρέλθει ο χρόνος προβολής της ακυρότητας), ακυρώσιμη (εφόσον έχει ακυρωθεί) ή ανυπόστατη] δε μπορεί να οδηγήσει σε απαλλαγή από την ευθύνη.

    Περαιτέρω, η απόφαση θα πρέπει να έχει τα σχετικά, αναγκαία, τυπικά χαρακτηριστικά. Δεν αρκούν απλή οδηγία ή κατευθύνσεις της ΓΣ ή της πλειοψηφίας των μετόχων ή ακόμα και του μοναδικού μετόχου.

    Μια τέτοια απόφαση της ΓΣ πρέπει να προηγείται, χρονικά, της επίμαχης πράξης ή παράλειψης του μέλους του ΔΣ, που διαφορετικά θα οδηγούσε σε ευθύνη του. Το αντικείμενο της απόφασης και η έκταση της δοθείσας έγκρισης θα πρέπει να προκύπτουν από την απόφαση της ΓΣ.

    Μια σύννομη, πάντως, απόφαση της ΓΣ, οδηγεί σε απαλλαγή μόνο εφόσον δεν προβάλλεται κακόπιστα. Δεν μπορεί, λ.χ., το μέλος του ΔΣ να επικαλεστεί την απόφαση της ΓΣ εφόσον έχουν αλλάξει ουσιωδώς οι συνθήκες από τη λήψη της.

    Εύλογη Επιχειρηματική Απόφαση (Business Judgement Rule)

    Ο συγκεκριμένος λόγος απαλλαγής αποσκοπεί στην αποτροπή τυχόν αδρανούς στάσης από τα μέλη του ΔΣ και της μη λήψης εκ μέρους τους επιχειρηματικών πρωτοβουλιών, υπό τον φόβο της προσωπικής τους ευθύνης.

    Τούτο το ενδεχόμενο είχε εντοπιστεί, ήδη, υπό το προϊσχύσαν καθεστώς, οπότε και  αναγνωριζόταν ένα περιθώριο διακριτικής ευχέρειας στα μέλη του ΔΣ. Μάλιστα, ζημία προκληθείσα από λήψη επιχειρηματικής απόφασης εντασσόταν, νομολογιακά, στους επιχειρηματικούς κινδύνους που δέχεται και αναλαμβάνει η διοίκηση μίας εταιρείας (419/2005 ΠρωτΠρωτΑθ, 1698/2013 ΑΠ, αμφότερες σε ΤΝΠ ΝΟΜΟΣ).

    Υπό το ισχύον καθεστώς, προβλέπεται, ρητά, ότι η εν λόγω ευθύνη των μελών ΔΣ δεν υφίσταται, εφόσον οι πράξεις ή παραλείψεις τους αφορούν εύλογη επιχειρηματική απόφαση, η οποία ελήφθη: (α) με καλή πίστη, (β) με βάση επαρκή, για τις συγκεκριμένες συνθήκες, πληροφόρηση και (γ) με αποκλειστικό κριτήριο την εξυπηρέτηση του εταιρικού συμφέροντος.

    Προκειμένου, επομένως, να γίνει αποδεκτό το εύλογο της επιχειρηματικής απόφασης, θα πρέπει να συντρέχουν (σωρευτικά) συγκεκριμένες προϋποθέσεις:

    (α) Εύλογη Επιχειρηματική Απόφαση

    Προϋποτίθεται η ύπαρξη επιχειρηματικής απόφασης του ΔΣ (λ.χ. επί ζητημάτων χρηματοδότησης ή επενδύσεων). Συμπεριλαμβάνονται τόσο οι πράξεις όσο και οι (τυχόν) παραλείψεις του ΔΣ. Την εν λόγω προϋπόθεση (:της επιχειρηματικής απόφασης) δεν πληρούν αποφάσεις του ΔΣ που ελήφθησαν στο πλαίσιο καταστατικών ή νομικών τους υποχρεώσεων-χωρίς οποιοδήποτε περιθώριο απόκλισης.

    Επιπρόσθετα: η επιχειρηματική απόφαση απαιτείται να είναι εύλογη. Θα πρέπει, δηλ., να  μπορεί να δικαιολογηθεί με βάση αντικειμενικά κριτήρια. Θα πρέπει, επιπρόσθετα, να μη θέτει σε αδικαιολόγητα υψηλό κίνδυνο την ΑΕ.

    (β) Καλή Πίστη

    Προϋποτίθεται, επίσης, η λήψη της εύλογης επιχειρηματικής απόφασης με καλή πίστη. Έννοια που διατρέχει το σύνολο του εθνικού μας δικαίου. Το μέλος του ΔΣ οφείλει να δρα (αντικειμενικά και υποκειμενικά) καλόπιστα. Κατά τη λήψη της απόφασης δεν θα πρέπει να συντρέχει περίπτωση σύγκρουσης συμφερόντων (:αντικειμενικό κριτήριο). Ταυτόχρονα, όμως, το εκάστοτε μέλος του ΔΣ οφείλει να μην δρα δόλια ή χωρίς να πιστεύει στην ορθότητα της εκάστοτε επιχειρηματικής απόφασης (:υποκειμενικό κριτήριο).

    (γ) Επαρκής Πληροφόρηση

    Τα μέλη του ΔΣ είναι αναγκαίο να ενημερώνονται «επαρκώς» πριν τη λήψη της εκάστοτε επιχειρηματικής απόφασης. Τούτο δεν σημαίνει ότι είναι αναγκαίο να εξαντληθεί κάθε πηγή πληροφόρησης (και πώς θα ήταν, άλλωστε, δυνατό;). Αντίθετα, η ίδια η διοίκηση της εταιρείας θα κρίνει πότε και υπό ποιες συνθήκες έχει ενημερωθεί αρκετά, ώστε να προβεί στη λήψη απόφασης.

    Η επαρκής πληροφόρηση του ΔΣ κρίνεται ad hoc. Λαμβάνονται υπόψη κριτήρια όπως: η σημασία της συγκεκριμένης απόφασης για την εταιρεία, το μέγεθος της επιχείρησης, η δραστηριότητά της, ο  διαθέσιμος χρόνος για τη συλλογή πληροφοριών κ.ο.κ.

    (δ) Εξυπηρέτηση Αποκλειστικά Εταιρικού Συμφέροντος

    Η απόφαση θα πρέπει, ακόμη, να αποσκοπεί, αποκλειστικά, στην εξυπηρέτηση του εταιρικού συμφέροντος. Τούτο σημαίνει ότι το μέλος του ΔΣ που λαμβάνει την επιχειρηματική απόφαση δεν πρέπει να τελεί σε κατάσταση σύγκρουσης συμφερόντων. Η εξυπηρέτηση του εταιρικού συμφέροντος (γίνεται δεκτό ότι) επιτυγχάνεται με την επαύξηση της μακροχρόνιας αξίας της εταιρείας και τη μεγιστοποίηση του κέρδους των μετόχων (όπως έχει κατοχυρωθεί και για τις εισηγμένες ΑΕ, άρ. 2 §1 ν. 3016/2002).

    Εισήγηση/Γνώμη Ανεξάρτητου Οργάνου Ή Επιτροπής

    Όπως, ήδη, επισημάνθηκε, ο ν. 4548/2018 αναγνωρίζει διακριτική ευχέρεια στον δικαστή να αποφασίσει πως δεν συντρέχει ευθύνη μελών ΔΣ, προκειμένου για πράξεις ή παραλείψεις που στηρίζονται σε εισήγηση ή γνώμη ανεξάρτητου οργάνου ή επιτροπής, που λειτουργεί στην εταιρεία, σύμφωνα με το νόμο (102 §4 in fine). Πρόκειται για πρόβλεψη που συναντάται, για πρώτη φορά, το πρώτον στον ν. 4548/2018.

    Η πρόβλεψη αυτή δεν εισάγει νέο λόγο απαλλαγής από την ευθύνη του άρθρου 102. Αντίθετα, κατά το γράμμα του νόμου, πρόκειται για δυνατότητα του δικαστηρίου να αποφασίσει ότι δεν συντρέχει ευθύνη των μελών.

    Για την εφαρμογή της συγκεκριμένης ρύθμισης, εύλογα αναρωτιέται κανείς ποιος εμπίπτει στην έννοια του οργάνου ή της επιτροπής. Η εφαρμογή της φαίνεται να έχει περιορισμένο πεδίο εφαρμογής. Τέτοιου είδους όργανο λ.χ. συνιστά το Συμβούλιο Εμπειρογνωμόνων που προβλέπει ο ν. 3986/2011 για το ΤΑΙΠΕΔ Α.Ε (άρ. 4). Σε κάθε περίπτωση, η εφαρμογή της πρέπει να αναζητηθεί ακόμη και σε υποκατάστατα, όπως γίνεται δεκτό, όργανα ή σε επιτροπές που προβλέπονται στο νόμο περί ΑΕ ή σε ειδικό νόμο ή δημιουργούνται δυνάμει καταστατικής διάταξης.

    Βάρος Απόδειξης – Κρίσιμος Χρόνος

    Το βάρος απόδειξης της συνδρομής των προϋποθέσεων της απαλλαγής (:άρ. 102 §4) φέρουν τα μέλη του ΔΣ. Κρίσιμος χρόνος για την εκτίμηση της συνδρομής τους είναι αυτός της λήψης της συγκεκριμένης απόφασης-υπό το πρίσμα των συνθηκών που τότε συνέτρεχαν (βλ. Αιτιολογική Έκθεση ν. 4548/2018 επί του άρ. 102). Πρόκειται, συγκεκριμένα, για ένσταση, την οποία υποχρεούνται να προβάλλουν και αποδείξουν τα μέλη ΔΣ.

     

    Παραίτηση Της Εταιρείας Από Αξιώσεις – Συμβιβασμός

    Δεν είναι δυνατή, χωρίς τήρηση συγκεκριμένης διαδικασίας και πλήρωση συγκεκριμένων προϋποθέσεων, παραίτηση ή συμβιβασμός της ΑΕ με υπεύθυνο μέλος ΔΣ (άρ. 102 §7). Τούτο μοιάζει απολύτως εύλογο καθώς είναι αναγκαίο να αποτραπούν δόλιοι συμβιβασμοί/παραιτήσεις σε βάρος της εταιρείας (και μειοψηφούντων μετόχων). Απαιτείται, ως εκ τούτου, συγκατάθεση της ΓΣ στην οποία, όμως, μπορεί να προβληθεί veto της μειοψηφίας. Συγκεκριμένα θα πρέπει:

    (α) Η παραίτηση ή ο συμβιβασμός να έχουν συγκεκριμένες μορφές (πλήρης ή μερική άφεση χρέους, αρνητική αναγνωριστική σύμβαση, σύμβαση συμβιβασμού).

    (β) Να έχει παρέλθει διετία από την γέννηση της αξίωσης, προκειμένου η ΑΕ να αποφασίσει (:όχι βεβιασμένα) την όποια παραίτηση από τυχόν δικαστική επιδίωξη των αξιώσεών της. Πριν τη συμπλήρωση της διετίας, σχετικές ενέργειες είναι άκυρες. Στην περίπτωση, όμως, που ασκηθεί εταιρική αγωγή, η ΑΕ έχει τη δυνατότητα να παραιτηθεί από τυχόν αξιώσεις της ή να συμβιβαστεί οποτεδήποτε.

    (γ) Να ληφθεί σχετική απόφαση (συγκατάθεση) της ΓΣ. Στη σχετική συνεδρίαση, μετά την άσκηση εταιρικής αγωγής, καλείται να παραστεί και ο ειδικός εκπρόσωπος που τυχόν έχει ορισθεί. Τέλος,

    (δ) Να μην έχει αντιταχθεί κατά της ανωτέρω απόφασης το 1/10 του εκπροσωπούμενου εταιρικού κεφαλαίου (αν δεν έχει προηγηθεί εταιρική αγωγή) και το 1/20 (στην περίπτωση που έχει ήδη ασκηθεί αγωγή).

     

    Παραγραφή

    Οι αξιώσεις της εταιρείας για αποζημίωση, κατ’ άρθρο 102, παραγράφονται με την πάροδο τριετίας. Η προθεσμία παραγραφής αρχίζει με την τέλεση της πράξης ή της παράλειψης που οδήγησε στη ζημία της εταιρείας. Δεν συνιστά, αντίθετα, έναρξη της παραγραφής η γνώση του ζημιογόνου γεγονότος από την εταιρεία ούτε και η εμφάνιση των αποτελεσμάτων του (1483/2010 ΑΠ, 131/2022 ΑΠ, ΤΝΠ ΝΟΜΟΣ).

    Η παραγραφή αναστέλλεται για το διάστημα που ο υπεύθυνος παραμένει μέλος του ΔΣ (είναι υποκατάστατο όργανο, εκκαθαριστής κλπ.) Ομοίως, αναστολή χωρεί και στην περίπτωση υποβολής της αίτησης της μειοψηφίας προς το ΔΣ για την έγερση των αξιώσεων της ΑΕ (κατ΄ άρ. 104 §1, η οποία σε επόμενη αρθρογραφία θα μας απασχολήσει). Σε κάθε περίπτωση, οι αξιώσεις παραγράφονται μετά από δέκα έτη από την τέλεση της πράξης ή την τυχόν παράλειψη.

    Αν η ζημία της εταιρείας προκλήθηκε από παράβαση της απαγόρευσης ανταγωνισμού, προβλέπεται συντομότερη παραγραφή (άρ. 98 §3). Συγκεκριμένα, οι σχετικές αξιώσεις παραγράφονται μετά από ένα έτος και σε κάθε περίπτωση, μετά από πέντε.

     

    Όπως επανειλημμένα έχουμε διατυπώσει, η συμμετοχή σε ΔΣ Ανώνυμης Εταιρείας δεν είναι χωρίς ευθύνες. Τυχόν ζημιογόνες αποφάσεις, πράξεις ή παραλείψεις μελών του ΔΣ είναι δυνατό να τεκμηριώσουν, υπό προϋποθέσεις, προσωπική τους ευθύνη. Για την τυχόν απαλλαγή τους από την ΑΕ, παραίτηση από αξιώσεις ή συμβιβασμό της ΑΕ θα πρέπει να συντρέχουν συγκεκριμένες προϋποθέσεις. Σημαντικό ζητούμενο: η διασφάλιση των συμφερόντων της ΑΕ και των μετόχων μειοψηφίας. Το ΔΣ, εξάλλου, υποχρεούται σε έγκαιρη, πλήρη και επιμελή άσκηση των σχετικών αξιώσεων. Περί αυτών, όμως, σε επόμενη αρθρογραφία μας.-

    Σταύρος Κουμεντάκης
    Managing Partner

     

    Υ.Γ. Συνοπτική έκδοση του άρθρου δημοσιεύτηκε στην Εφημερίδα ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑ, στις 21 Απριλίου 2023.

     

    Η πληροφόρηση που εμπεριέχεται στο παρόν άρθρο δεν συνιστά (ούτε και έχει σκοπό να αποτελέσει) νομική συμβουλή. Μια τέτοια νομική συμβουλή είναι δυνατό να παρασχεθεί μόνον από αρμόδιο δικηγόρο ο οποίος θα λάβει υπόψη του το σύνολο των δεδομένων που θα του εκθέσετε για την υπόθεσή σας. Αναλυτικά.

  • Obligation to Legality of the Board Members

    Obligation to Legality of the Board Members

    In our previous article, we dealt with the powers of the Board of Directors. However, its members as well as the substitute bodies (art. 87-collectively: “the members of the Board of Directors”) cannot exercise them outside of specific limits. The relevant discussion seems completely technocratic, theoretical and, ultimately, boring; however, it has an absolutely tangible, as well as important result: potential liability of the members of the Board of Directors for exceeding the limits in question, will activate the relevant provisions and the possibility of attribution to the offenders. The present article regards the obligation on their part to observe legality.

     

    Obligations of Board Members

    The main obligations of the members of the Board of Directors are: (a) the duty of care (art. 96) and (b) the fiduciary duty (art. 97).

    Under the previous regime, there was only one legislative basis for the first of them (duty of care). On the contrary, the fiduciary duty was recognized in theory and jurisprudence. The law on SAs provides a more complete regulation of the two, specific, pillars of responsibility.

     

    Duty of Care

    Content

    The members of the Board of Directors must, while performing their duties, comply with the law, the statutes and the legal decisions of the Board of Directors (art. 96§1). They must also manage corporate affairs in order to promote the corporate interests, supervise the execution of the decisions of the Board of Directors and the General Assembly and inform the other members of the Board of Directors about corporate affairs.

    Such are reflected in the law as “the generally applicable provisions regarding the obligation to diligently perform the duties of the members of the Board of Directors” (see in this regard, Memorandum to the law 4548/2018 on art. 96). The members of the Board of Directors must, among other things, pay, during the exercise of their duties, the diligence of a prudent entrepreneur, who operates in similar circumstances (art. 102 §2). Otherwise, they are liable against the company (despite any exceptions – ind.: the rule of business judgment).

    Subcategories

    The content of the duty of care of the board members is broken down into three sub-categories:

    (a) the obligation to comply with legality (art. 96 §1 sub. a)

    (b) to the duty of due diligence in the narrow sense, which concerns their management duties in accordance with the due diligence set forth under the law (art. 96 §1 sub. b’ & 102§2) and

    (c) in the obligation to supervise and control the organization and operation of the SA (art. 96 §1 para. b’).

    In the present article we will look into, in particular, as mentioned in the introduction, the obligation to legality. Specifically:

     

    Obligation to Legality

    Concept – Content

    The obligation of the Board Members to observe legality (in other words: the obligation to ensure the legal operation of the company), is established, as already pointed out, in the law on SAs (art. 96 §1, section a’ and, and regarding listed SAs, art. 4 §2, c. e’ of Law 4706/2020). This is a basic and completely self-explanatory obligation that binds the members of the Board of Directors (see related, Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on art. 96) to:

    Comply with the law: The members of the Board of Directors are obliged, as a matter of course, to comply with the law. In this context, their compliance with the relevant provisions of the law on SAs (internal obligations) is mandatory. Among them and their obligation to refrain from taking decisions that fall within the responsibilities that (even by custom) belong to the authority of the company’s General Assembly. Any violation of this obligation gives rise to their liability towards the SA.

    Obligations of the members of the Board of Directors are also found in other provisions, apart from the law on SAs. These are legislative obligations of the SA itself (incl.: obligations to comply with the rules of competition law, environmental law, capital market, personal data, civil, tax, bankruptcy law, labor and social security legislation, etc.). The necessity of aligning the members of the Board of Directors with the aforementioned obligations seems self-evident. Possible illegality on the part of the SA (violation, e.g. of its tax obligations, detection of the violation by the tax authority and imposition of fines) will, as a rule, be associated with a violation of the obligations of the members of the Board of Directors. It will possibly trigger their own (:internal) liability.

    The prohibition of deviating from the principle of legality continues to exist even if the deviating results in a beneficial outcome for the SA (e.g. the conclusion of contracts following bribes).

    Board members should observe (and comply with) business ethics. Any deviation may tarnish the image and prestige of the SA. A related obligation, by law, does not exist due to the non-existence of related-specific legislative regulations (apart from the general clauses: 178, 179 and 288 of the Civil Code).

    (b) Comply with the statute: The members of the Board must, in addition, comply with its statute. They must, in this context, move within the logical limits set for the persuit of the corporate objectives (art. 86). They are obliged, therefore, to perform acts which are under it or promote its fulfillment. They are also obliged to comply with other requirements of the statute such as, for example, when the consent of the General Assembly is required for the conclusion of a contract by the Board.

    (c) Compliance with decisions of the General Assembly: The members of the Board of Directors must, finally, comply with the (legal) decisions of the General Assembly of the shareholders of the SA. Regarding, in particular, the “…legality of the decisions of the General Assembly should either have been judged by the courts or not have been validly disputed” (: Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on article 96).

    Special Obligations

    Coexisting with the general obligations of the members of the Board of Directors, other more specific ones are also found (no. 96 §2).

    They are obliged to (legally) observe the -according to the law (law. 4308/2014 on Accounting Standards)- books, files and other data of the company (art. 96 §2 para. a’). They have the collective duty to comply with the formalities related to the drafting and publication (art. 96 §2 para. b) of the annual financial statements (art. 147) and the annual management report (art. 150), the corporate governance statement (the listed companies – art. 152), the consolidated (for a group of companies) financial statements, the management reports and corporate governance statement, the remuneration report (art. 112).

    The members of the Board of Directors are charged with the specific (special) obligations collectively. Accordingly, their liability is collective and joint and several (in deviation from the apportionment rule – art. 102 §3).

     

    Special Legality Obligation Issues

    Situation of Legal Uncertainty/ Ambiguity

    The path to aligning board members with legality (and fulfilling their related obligation) is not always clearly delineated. More alternatives are often presented, created due to legal gaps, different legal opinions, reversals of jurisprudence. In this case, it is the duty of the members of the Board of Directors to seek appropriate legal advice and the appropriate, given the circumstances, legal control. If doubts remain after such an audit, the Board should, at its discretion, carry out a risk-benefit assessment.

    Such actions by the members of the Board of Directors seem necessary to defend the interests of the SA. The most important thing: for the removal (or mitigation, at least) of their personal responsibility towards the SA – in case of a negative outcome of their choices.

    Compliance with Contractual Obligations

    We should distinguish the observance of the SA’s contractual commitments vis-à-vis third parties from the obligation to observe legality. The SA is obliged to align with them, but this is not always possible (in cases, e.g., of financial hardship). Sometimes, possibly not even advisable. The responsibility of the members of the Board of Directors does not arise, in principle, towards the SA for the (non)fulfillment of the contractual obligations it has undertaken. Issues of liability of the members of the Board of Directors will arise, possibly, if any unnecessary violation of contractual obligations will result in increased financial loss of the SA.

    “Profitable Violations of Legal Regulations”

    The members of the Board of Directors are prohibited, as we found above, to take illegal actions in order to satisfy corporate interests. Any “beneficial violations of the rules of law” (as they are usually called) constitute unacceptable behavior. In addition, they represent an unfair way of exercising administration, and absolutely incompatible with the obligation to observe legality.

    Adherence to the principle of legality obviously takes precedence over the corporate interest. Moreover, the purpose of the SA cannot be illegal; much more so, the way of pursuing it. Possible illegal behavior of members of the Board of Directors gives rise to their obligation to compensate the SA. However, any profit earned by the SA due to their illegal conduct should be taken into account.

     

    The obligation to observe legality (obeying the law, the statute and the decisions of the Board of Directors) on the part of the members of the Board of Directors, is not a wish list or a statement without meaning. It constitutes the members’ clear obligation. A possible violation of this obligation damages the SA and activates the relevant provisions on the responsibilities of the violators. Invoking arguments of the kind “the end justifies the means” cannot, under any circumstances, be tolerated. However, the obligations of the members of the Board of Directors and its substitute bodies do not end here. About the other duties of care, see our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (March 5th, 2023).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Conditions for Invoking the Invalidity of the Decisions of the BoD

    Conditions for Invoking the Invalidity of the Decisions of the BoD

    In a previous article we dealt with the defective and non-existent decisions of the Board. But what are the conditions of invalidity? In the present article we will look into the relevant procedural conditions.

     

    Standing to Bring an Action: The Claimants

    Those who are entitled to rely on defects of the decisions of the Board of Directors are many. We will refer to the two important categories: (a) decisions with substantive defects (art. 95 §1) and procedural defects (art. 95 §2) as well as (b) those that resemble decisions of the shareholders’ General Assembly (art. 95 §4). For the first category, special arrangements are provided (art. 95 §3). For the second, the corresponding provisions for the decisions of the General Assembly (art. 137 and 138) apply by analogy. In more detail:

    Who can Invoke Invalidity of Decisions With Substantive & Procedural Defects

    With regard to the specific defective decisions of the Board of Directors, the persons entitled to invoke their nullity are:

    (a) The members of the Board individually

    The power of the members of the Board of Directors to invoke the invalidity of its decisions seems both reasonable and obvious. The members of the Board of Directors are responsible for what the body has decided and, therefore, they have every reason to want to maintain the legality of the Board and to avoid all liabilities. In fact, their right to challenge the decisions in question exists whether or not they participated in the (defective) decision (see related Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 95). Those who voted against the problematic decision are entitled, in any case, to invoke any invalidity. However, those who voted in favor can do so as long as they do not operate in a contradictory and abusive manner (281 CC).

    The Board of Directors, however, is not entitled to invoke, collectively as a body, potential invalidity.

    (b) Third parties (shareholders or non-shareholders)

    Third parties (shareholders or not) may retain the right to invoke any invalidity. Under the condition, however, that they justify a personal and special legal interest (art. 95 §3 section a) and, in this context, damage to their personal interests.

    Moreover: “… (as is also the case in the case of direct damage) the shareholder or the third party has an individual right of protection and will have a legitimate interest to invoke the nullity of the decision… but not with reference to the corporate interest and the expediency of the management judgment of the Board of Directors ” (therefore the control of the decisions takes place in the light of other provisions, i.e. 102) “…but with reference to the harm that they personally and directly suffer” (: Petition Ex. Law 4548/2018, on the article 95). Correspondingly, that is, to their standing to bring an action in order to claim the direct damage they suffer from acts of the Board of Directors (1214/2021 Supreme Court, 1298/2006 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database), likewise, they can invoke the invalidity of a decision of the Board “…which damages them personally and directly (e.g. the Board of Directors decides not to pay a dividend, which was legally decided by the General Assembly to be paid)”.

    Beneficiaries of Invoking of Decisions Simulating General Assembly Decisions as Null/Invalid

    For the restrictively mentioned, in the law, decisions that are similar to decisions of the General Assembly (art. 95 §4), the provisions on defective decisions of the General Assembly (art. 137 and 138) shall apply by analogy. In this context, the annulment of the decision of the Board of Directors (art. 137) can be invoked by a shareholder representing at least 2% of the capital. And so can each member of the Board of Directors, individually. On the contrary, any person, shareholder or third party who has a relevant legal interest to invoke nullity (art. 138).

    In this case the invocation (and proof) of the shareholder status is enough. Proof of personal, special, legitimate interest is not required, as is required in decisions of the Board of Directors with defects of substance or procedure.

    Ex officio Audit

    Lastly, any invalidity of a Board decision can be taken into account ex officio by the court. Provided that it is a continuous violation of legal provisions of a mandatory nature. In this case, the illegality of the decision can also be invoked by the shareholders, regardless of whether they are personally and directly harmed (art. 95 §3 in fine). A justifiable reason is the fact that it is intolerable for the shareholders to perpetuate an illegal situation in the SA and for them to be unable to react (see Memorandum of Law 4548/2018 on Art. 95).

     

    Invocation Deadline

    The Rule

    The possibility of invoking the invalidity (or annulment) of a Board decision cannot exist in perpetuity. The relevant deadlines vary.

    (a) Regarding decisions with a defect in substance (95 §1) or procedure (95 §2): The relevant appeal can take place within six months from the entry of the contested decision in the SA minutes book (according to art. 93). If, however, it is a decision to be published, the six-month long deadline starts from its registration in the Business Registry (according to art. 12).

    (b) Regarding decisions that are similar to decisions of the General Assembly (95 §4): The deadlines applicable to defective decisions of the General Assembly shall apply proportionally. In particular, with regard to annullable decisions (137), any action to annul them is required to be brought within a four-month period. Whereas, as regards the invalid ones (138), the invocation of the invalidity is subject to a short period of time. The deadlines, in both cases, start from the taking of the relevant decision of the Board of Directors. In other cases, from the moment it is published to the Business Registry – as long as it is a decision to be published.

    The Exception

    In the event that the decision of the Board of Directors results in a continuous violation of provisions of mandatory law, the invocation of any invalidity is not subject to a time limit (art. 95 §3 section b and 138 §4).

     

    Competent court

    The competent court (in terms of matter and place) for adjudicating cases concerning defective decisions of the Board of Directors is the Single-Member Court of First Instance of the company’s registered office. This is provided by a special regulation (95 §4) for the case of decisions that resemble decisions of the General Assembly (95 §4) and the legal consequence of their defect is annulment (137). We should, however, accept a corresponding competence (according to the correct point of view, see art. 3 §1) for all other relevant cases as well.

    If, moreover, different competences were accepted (Multi-member and Single-member Court of First Instance of the company’s headquarters), we would be led to a division of competences. Specifically, lawsuits against decisions of the Board of Directors, the reality of which would probably be reviewed both in the light of annulment and invalidity, should be brought to the Single-Member and Multi-Member Court of First Instance respectively. Which is illogical.

     

    Interim Measures

    With regard to the decisions of the Board of Directors that are similar to those of the General Assembly, there is no doubt as to the possibility of recourse to interim measures (art. 95 §4, 137§11 & 138§7). The same goes, in the opinion we adopt, also in the cases of decisions with defects of substance (art. 95 §1) or procedure (art. 95 §2).

     

    Disclosure Requirements

    The court decision, which recognizes any invalidity of the decision of the Board of Directors, should be published in the Business Registry, since the said decision is subject to publicity (art. 95 §5). This regulation follows the spirit of the articles on defective decisions of the General Assembly (art. 137 §12 and 138 §8).

    Third Party Protection

    On defective decisions of the Board of Directors (it should be accepted that) protection is provided for bona fide third parties (no. 95 §6 and 86 §§2 and 3) with regard to all defective decisions (as it is argued: even the non-existent ones). Provided that they have been published and rights have been created in favor of third parties.

    Consequently, the flaw in the decisions of the Board of Directors cannot be suggested against third parties in order to avoid, e.g., contractual obligations on the part of the company.

     

    The members of the Board of Directors of the SA must operate within the framework of what the law, the statutes and the decisions of the General Assembly define (a topic that will concern us in our next article). Reasonably, according to a logical sequence, decisions of the Board of Directors that go beyond the specific limits can be challenged by its members and third parties-shareholders or not). The relevant conditions and deadlines derive or are inferred from the law. However, the legal decision-making and their wording in a way that guarantees the rights of the SAs, the shareholders and, of course, the members of the Board of Directors themselves, is of priority.

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (February 26th, 2023).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Defective Board Decisions

    Defective Board Decisions

    In our previous article, we explored issues related to the conditions for valid decision-making by the Board of Directors. Possible violation of procedural conditions and/or substantive provisions leads to defective decisions. This article is about them.

     

    Necessity of Special Provisions

    Under the previous regime, the legislator did not provide for dealing with the relevant cases. However, with Law 4548/2018, firstly, a special legislative provision was established regarding defective decisions of the Board of Directors (no. 95).

    The provisions for defective decisions of the Board of Directors are not the same as those for the General Assembly. This is clearly due to the different nature of the decisions of the two bodies and in particular (as also pointed out in the Memorandum of Law 4548/2018 on Article 95):

    (a) The decisions of the Board of Directors mainly concern management issues. Therefore, it would be imprudent to subject administrative decisions to judicial review. Given the – mentioned below – rule of business judgment.

    (b) The decisions of the Board of Directors are taken by a body that is liable towards the SA. On the contrary, shareholders are, in principle, under no liability. The relative liability of the Board, therefore, can be considered as a safety net, which will adequately deal (even ex post) with the issues arising from any illegal decisions of the Board.

    (c) The decisions of the Board of Directors, once made, are executed. Therefore, it may be meaningless to consider whether or not decisions were valid. Still, even if they have been executed, the liability of the members of the Board of Directors is still in place.

    Given the above and for reasons of legal certainty on the one hand and unsafe conclusions of jurisprudence on the other, special regulation was deemed necessary to deal with the defective decisions of the Board of Directors.

    The law, in particular, distinguishes, with regard to defective decisions of the Board of Directors, between: (a) decisions with substantive defects (art. 95 §1), (b) decisions with procedural defects (art. 95 §2) and (c) decisions which resemble decisions of the General Assembly of Shareholders (art. 95 §4).

     

    Decisions With Substantive Defects

    Any decision of the Board of Directors, the content of which contradicts the law or the statutes of the SA, is invalid (art. 95 §1).

    The concept of law includes the prohibitive provisions of compulsory law. Not provisions of injunctive law, from which deviation is allowed.

    In this sense, any decision of the Board of Directors that contradicts prohibitory provisions of the Civil Code is invalid. E.g.: decisions that are contrary to accepted principles of morality (Civil Code 178, 179), decisions taken by abuse of right (:281Civil Code-subject to the consequence of the violation of 281Civil Code in the enumerated decisions of §4 of art. 95).

    The same applies to any decision that violates the provisions on the exclusive competence of the General Assembly. As expressly provided, the General Assembly is the only one competent to decide – among other things – on amendments to the articles of association, the election of Board members and auditors, the approval of the overall management and the annual financial statements, the allocation of annual profits. Therefore, decisions of the Board of Directors on these issues or others listed in the law are null and void (117 §1).

    Also invalid are the decisions of the Board of Directors, the content of which conflicts with (valid) statutory provisions or (legal) decision of the General Assembly.

    However, a decision contrary to an extra-corporate (extra-statutory) agreement is not invalid. Even if all shareholders have agreed to its conclusion.

     

    Decisions With Procedural Defects

    The Rule

    The legislator chose the rule of nullity whether it is decisions with defects in substance or defects in the process of making them. Similarly, therefore, decisions of the Board of Directors that were taken in a way that is not in accordance with the law or the statutes are invalid (art. 95 §2). Decisions, i.e., for which a procedural error occurred when they were taken.

    Such defects refer to decisions taken in violation of the:

    (a) legal composition of the Board of Directors: e.g., in violation of the provisions on quorum and majority (see Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on article 95). In this context, a decision taken with the presence of a smaller number of Board members than that provided for in the articles of association or in the decision of the General Assembly has been deemed invalid (8064/2017 Multimember Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki, NOMOS Legal Database, 2070/2011 Court of Appeal of Athens, “Dikaio Epixiriseon kai Etairion” 2011). Also, and only indicatively, a case of illegal composition of the Board of Directors is the non-representation or presence of more than half of the members of the Board of Directors. Also, the non-compliance with the minimum number of three (present or represented) members, provided for in the law (art. 92 §1).

    (b) legal convening of the Board of Directors: Such a case occurs when, e.g., the invitation was not communicated to all members of the Board of Directors. Or this was not notified within the deadline provided by the law or the statute.

    The Exemption of the Unanimous Decision of the Board of Directors

    An exception is, however, introduced to the rule of invalidity in respect of procedural violations. In particular, when a decision was taken unanimously – by all the members of the Board of Directors (present or legally represented), any invalidity is not justified (see Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on article 95). On this specific regulation, serious reservations are expressed (and rightly so). And this is because from the letter of the law, it appears that this regulation covers all procedural errors. Whether they concern the legal convocation or the legal composition.

    Such an admission, however, would constitute a deviation from more specific provisions for the Board of Directors. Those concerning the validity of off-site meetings (90 §3) or the non-listing (clearly) of the items on the agenda (91 §2 section b) – as long as all the members of the Board are present (or represented) and no one objects.

    Also, this admission is inconsistent with the provisions on quorum and majority. The violation of these, in particular, excludes the achievement of unanimity.

    Given the above, the interpretation (according to others, in particular and, according to us, more correctly: the teleological contraction) of the said provision on the exception is proposed.

    First of all, it should be accepted that this exception excludes errors concerning the legal composition of the Board of Directors. Secondly, the justification of the non-nullity of the defective decision should not be sought in its unanimous adoption. On the contrary, in the presence (and/or representation) of all the members of the Board of Directors and in the non-formulation of objection to the taking of this decision.

     

    Application by Analogy of the Relevant Provisions for the General Assembly

    Specially Regulated Decisions of the Board of Directors

    In addition to the above decisions of the Board of Directors, for certain others it is reserved (art. 95 §4), in case of their defect, application by analogy of corresponding regulations for the General Assembly (art. 137 and 138).

    In particular, these regard the following decisions of the Board of Directors, limited to those mentioned in the law:

    (a) The decision taken by a majority of 2/3 of the members of the Board of Directors, on the limitation of or deviation from the right of preference (art. 27 §4).

    It must be accepted, reasonably (given also the subordination of the case of art. 117 §2 para. a’ to the mentioned decisions of the Board of Directors), that articles 137 and 138 are applied by analogy to the previous (main) decision of the Board of Directors for an extraordinary capital increase due to the principal-subsidiary relationship that connects them.

    (b) The decision concerning the issuance of warrants (art. 56 §2).

    (c) The decision regarding the issuance of a bond loan with convertible bonds (art. 71 §1 para. b΄).

    (d) Decisions regarding capital increases or capital readjustment operations, the amendment or adjustment of provisions of the articles of association and the merger (art. 117 §2 par. a’, b’, e’).

    By taking the above decisions, the Board of Directors functions, in essence, like the General Assembly. For this reason (and with the aim of uniform treatment of decisions with a similar subject matter, regardless of the body that issues them), the legislator opts for the solution of the proportional application of the provisions for defective decisions of the General Assembly.

    Therefore, any defective relevant decisions become voidable, since procedural rules have been violated when they were taken by the Board. Otherwise they are invalid, as long as their content is contrary to the law or the statute (according to the provisions of articles 137, 138).

    The Special Case of Abuse of the Power of the Majority

    From the application by analogy to the defective decisions of the Board of Directors of the provisions for the corresponding (: defective decisions) of the General Assembly (art. 137 and 138) the case of annulment of a decision by the General Assembly which was taken by abuse of the power of the majority (art. 137 §) is expressly excluded 2, c. b’). The provision in question provides for annulment (281 Civil Code – even though it is a defect of substance).

    The legal theory is devided regarding how these decisions will be dealt with. That is, whether they will become invalid or voidable and based on which provision. The answer to the relevant question is the subject of extensive legal debate and even the contra legem interpretation is proposed.

    In any case, however, this exception would not justify any position regarding non-control of abuse of said decisions (this was also accepted under the previous law, 1408/2010 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database, 8064/2017 Multimember Court of First Instance of Thess, NOMOS Legal Database). Otherwise, an impermissible gap would be created in the protection of any minority shareholders from abusive decisions of the Board of Directors.

    Nonexistent Decision

    Contrary to the legislative provisions for defective decisions of the Board of Directors, the law (no. 95) does not deal with the case of any non-existent decisions of the Board of Directors. The application of the appropriate provisions, as the case may be, is left to the court to decide.

    These are, however, completely exceptional cases: Non-existent is (among others) the decision in which only non-members of the Board participated. Correspondingly, when a decision of the Board of Directors is taken by minutes with signatures only, and the signatures of all its members are absent (547/2019 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database, also see Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on art. 95).

     

    Particular Issues Regarding the Decisions of the Board of Directors

    Mismanagement by the Board

    It is accepted (and rightly so) that possible mismanagement on the part of the Board of Directors does not affect the validity of its decisions. Otherwise, the control of the decisions of the body in question would end up being a control of expediency and not only of legality. Such would be incompatible with the rule of board autonomy and business freedom (as it is founded on the basis of the rule of business judgment).

    After all, issues related to management by the Board of Directors are dealt with by more specific provisions and, specifically, by the provisions on the liability of the members of the Board of Directors (art. 102 and 107).

    Defects of Individual Votes

    As explicitly stated in the Memorandum of Law 4548/2018 on Article 95: “it is understood that defects in individual votes cast by members of the Board of Directors (e.g. a consultant with a conflict of interest votes) will affect the validity of the decision only if without this vote a majority would not have been formed.”

    This assumption stems from the theory of relevancy (found in German law). The content of this theory is explicitly reflected in the legislative regulation for the decisions of the General Assembly (art. 137 §5). However, its application is, reasonably, accepted -by analogy- also in the defective decisions of the Board of Directors.

    Validation of Defective Decision

    The application by analogy of §6 c’ of article 137 on the validation of a defective decision of the General Assembly to the decisions of the Board of Directors is also accepted.

    According to the opinion held in theory and jurisprudence, the Board of Directors is required to take a “newer decision”, freed, this time, from any defect (876/2010 Supreme Court, 2182/2013 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). Reasonably, confirming the previous one, without the defect. Otherwise, it would be a new decision, which would render the possibility of validation irrelevant.

    This validating decision – with regard to the invalid and voidable decisions that have been judicially annulled – does not have retroactive effect. As it is accepted that the private will cannot cure any invalidity (2182/2013 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). Whereas, in a different case, the purpose of the invalidity would be defeated (907/2000 Court of Appeal of Piraeus, 134/2014 Single Membered Court of Appeal of Thrace, NOMOS Legal Database).

    The Board of Directors that made the defective decision becomes the competent body for issuing the validating decision.

     

    The signatory has repeatedly expressed the opinion that the Board of Directors is, for many reasons, the most important (although not the hierarchically superior) body of the SA. Its decisions are therefore of particular importance and value both for the SA itself and for its members. Therefore, it became necessary to establish a special regulation to deal with its defective decisions. However, more important than the subsequent management of any related problems is their avoidance and prevention. Otherwise, we get involved in legal actions, but more on those, in our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (February 19th, 2023).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Board Decisions: Valid Taking & Representation

    Board Decisions: Valid Taking & Representation

    We have already established the critical role of the Board of Directors for the SA. We referred, in the context of our related article, to the beginning of its collective action. The legal making of its decisions requires a number of conditions. On them, but also on the representation of its members, the present article.

     

    The Principle Of Collective Action Of The Board; Its Assurance.

    From the principle of collective action of the Board of Directors mentioned in the introduction (art. 77 §1 ed. b’ of Law 4548/2018) it follows that the specific body acts, in principle, collectively. Ensuring the possibility of the participation of all the members of the Board of Directors proves, in this regard, to be particularly important. Let it be reminded, parenthetically, that from the principle in question, statutory deviations are tolerated (: the common practice) [ ind.: the appointment of a substitute body and the sovereignty of the president’s vote in the event of a tie (art. 92 par. 2 sub. b’)].

    In order to ensure the participation of all the members of the Board of Directors in the decision-making process, specific conditions must be met: the existence of a legal composition and the concentration of the quorum and majority prescribed by law and/or the articles of association. If a decision is taken, without observing them, the consequence is that it becomes defective (according to art. 95). In fact, it results in the absolute nullity of the decision (art. 174 CC), which is considered as if it did not take place (art. 180 CC).

    A later legal administration, however, can retroactively enforce invalid acts of the previous non-legal one, by approving them (ind.: 966/2014 Court of Appeal of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database). The same goes in the case of a subsequent approval by the same body, which legally meets and takes a decision.

     

    Conditions for Valid Decision Making

    Legal Composition of the Board of Directors

    In order for the composition of the Board to be legal, it is required that: (a) the election or appointment of the Board does not contravene the law and (b) the number of members of the Board, as determined by the articles of association or the General Assembly, does not exceed the limits of the law and the statute – and neither falls short of them. The number of members of the Board of Directors (see for reference) cannot, by law, be less than three or exceed fifteen (art. 77 §3).

    During the term of office of the Board, a member or members may lose their status in any way. In this case, in order for the composition of the Board to be legal (from that point on), their substitution or replacement is required (art. 81 and 82, respectively). This, of course, does not exclude a statutory provision for the continuation of the operation of the Board of Directors without replacing the missing ones (art. 82 §2). It is sufficient that the remaining members are more than half of those elected/appointed. Additionally: that they are no less than three.

    Quorum

    By Law

    A prerequisite for the valid decision-making of the Board of Directors is the observance of the quorum, required by law (art. 92 §1 ed. a’). The Board is in a quorum and meets validly-by law, when at least half plus one of its members are present (:50%+1 advisors). Any fraction is omitted (art. 92 § 1 sec. b).

    In no case, however, is it possible (here as well) for the number of advisors who are either present or/or represented to fall short of three. The older rule, which required, in any case, the physical presence of three members, was deemed unnecessary, since even in the case of the minutes signed in circulation (art. 94) the members of the Board of Directors can all be represented (see in this regard, Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on Article 92).

    By the Statute

    The provision for the legal quorum is of mandatory nature, in the following sense: It determines the minimum quorum percentages for making a valid decision of the Board of Directors. Determining, therefore-based on a statutory provision, lower percentages for the formation of a quorum than those required by law is not tolerated.

    The articles of association, however, may require higher quorum percentages than those provided for in the law (: art. 92 §1). In fact, it is argued (not without objections) that the articles of association may require the presence/representation of all the members of the Board of Directors (: 100% of the advisors) for the formation of a quorum.

    Basis of Calculation

    To find the number of advisors required to form a quorum of the Board of Directors, the basis of calculation is the total number of its members. The specific number is determined, as a rule, by the articles of association. It is specialized, alternatively, by the General Assembly within the minimum and, respectively, maximum limits that may be set by the statute (art. 77 §3).

    A condition for the formation of a legal quorum is the possibility to participate in the meeting of the Board of Directors of all its members. This means that in the event of a member losing their specific capacity, it does not matter if the remaining members of the Board of Directors are sufficient to form the required quorum. This is because the condition of the legal composition of the Board of Directors is not met (1408/2010 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). It is, however, possible for the number of remaining members of the Board to be the basis for gathering the required quorum. This, provided that the continuation of the operation of the Board of Directors is allowed by the statutes – without the replacement of any missing members.

    In the case of an impediment to the participation of a consultant in the decision-making of the Board of Directors, the specific member is not included in the determination of the quorum. Without, in fact, the need to substitute them. This occurs in case of a conflict (in the obstructed person) of own and corporate interests (855/2007 Court of Appeal of Athens, 6648/1999 Court of Appeal of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database). Possible participation of the obstructed party in the taking of the contested decision results in its nullity. Much more so, when the vote of the disqualified person was a decisive for the taking the relevant decision.

    Time of the Calculation of the Quorum

    The start of the discussion of the Board of Directors marks the time of verification of the required quorum in each case. Mandatory, however, for the legitimacy of the decision of the Board of Directors, that its percentage be maintained throughout the meeting.

    Majority

    Majority set by the Law

    The final condition for the valid decision-making of the Board of Directors is the observance of the required, by law, majority. The decisions of the Board of Directors are validly taken by an absolute majority of those members who are present as well as those who are represented during the meeting of the Board of Directors (art. 92 § 2 paragraph a). Those cases where the law itself defines otherwise are excluded from this rule. Indicative: the requirement of an increased majority (2/3 of all the members of the Board of Directors) for the decision to make an extraordinary increase in the share capital of the SA (art. 24 §1).

    Majority set by the Statute

    Deviations from the specific rule can also be introduced by the statute by claiming increased (: exclusive) percentages for making a specific decision. Or even unanimity (with the existence, however, of an opposing position on the matter). What is certain, however, is that the introduction of relevant statutory provisions for all decisions of the Board of Directors (especially unanimity), will make decision-making more difficult and, at times, impossible.

    Calculating method

    The majority required for a decision by the Board of Directors is calculated based on the persons/members of the Board. Each director has (by law) one vote (principle of equality of board members).

    An exception is brought about by any statutory provision for overriding the vote of the  . Only, however, if there is a tie (art. 92 §2 ed b) A related clause aims to remove situations of inability to make corporate decisions (“deadlock”). Statutory clauses that, possibly, refer, e.g., to overriding, in general, the vote of the president or member of the Board of Directors (ind.: depending on the method of their election/appointment) are not legal.

    To calculate the majority, the votes of the present and represented members are counted. In the minority, on the contrary, the blank votes and those of the abstaining members are included (apart from the votes that express positions different from the majority).

    A case of non-counting of a member for the calculation of the required majority constitutes, as happens in the calculation of the quorum, the case of the existence of a voting obstacle in the person of the member (ind.: art. 66 CC and 97 §3).

    Waiver of the right to vote is not possible.

     

    Representation of Members

    In General

    The presence in person of the advisors at the meetings of the Board of Directors is not necessary for their participation. The members of the Board of Directors, as already mentioned, have an (inalienable) right to participate in it and to exercise the right to vote (also) by proxy. In this way, the conduct of the discussions of the Board of Directors body is simplified and issues of actual impossibility of representation of its members are resolved.

    The possibility of representation constitutes a compulsory right and cannot be abolished by the statute (6884/1995 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database).

    Conditions

    It is not necessary to follow specific formalities for the representation to be valid. Necessary, however, is the cumulative occurrence of the following conditions: (a) representatives of advisers are appointed, exclusively, among the (regular or substitute) members of the Board of Directors (art. 92 § 4) and (b) each adviser can, validly, represent one, only, other advisor (art. 92 § 3).

    Representation Content

    The power of representation is exercised, in principle, within the limits and orders that may have been provided by the represented person. However, a vote of the representative contrary to the instructions they received from the represented member is considered (and correctly) as not rendering the decision of the Board defective. Even if the representative’s vote was decisive for achieving the majority (application by analogy of art. 128 §3).

    However, the case of the presence of an obstacle regarding the participation of the representative (e.g. conflict of interest) is different. In this case, the represented person must provide the representative with a special instruction regarding the exercise and content of the vote (5834/1991 Single Member Court of First Instance of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database).

    Participation with a representative in a meeting of the Board of Directors remains unacceptable, however, when the represented member faces an obstacle to participation (e.g. conflict of interest).

     

    Although not the highest hierarchically, it could certainly be argued that the Board is the most important body of the SA. Its involvement, moreover, in defining the strategy, approving the business plan, budget, financial statements and, in general, in making important decisions is all the proof one needs. However, precisely because of the importance of the Board of Directors, it is understandable that the participation of its members should be protected by all means, and so must the alignment with what the law and the statute require for its operation. As, in fact, the law provides sufficient, relative, leeway, the statute must be adapted to the needs of each SA and, first of all, to the rules set by its shareholders. The decisions taken by the Board of Directors must be recorded, for the aforementioned (and many other reasons), in its relevant minutes. About them, however, see our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (February 5th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • President, Convocation and Board Meetings

    President, Convocation and Board Meetings

    We have already examined the important role of the Board of Directors in our previous article. We were also concerned with its function and members; the rule and exceptions as to the manner of electing members and their alternates; the conditions of eligibility and the defects of their election or appointment. Finally, the scope of the powers of the Board of Directors and the possibility of appointing substitute bodies. In the present article, we will look into issues related to the convening of the Board of Directors: the place, the time and the conditions for a legitimate convening. Also, its head: the Chairman of the Board and their role.

     

    The Chairman of the Board

    Generally

    The role of the chairman of the Board of Directors is critical for the operation of the Board of Directors.

    Under the previous regime, matters relating to the chairman of the board (and their deputy) were tackled in practice on the basis of, usually, relevant statutory provisions. Under the current regime, it was considered appropriate to have such provisions in the relevant law, for the sake of completeness and to avoid disputes, taking into account: (a) the existence of scattered references in the law on SAs to the powers of the chairman (and his deputy) and (b) the lack of provision for the case of non-appointment of a president (see Explanatory Report n. 4548/2018 on article 89).

    The relevant legislative provision (art. 89 n. 4548/2018) regulates issues related to the election (or appointment) of the president and their deputy, their replacement as well as the powers of the president.

    Election/Appointment of Chairman (And Deputy) of the Board

    As provided in the law (art. 89 §1), the president is (usually) elected by the Board of Directors, at its constituent sitting. Their election may be subject to certain conditions, provided for in the articles of association.

    It is possible to appoint the first president from the statute-during the founding stage of the SA. Also by the General Assembly during the election of the members of the Board. It is therefore clearly concluded that the chairman of the board must also be a member of it. There is, however, an important exception: if there is no president (nor a deputy), the shareholder with the largest number of voting rights can temporarily act as president (art. 89 §1). The purpose of this regulation is to deal with emergency situations that arise in the absence of the president (and their deputy). The duties of the said (temporary) chairman may be to convene the Board of Directors for the election of a (new) chairman and to issue copies of the Board and General Assembly minutes.

    The articles of association, the General Assembly and/or the Board of Directors may also elect a deputy president (usually: vice-president), in order to replace them in cases of unavailability or absence.

    Replacement

    The Board of Directors can (art. 89 §2) replace the president and their deputy – at any time.

    In order to take the relevant decision of the Board of Directors, as long as there is no more specific regulation, a simple quorum and majority is required (according to art. 92 §§1 and 2). However, in case the president and the deputy have been designated by the statute or the General Assembly, then an increased quorum (2/3 of all members) and a majority (2/3 of those present) are required for the decision to replace them.

    If the president (or their deputy) is replaced (or resigns), they still remain an ordinary member of the Board.

    Responsibilities

    The chairman of the Board of Directors exercises the powers provided by the law and the statutes (art. 89 §3). Their responsibilities are mainly of a coordinating nature regarding the functioning of the Board. The president convenes the Board of Directors and determines the agenda (art. 91 §2). They are charged with the authority to receive requests to convene the body. They decide on the entry of an opinion in the minutes of the Board of Directors and issues copies thereof (art. 93 §§1 and 2 respectively). They give the floor to the substitute members to speak to the Board (81 §3). The vote of the president prevails, in case of a tie, for the decision of the Board of Directors – as long as there is a relevant statutory provision. The chairman of the board, in one sense, can be granted a veto right when making decisions of the board.

    In addition to the above, important powers for the operation of the Board, the chairman of the Board signs the amended statute (art. 4 §3). Receives requests to convene the General Assembly (art. 121 §2 and 141 §1). Is the temporary president of the General Assembly until the election of the final president (art. 129). Signs the balance sheet (art. 147 §1).

    The chairman of the board may also be the managing director of the SA (or have such responsibilities, as executive chairman) – unless, however, it is provided otherwise, such as e.g. in financial institutions.

     

    Board Meeting Place

    Physical session

    According to the general rule, the Board of Directors must meet in the municipality where the seat of the SA is located (art. 90 §1). In the articles of association, it is possible to provide for another place of meeting of the Board of Directors – even abroad (art. 90 §2). In case of more alternates, the choice of the place of the meeting of the Board of Directors rests with the president who convenes it. The Board of Directors, however, validly meets in any (other) place, as long as all its members are present or represented and no one objects (art. 90 §3). Similarly, in this case, the choice of the place of meeting belongs to the chairman of the Board of Directors. The latter must, however, ensure, in advance, the consent of the members of the Board of Directors for the off-site meeting.

    Video conference

    If there is a relevant statutory provision, the invitation to a meeting of the Board of Directors may stipulate that it will be held by teleconference (art. 90 §4) with respect to some and/or all of its members. In this case, the invitation must include the necessary information and technical instructions for the members’ participation in the meeting. The Board of Directors can also meet this way (as a whole), as long as all its members agree – regardless of a lack of a relevant statutory provision.

    Each member of the Board of Directors is entitled, subject to conditions (art. 90 §5), to demand the holding of the meeting by teleconference only for them. Specifically, if: (a) they reside in a different country from the one where the meeting takes place or (b) there is another important reason, in particular illness, disability or epidemic.

     

    Frequency of Board Meetings

    In terms of the frequency of the meetings, there is no provision for a minimum number or for meetings at specific, regular intervals. The Board of Directors meets whenever the law, the statutes or the needs of the company require it (art. 91 §1).

     

    Convocation of the Board of Directors

    Power of Convening & Invitation

    The Board of Directors, as we have already established, is convened by the chairman or their deputy (art. 91 §2, section a’) or, in their absence, by the majority shareholder (art. 89 §1).

    For the legal convening of the Board of Directors and, by extension, its valid decision-making, a timely invitation of its members is required: (a) two working days before the meeting or (b) five working days, if the meeting is to be held outside of the company’s headquarters (art. 91 §2, section a’). For these deadlines, the day of the invitation and the day of the meeting of the Board of Directors are not taken into account. It is not necessary to publish the invitation to the General Assembly, nor to officially serve the invitation to the members of the Board of Directors with a bailiff (according to art. 122 et seq. of the Civil Code). It is sufficient to notify it in any convenient way (4377/2004 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens) – e.g. to the e- mail that has been provided to the SA.

    Furthermore, the items on the agenda must be clearly stated in the invitation. Issues that are not listed on the agenda can be the subject of a decision if all the members of the Board of Directors are present or represented and no one objects to the decision-making on them (art. 91 §2, section b).

    Convening at the Request of Two Board Members

    The initiative, competence and authority to convene the Board of Directors and determine the agenda items does not belong, exclusively, to its president. The convening of the Board of Directors may be requested by at least two of its members with a (preferably written) request to the president or their deputy. The latter two are required to convene the Board of Directors in a timely manner, so that it meets within seven (calendar) days from the submission of the application.

    If the Board is not convened (by the president or their deputy) within the specified seven-day period, the requesting members are allowed to convene the Board themselves. The relevant invitation can be addressed to the other members within five days after the previous seven-day period has passed. If the five-day deadline elapses, it is considered that they (the requesting members) have waived their right to convene it.

    Differentiation of Conditions and Deadlines for Convening the Board of Directors

    In derogation of the publicity formalities and the deadlines set by the law (no. 91), it is possible, with a statutory provision, to shorten the deadlines for convening the Board of Directors as well as to define other formalities. The specific possibility concerns, exclusively, non-listed SAs. In any case, however, any statutory regulations should not make it more difficult, in the end, to convene the Board of Directors.

     

    The role of the President of the SA Board is pivotal for the functioning of the body and, ultimately, of the SA. They ensure, among other things, the convening, meetings and smooth operation of the Board. In the case, however, that they are unavailable, unable or refuse to fulfill their duties, the law provides important freedoms and adequate safeguards. Their utilization is imposed not only through the activation of the other members of the Board of Directors and, possibly, the shareholders, but also through the appropriate statutory regulations. It is a given that all this will work in favor of the SA. They will also contribute to the smooth and optimal taking of the appropriate decisions of the Board of Directors, which, however, will be further explored in our next article.=-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 29th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

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