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  • Ευθύνη Μελών ΔΣ: Λόγοι Απαλλαγής

    Ευθύνη Μελών ΔΣ: Λόγοι Απαλλαγής

    Σε προηγούμενή αρθρογραφία μας εξετάσαμε τους λόγους θεμελίωσης της ευθύνης των μελών του ΔΣ έναντι της ΑΕ, εξαιτίας πράξεων ή παραλείψεών τους, που συνιστούν παράβαση των καθηκόντων τους (102 §1 ν. 4548/2018). Διαπιστώσαμε εκεί πως ευθύνη δεν υφίσταται, εφόσον το μέλος ΔΣ «…αποδείξει ότι κατέβαλε κατά την άσκηση των καθηκόντων του την επιμέλεια του συνετού επιχειρηματία που δραστηριοποιείται σε παρόμοιες συνθήκες» (άρ. 102 §2). Θα μας απασχολήσουν, εδώ, οι συγκεκριμένοι λόγοι απαλλαγής των μελών του ΔΣ από την ευθύνη αυτή (άρ. 102 §4). Θα μας απασχολήσουν, επίσης, η δυνατότητα και προϋποθέσεις της ΑΕ να παραιτηθεί ή συμβιβαστεί, εφόσον θεμελιώνεται σχετική ευθύνη μέλους και γεννάται σχετική αξίωση της ΑΕ. Θα μας απασχολήσει, τέλος, η παραγραφή των συγκεκριμένων αξιώσεων.

     

    Απαλλαγή Μελών ΔΣ

    Ευθύνη μελών του ΔΣ δεν στοιχειοθετείται για πράξεις ή παραλείψεις που (α) στηρίζονται σε σύννομη απόφαση της ΓΣ ή (β) αφορούν εύλογη επιχειρηματική απόφαση (5626/2020 ΕφΑθ, ΤΝΠ ΝΟΜΟΣ). Εκτός από τους συγκεκριμένους λόγους, το δικαστήριο μπορεί να θεωρήσει ότι δεν υφίσταται ευθύνη στις περιπτώσεις πράξεων που έχει προηγηθεί σχετική εισήγηση ανεξάρτητου οργάνου ή επιτροπής που λειτουργεί στην εταιρεία σύμφωνα με το νόμο.

    Οι Κατ’ Ιδίαν Λόγοι Απαλλαγής

    Σύννομη Απόφαση Της ΓΣ

    Απαλλαγή από την ευθύνη των μελών του ΔΣ παρέχεται, από το νόμο, όταν η επίμαχη πράξη ή παράλειψη του μέλους στηρίζεται σε απόφαση της ΓΣ. Η γενική πρόβλεψη του νόμου (κατ΄ αντιστοιχία του προϊσχύσαντος καθεστώτος–άρ. 22α α.ν. 2190/1920) οδηγεί σε δυνητική διεύρυνση των αρμοδιοτήτων της ΓΣ. Το ΔΣ, δεδομένης της σχετικής πρόβλεψης, ενδέχεται (και μάλλον μοιάζει αναγκαίο) να οδηγήσει σωρεία αποφάσεων ενώπιον της ΓΣ, προκειμένου να μην υπέχει την ευθύνη που, ενδεχομένως, του αναλογεί.

    Σε κάθε περίπτωση, όμως, μια τέτοια απόφαση της ΓΣ πρέπει να είναι «σύννομη» (:νόμιμη). Ελαττωματική απόφαση της ΓΣ [άκυρη (εφόσον δεν έχει παρέλθει ο χρόνος προβολής της ακυρότητας), ακυρώσιμη (εφόσον έχει ακυρωθεί) ή ανυπόστατη] δε μπορεί να οδηγήσει σε απαλλαγή από την ευθύνη.

    Περαιτέρω, η απόφαση θα πρέπει να έχει τα σχετικά, αναγκαία, τυπικά χαρακτηριστικά. Δεν αρκούν απλή οδηγία ή κατευθύνσεις της ΓΣ ή της πλειοψηφίας των μετόχων ή ακόμα και του μοναδικού μετόχου.

    Μια τέτοια απόφαση της ΓΣ πρέπει να προηγείται, χρονικά, της επίμαχης πράξης ή παράλειψης του μέλους του ΔΣ, που διαφορετικά θα οδηγούσε σε ευθύνη του. Το αντικείμενο της απόφασης και η έκταση της δοθείσας έγκρισης θα πρέπει να προκύπτουν από την απόφαση της ΓΣ.

    Μια σύννομη, πάντως, απόφαση της ΓΣ, οδηγεί σε απαλλαγή μόνο εφόσον δεν προβάλλεται κακόπιστα. Δεν μπορεί, λ.χ., το μέλος του ΔΣ να επικαλεστεί την απόφαση της ΓΣ εφόσον έχουν αλλάξει ουσιωδώς οι συνθήκες από τη λήψη της.

    Εύλογη Επιχειρηματική Απόφαση (Business Judgement Rule)

    Ο συγκεκριμένος λόγος απαλλαγής αποσκοπεί στην αποτροπή τυχόν αδρανούς στάσης από τα μέλη του ΔΣ και της μη λήψης εκ μέρους τους επιχειρηματικών πρωτοβουλιών, υπό τον φόβο της προσωπικής τους ευθύνης.

    Τούτο το ενδεχόμενο είχε εντοπιστεί, ήδη, υπό το προϊσχύσαν καθεστώς, οπότε και  αναγνωριζόταν ένα περιθώριο διακριτικής ευχέρειας στα μέλη του ΔΣ. Μάλιστα, ζημία προκληθείσα από λήψη επιχειρηματικής απόφασης εντασσόταν, νομολογιακά, στους επιχειρηματικούς κινδύνους που δέχεται και αναλαμβάνει η διοίκηση μίας εταιρείας (419/2005 ΠρωτΠρωτΑθ, 1698/2013 ΑΠ, αμφότερες σε ΤΝΠ ΝΟΜΟΣ).

    Υπό το ισχύον καθεστώς, προβλέπεται, ρητά, ότι η εν λόγω ευθύνη των μελών ΔΣ δεν υφίσταται, εφόσον οι πράξεις ή παραλείψεις τους αφορούν εύλογη επιχειρηματική απόφαση, η οποία ελήφθη: (α) με καλή πίστη, (β) με βάση επαρκή, για τις συγκεκριμένες συνθήκες, πληροφόρηση και (γ) με αποκλειστικό κριτήριο την εξυπηρέτηση του εταιρικού συμφέροντος.

    Προκειμένου, επομένως, να γίνει αποδεκτό το εύλογο της επιχειρηματικής απόφασης, θα πρέπει να συντρέχουν (σωρευτικά) συγκεκριμένες προϋποθέσεις:

    (α) Εύλογη Επιχειρηματική Απόφαση

    Προϋποτίθεται η ύπαρξη επιχειρηματικής απόφασης του ΔΣ (λ.χ. επί ζητημάτων χρηματοδότησης ή επενδύσεων). Συμπεριλαμβάνονται τόσο οι πράξεις όσο και οι (τυχόν) παραλείψεις του ΔΣ. Την εν λόγω προϋπόθεση (:της επιχειρηματικής απόφασης) δεν πληρούν αποφάσεις του ΔΣ που ελήφθησαν στο πλαίσιο καταστατικών ή νομικών τους υποχρεώσεων-χωρίς οποιοδήποτε περιθώριο απόκλισης.

    Επιπρόσθετα: η επιχειρηματική απόφαση απαιτείται να είναι εύλογη. Θα πρέπει, δηλ., να  μπορεί να δικαιολογηθεί με βάση αντικειμενικά κριτήρια. Θα πρέπει, επιπρόσθετα, να μη θέτει σε αδικαιολόγητα υψηλό κίνδυνο την ΑΕ.

    (β) Καλή Πίστη

    Προϋποτίθεται, επίσης, η λήψη της εύλογης επιχειρηματικής απόφασης με καλή πίστη. Έννοια που διατρέχει το σύνολο του εθνικού μας δικαίου. Το μέλος του ΔΣ οφείλει να δρα (αντικειμενικά και υποκειμενικά) καλόπιστα. Κατά τη λήψη της απόφασης δεν θα πρέπει να συντρέχει περίπτωση σύγκρουσης συμφερόντων (:αντικειμενικό κριτήριο). Ταυτόχρονα, όμως, το εκάστοτε μέλος του ΔΣ οφείλει να μην δρα δόλια ή χωρίς να πιστεύει στην ορθότητα της εκάστοτε επιχειρηματικής απόφασης (:υποκειμενικό κριτήριο).

    (γ) Επαρκής Πληροφόρηση

    Τα μέλη του ΔΣ είναι αναγκαίο να ενημερώνονται «επαρκώς» πριν τη λήψη της εκάστοτε επιχειρηματικής απόφασης. Τούτο δεν σημαίνει ότι είναι αναγκαίο να εξαντληθεί κάθε πηγή πληροφόρησης (και πώς θα ήταν, άλλωστε, δυνατό;). Αντίθετα, η ίδια η διοίκηση της εταιρείας θα κρίνει πότε και υπό ποιες συνθήκες έχει ενημερωθεί αρκετά, ώστε να προβεί στη λήψη απόφασης.

    Η επαρκής πληροφόρηση του ΔΣ κρίνεται ad hoc. Λαμβάνονται υπόψη κριτήρια όπως: η σημασία της συγκεκριμένης απόφασης για την εταιρεία, το μέγεθος της επιχείρησης, η δραστηριότητά της, ο  διαθέσιμος χρόνος για τη συλλογή πληροφοριών κ.ο.κ.

    (δ) Εξυπηρέτηση Αποκλειστικά Εταιρικού Συμφέροντος

    Η απόφαση θα πρέπει, ακόμη, να αποσκοπεί, αποκλειστικά, στην εξυπηρέτηση του εταιρικού συμφέροντος. Τούτο σημαίνει ότι το μέλος του ΔΣ που λαμβάνει την επιχειρηματική απόφαση δεν πρέπει να τελεί σε κατάσταση σύγκρουσης συμφερόντων. Η εξυπηρέτηση του εταιρικού συμφέροντος (γίνεται δεκτό ότι) επιτυγχάνεται με την επαύξηση της μακροχρόνιας αξίας της εταιρείας και τη μεγιστοποίηση του κέρδους των μετόχων (όπως έχει κατοχυρωθεί και για τις εισηγμένες ΑΕ, άρ. 2 §1 ν. 3016/2002).

    Εισήγηση/Γνώμη Ανεξάρτητου Οργάνου Ή Επιτροπής

    Όπως, ήδη, επισημάνθηκε, ο ν. 4548/2018 αναγνωρίζει διακριτική ευχέρεια στον δικαστή να αποφασίσει πως δεν συντρέχει ευθύνη μελών ΔΣ, προκειμένου για πράξεις ή παραλείψεις που στηρίζονται σε εισήγηση ή γνώμη ανεξάρτητου οργάνου ή επιτροπής, που λειτουργεί στην εταιρεία, σύμφωνα με το νόμο (102 §4 in fine). Πρόκειται για πρόβλεψη που συναντάται, για πρώτη φορά, το πρώτον στον ν. 4548/2018.

    Η πρόβλεψη αυτή δεν εισάγει νέο λόγο απαλλαγής από την ευθύνη του άρθρου 102. Αντίθετα, κατά το γράμμα του νόμου, πρόκειται για δυνατότητα του δικαστηρίου να αποφασίσει ότι δεν συντρέχει ευθύνη των μελών.

    Για την εφαρμογή της συγκεκριμένης ρύθμισης, εύλογα αναρωτιέται κανείς ποιος εμπίπτει στην έννοια του οργάνου ή της επιτροπής. Η εφαρμογή της φαίνεται να έχει περιορισμένο πεδίο εφαρμογής. Τέτοιου είδους όργανο λ.χ. συνιστά το Συμβούλιο Εμπειρογνωμόνων που προβλέπει ο ν. 3986/2011 για το ΤΑΙΠΕΔ Α.Ε (άρ. 4). Σε κάθε περίπτωση, η εφαρμογή της πρέπει να αναζητηθεί ακόμη και σε υποκατάστατα, όπως γίνεται δεκτό, όργανα ή σε επιτροπές που προβλέπονται στο νόμο περί ΑΕ ή σε ειδικό νόμο ή δημιουργούνται δυνάμει καταστατικής διάταξης.

    Βάρος Απόδειξης – Κρίσιμος Χρόνος

    Το βάρος απόδειξης της συνδρομής των προϋποθέσεων της απαλλαγής (:άρ. 102 §4) φέρουν τα μέλη του ΔΣ. Κρίσιμος χρόνος για την εκτίμηση της συνδρομής τους είναι αυτός της λήψης της συγκεκριμένης απόφασης-υπό το πρίσμα των συνθηκών που τότε συνέτρεχαν (βλ. Αιτιολογική Έκθεση ν. 4548/2018 επί του άρ. 102). Πρόκειται, συγκεκριμένα, για ένσταση, την οποία υποχρεούνται να προβάλλουν και αποδείξουν τα μέλη ΔΣ.

     

    Παραίτηση Της Εταιρείας Από Αξιώσεις – Συμβιβασμός

    Δεν είναι δυνατή, χωρίς τήρηση συγκεκριμένης διαδικασίας και πλήρωση συγκεκριμένων προϋποθέσεων, παραίτηση ή συμβιβασμός της ΑΕ με υπεύθυνο μέλος ΔΣ (άρ. 102 §7). Τούτο μοιάζει απολύτως εύλογο καθώς είναι αναγκαίο να αποτραπούν δόλιοι συμβιβασμοί/παραιτήσεις σε βάρος της εταιρείας (και μειοψηφούντων μετόχων). Απαιτείται, ως εκ τούτου, συγκατάθεση της ΓΣ στην οποία, όμως, μπορεί να προβληθεί veto της μειοψηφίας. Συγκεκριμένα θα πρέπει:

    (α) Η παραίτηση ή ο συμβιβασμός να έχουν συγκεκριμένες μορφές (πλήρης ή μερική άφεση χρέους, αρνητική αναγνωριστική σύμβαση, σύμβαση συμβιβασμού).

    (β) Να έχει παρέλθει διετία από την γέννηση της αξίωσης, προκειμένου η ΑΕ να αποφασίσει (:όχι βεβιασμένα) την όποια παραίτηση από τυχόν δικαστική επιδίωξη των αξιώσεών της. Πριν τη συμπλήρωση της διετίας, σχετικές ενέργειες είναι άκυρες. Στην περίπτωση, όμως, που ασκηθεί εταιρική αγωγή, η ΑΕ έχει τη δυνατότητα να παραιτηθεί από τυχόν αξιώσεις της ή να συμβιβαστεί οποτεδήποτε.

    (γ) Να ληφθεί σχετική απόφαση (συγκατάθεση) της ΓΣ. Στη σχετική συνεδρίαση, μετά την άσκηση εταιρικής αγωγής, καλείται να παραστεί και ο ειδικός εκπρόσωπος που τυχόν έχει ορισθεί. Τέλος,

    (δ) Να μην έχει αντιταχθεί κατά της ανωτέρω απόφασης το 1/10 του εκπροσωπούμενου εταιρικού κεφαλαίου (αν δεν έχει προηγηθεί εταιρική αγωγή) και το 1/20 (στην περίπτωση που έχει ήδη ασκηθεί αγωγή).

     

    Παραγραφή

    Οι αξιώσεις της εταιρείας για αποζημίωση, κατ’ άρθρο 102, παραγράφονται με την πάροδο τριετίας. Η προθεσμία παραγραφής αρχίζει με την τέλεση της πράξης ή της παράλειψης που οδήγησε στη ζημία της εταιρείας. Δεν συνιστά, αντίθετα, έναρξη της παραγραφής η γνώση του ζημιογόνου γεγονότος από την εταιρεία ούτε και η εμφάνιση των αποτελεσμάτων του (1483/2010 ΑΠ, 131/2022 ΑΠ, ΤΝΠ ΝΟΜΟΣ).

    Η παραγραφή αναστέλλεται για το διάστημα που ο υπεύθυνος παραμένει μέλος του ΔΣ (είναι υποκατάστατο όργανο, εκκαθαριστής κλπ.) Ομοίως, αναστολή χωρεί και στην περίπτωση υποβολής της αίτησης της μειοψηφίας προς το ΔΣ για την έγερση των αξιώσεων της ΑΕ (κατ΄ άρ. 104 §1, η οποία σε επόμενη αρθρογραφία θα μας απασχολήσει). Σε κάθε περίπτωση, οι αξιώσεις παραγράφονται μετά από δέκα έτη από την τέλεση της πράξης ή την τυχόν παράλειψη.

    Αν η ζημία της εταιρείας προκλήθηκε από παράβαση της απαγόρευσης ανταγωνισμού, προβλέπεται συντομότερη παραγραφή (άρ. 98 §3). Συγκεκριμένα, οι σχετικές αξιώσεις παραγράφονται μετά από ένα έτος και σε κάθε περίπτωση, μετά από πέντε.

     

    Όπως επανειλημμένα έχουμε διατυπώσει, η συμμετοχή σε ΔΣ Ανώνυμης Εταιρείας δεν είναι χωρίς ευθύνες. Τυχόν ζημιογόνες αποφάσεις, πράξεις ή παραλείψεις μελών του ΔΣ είναι δυνατό να τεκμηριώσουν, υπό προϋποθέσεις, προσωπική τους ευθύνη. Για την τυχόν απαλλαγή τους από την ΑΕ, παραίτηση από αξιώσεις ή συμβιβασμό της ΑΕ θα πρέπει να συντρέχουν συγκεκριμένες προϋποθέσεις. Σημαντικό ζητούμενο: η διασφάλιση των συμφερόντων της ΑΕ και των μετόχων μειοψηφίας. Το ΔΣ, εξάλλου, υποχρεούται σε έγκαιρη, πλήρη και επιμελή άσκηση των σχετικών αξιώσεων. Περί αυτών, όμως, σε επόμενη αρθρογραφία μας.-

    Σταύρος Κουμεντάκης
    Managing Partner

     

    Υ.Γ. Συνοπτική έκδοση του άρθρου δημοσιεύτηκε στην Εφημερίδα ΜΑΚΕΔΟΝΙΑ, στις 21 Απριλίου 2023.

     

    Η πληροφόρηση που εμπεριέχεται στο παρόν άρθρο δεν συνιστά (ούτε και έχει σκοπό να αποτελέσει) νομική συμβουλή. Μια τέτοια νομική συμβουλή είναι δυνατό να παρασχεθεί μόνον από αρμόδιο δικηγόρο ο οποίος θα λάβει υπόψη του το σύνολο των δεδομένων που θα του εκθέσετε για την υπόθεσή σας. Αναλυτικά.

  • Obligation to Legality of the Board Members

    Obligation to Legality of the Board Members

    In our previous article, we dealt with the powers of the Board of Directors. However, its members as well as the substitute bodies (art. 87-collectively: “the members of the Board of Directors”) cannot exercise them outside of specific limits. The relevant discussion seems completely technocratic, theoretical and, ultimately, boring; however, it has an absolutely tangible, as well as important result: potential liability of the members of the Board of Directors for exceeding the limits in question, will activate the relevant provisions and the possibility of attribution to the offenders. The present article regards the obligation on their part to observe legality.

     

    Obligations of Board Members

    The main obligations of the members of the Board of Directors are: (a) the duty of care (art. 96) and (b) the fiduciary duty (art. 97).

    Under the previous regime, there was only one legislative basis for the first of them (duty of care). On the contrary, the fiduciary duty was recognized in theory and jurisprudence. The law on SAs provides a more complete regulation of the two, specific, pillars of responsibility.

     

    Duty of Care

    Content

    The members of the Board of Directors must, while performing their duties, comply with the law, the statutes and the legal decisions of the Board of Directors (art. 96§1). They must also manage corporate affairs in order to promote the corporate interests, supervise the execution of the decisions of the Board of Directors and the General Assembly and inform the other members of the Board of Directors about corporate affairs.

    Such are reflected in the law as “the generally applicable provisions regarding the obligation to diligently perform the duties of the members of the Board of Directors” (see in this regard, Memorandum to the law 4548/2018 on art. 96). The members of the Board of Directors must, among other things, pay, during the exercise of their duties, the diligence of a prudent entrepreneur, who operates in similar circumstances (art. 102 §2). Otherwise, they are liable against the company (despite any exceptions – ind.: the rule of business judgment).

    Subcategories

    The content of the duty of care of the board members is broken down into three sub-categories:

    (a) the obligation to comply with legality (art. 96 §1 sub. a)

    (b) to the duty of due diligence in the narrow sense, which concerns their management duties in accordance with the due diligence set forth under the law (art. 96 §1 sub. b’ & 102§2) and

    (c) in the obligation to supervise and control the organization and operation of the SA (art. 96 §1 para. b’).

    In the present article we will look into, in particular, as mentioned in the introduction, the obligation to legality. Specifically:

     

    Obligation to Legality

    Concept – Content

    The obligation of the Board Members to observe legality (in other words: the obligation to ensure the legal operation of the company), is established, as already pointed out, in the law on SAs (art. 96 §1, section a’ and, and regarding listed SAs, art. 4 §2, c. e’ of Law 4706/2020). This is a basic and completely self-explanatory obligation that binds the members of the Board of Directors (see related, Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on art. 96) to:

    Comply with the law: The members of the Board of Directors are obliged, as a matter of course, to comply with the law. In this context, their compliance with the relevant provisions of the law on SAs (internal obligations) is mandatory. Among them and their obligation to refrain from taking decisions that fall within the responsibilities that (even by custom) belong to the authority of the company’s General Assembly. Any violation of this obligation gives rise to their liability towards the SA.

    Obligations of the members of the Board of Directors are also found in other provisions, apart from the law on SAs. These are legislative obligations of the SA itself (incl.: obligations to comply with the rules of competition law, environmental law, capital market, personal data, civil, tax, bankruptcy law, labor and social security legislation, etc.). The necessity of aligning the members of the Board of Directors with the aforementioned obligations seems self-evident. Possible illegality on the part of the SA (violation, e.g. of its tax obligations, detection of the violation by the tax authority and imposition of fines) will, as a rule, be associated with a violation of the obligations of the members of the Board of Directors. It will possibly trigger their own (:internal) liability.

    The prohibition of deviating from the principle of legality continues to exist even if the deviating results in a beneficial outcome for the SA (e.g. the conclusion of contracts following bribes).

    Board members should observe (and comply with) business ethics. Any deviation may tarnish the image and prestige of the SA. A related obligation, by law, does not exist due to the non-existence of related-specific legislative regulations (apart from the general clauses: 178, 179 and 288 of the Civil Code).

    (b) Comply with the statute: The members of the Board must, in addition, comply with its statute. They must, in this context, move within the logical limits set for the persuit of the corporate objectives (art. 86). They are obliged, therefore, to perform acts which are under it or promote its fulfillment. They are also obliged to comply with other requirements of the statute such as, for example, when the consent of the General Assembly is required for the conclusion of a contract by the Board.

    (c) Compliance with decisions of the General Assembly: The members of the Board of Directors must, finally, comply with the (legal) decisions of the General Assembly of the shareholders of the SA. Regarding, in particular, the “…legality of the decisions of the General Assembly should either have been judged by the courts or not have been validly disputed” (: Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on article 96).

    Special Obligations

    Coexisting with the general obligations of the members of the Board of Directors, other more specific ones are also found (no. 96 §2).

    They are obliged to (legally) observe the -according to the law (law. 4308/2014 on Accounting Standards)- books, files and other data of the company (art. 96 §2 para. a’). They have the collective duty to comply with the formalities related to the drafting and publication (art. 96 §2 para. b) of the annual financial statements (art. 147) and the annual management report (art. 150), the corporate governance statement (the listed companies – art. 152), the consolidated (for a group of companies) financial statements, the management reports and corporate governance statement, the remuneration report (art. 112).

    The members of the Board of Directors are charged with the specific (special) obligations collectively. Accordingly, their liability is collective and joint and several (in deviation from the apportionment rule – art. 102 §3).

     

    Special Legality Obligation Issues

    Situation of Legal Uncertainty/ Ambiguity

    The path to aligning board members with legality (and fulfilling their related obligation) is not always clearly delineated. More alternatives are often presented, created due to legal gaps, different legal opinions, reversals of jurisprudence. In this case, it is the duty of the members of the Board of Directors to seek appropriate legal advice and the appropriate, given the circumstances, legal control. If doubts remain after such an audit, the Board should, at its discretion, carry out a risk-benefit assessment.

    Such actions by the members of the Board of Directors seem necessary to defend the interests of the SA. The most important thing: for the removal (or mitigation, at least) of their personal responsibility towards the SA – in case of a negative outcome of their choices.

    Compliance with Contractual Obligations

    We should distinguish the observance of the SA’s contractual commitments vis-à-vis third parties from the obligation to observe legality. The SA is obliged to align with them, but this is not always possible (in cases, e.g., of financial hardship). Sometimes, possibly not even advisable. The responsibility of the members of the Board of Directors does not arise, in principle, towards the SA for the (non)fulfillment of the contractual obligations it has undertaken. Issues of liability of the members of the Board of Directors will arise, possibly, if any unnecessary violation of contractual obligations will result in increased financial loss of the SA.

    “Profitable Violations of Legal Regulations”

    The members of the Board of Directors are prohibited, as we found above, to take illegal actions in order to satisfy corporate interests. Any “beneficial violations of the rules of law” (as they are usually called) constitute unacceptable behavior. In addition, they represent an unfair way of exercising administration, and absolutely incompatible with the obligation to observe legality.

    Adherence to the principle of legality obviously takes precedence over the corporate interest. Moreover, the purpose of the SA cannot be illegal; much more so, the way of pursuing it. Possible illegal behavior of members of the Board of Directors gives rise to their obligation to compensate the SA. However, any profit earned by the SA due to their illegal conduct should be taken into account.

     

    The obligation to observe legality (obeying the law, the statute and the decisions of the Board of Directors) on the part of the members of the Board of Directors, is not a wish list or a statement without meaning. It constitutes the members’ clear obligation. A possible violation of this obligation damages the SA and activates the relevant provisions on the responsibilities of the violators. Invoking arguments of the kind “the end justifies the means” cannot, under any circumstances, be tolerated. However, the obligations of the members of the Board of Directors and its substitute bodies do not end here. About the other duties of care, see our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (March 5th, 2023).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Conditions for Invoking the Invalidity of the Decisions of the BoD

    Conditions for Invoking the Invalidity of the Decisions of the BoD

    In a previous article we dealt with the defective and non-existent decisions of the Board. But what are the conditions of invalidity? In the present article we will look into the relevant procedural conditions.

     

    Standing to Bring an Action: The Claimants

    Those who are entitled to rely on defects of the decisions of the Board of Directors are many. We will refer to the two important categories: (a) decisions with substantive defects (art. 95 §1) and procedural defects (art. 95 §2) as well as (b) those that resemble decisions of the shareholders’ General Assembly (art. 95 §4). For the first category, special arrangements are provided (art. 95 §3). For the second, the corresponding provisions for the decisions of the General Assembly (art. 137 and 138) apply by analogy. In more detail:

    Who can Invoke Invalidity of Decisions With Substantive & Procedural Defects

    With regard to the specific defective decisions of the Board of Directors, the persons entitled to invoke their nullity are:

    (a) The members of the Board individually

    The power of the members of the Board of Directors to invoke the invalidity of its decisions seems both reasonable and obvious. The members of the Board of Directors are responsible for what the body has decided and, therefore, they have every reason to want to maintain the legality of the Board and to avoid all liabilities. In fact, their right to challenge the decisions in question exists whether or not they participated in the (defective) decision (see related Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 95). Those who voted against the problematic decision are entitled, in any case, to invoke any invalidity. However, those who voted in favor can do so as long as they do not operate in a contradictory and abusive manner (281 CC).

    The Board of Directors, however, is not entitled to invoke, collectively as a body, potential invalidity.

    (b) Third parties (shareholders or non-shareholders)

    Third parties (shareholders or not) may retain the right to invoke any invalidity. Under the condition, however, that they justify a personal and special legal interest (art. 95 §3 section a) and, in this context, damage to their personal interests.

    Moreover: “… (as is also the case in the case of direct damage) the shareholder or the third party has an individual right of protection and will have a legitimate interest to invoke the nullity of the decision… but not with reference to the corporate interest and the expediency of the management judgment of the Board of Directors ” (therefore the control of the decisions takes place in the light of other provisions, i.e. 102) “…but with reference to the harm that they personally and directly suffer” (: Petition Ex. Law 4548/2018, on the article 95). Correspondingly, that is, to their standing to bring an action in order to claim the direct damage they suffer from acts of the Board of Directors (1214/2021 Supreme Court, 1298/2006 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database), likewise, they can invoke the invalidity of a decision of the Board “…which damages them personally and directly (e.g. the Board of Directors decides not to pay a dividend, which was legally decided by the General Assembly to be paid)”.

    Beneficiaries of Invoking of Decisions Simulating General Assembly Decisions as Null/Invalid

    For the restrictively mentioned, in the law, decisions that are similar to decisions of the General Assembly (art. 95 §4), the provisions on defective decisions of the General Assembly (art. 137 and 138) shall apply by analogy. In this context, the annulment of the decision of the Board of Directors (art. 137) can be invoked by a shareholder representing at least 2% of the capital. And so can each member of the Board of Directors, individually. On the contrary, any person, shareholder or third party who has a relevant legal interest to invoke nullity (art. 138).

    In this case the invocation (and proof) of the shareholder status is enough. Proof of personal, special, legitimate interest is not required, as is required in decisions of the Board of Directors with defects of substance or procedure.

    Ex officio Audit

    Lastly, any invalidity of a Board decision can be taken into account ex officio by the court. Provided that it is a continuous violation of legal provisions of a mandatory nature. In this case, the illegality of the decision can also be invoked by the shareholders, regardless of whether they are personally and directly harmed (art. 95 §3 in fine). A justifiable reason is the fact that it is intolerable for the shareholders to perpetuate an illegal situation in the SA and for them to be unable to react (see Memorandum of Law 4548/2018 on Art. 95).

     

    Invocation Deadline

    The Rule

    The possibility of invoking the invalidity (or annulment) of a Board decision cannot exist in perpetuity. The relevant deadlines vary.

    (a) Regarding decisions with a defect in substance (95 §1) or procedure (95 §2): The relevant appeal can take place within six months from the entry of the contested decision in the SA minutes book (according to art. 93). If, however, it is a decision to be published, the six-month long deadline starts from its registration in the Business Registry (according to art. 12).

    (b) Regarding decisions that are similar to decisions of the General Assembly (95 §4): The deadlines applicable to defective decisions of the General Assembly shall apply proportionally. In particular, with regard to annullable decisions (137), any action to annul them is required to be brought within a four-month period. Whereas, as regards the invalid ones (138), the invocation of the invalidity is subject to a short period of time. The deadlines, in both cases, start from the taking of the relevant decision of the Board of Directors. In other cases, from the moment it is published to the Business Registry – as long as it is a decision to be published.

    The Exception

    In the event that the decision of the Board of Directors results in a continuous violation of provisions of mandatory law, the invocation of any invalidity is not subject to a time limit (art. 95 §3 section b and 138 §4).

     

    Competent court

    The competent court (in terms of matter and place) for adjudicating cases concerning defective decisions of the Board of Directors is the Single-Member Court of First Instance of the company’s registered office. This is provided by a special regulation (95 §4) for the case of decisions that resemble decisions of the General Assembly (95 §4) and the legal consequence of their defect is annulment (137). We should, however, accept a corresponding competence (according to the correct point of view, see art. 3 §1) for all other relevant cases as well.

    If, moreover, different competences were accepted (Multi-member and Single-member Court of First Instance of the company’s headquarters), we would be led to a division of competences. Specifically, lawsuits against decisions of the Board of Directors, the reality of which would probably be reviewed both in the light of annulment and invalidity, should be brought to the Single-Member and Multi-Member Court of First Instance respectively. Which is illogical.

     

    Interim Measures

    With regard to the decisions of the Board of Directors that are similar to those of the General Assembly, there is no doubt as to the possibility of recourse to interim measures (art. 95 §4, 137§11 & 138§7). The same goes, in the opinion we adopt, also in the cases of decisions with defects of substance (art. 95 §1) or procedure (art. 95 §2).

     

    Disclosure Requirements

    The court decision, which recognizes any invalidity of the decision of the Board of Directors, should be published in the Business Registry, since the said decision is subject to publicity (art. 95 §5). This regulation follows the spirit of the articles on defective decisions of the General Assembly (art. 137 §12 and 138 §8).

    Third Party Protection

    On defective decisions of the Board of Directors (it should be accepted that) protection is provided for bona fide third parties (no. 95 §6 and 86 §§2 and 3) with regard to all defective decisions (as it is argued: even the non-existent ones). Provided that they have been published and rights have been created in favor of third parties.

    Consequently, the flaw in the decisions of the Board of Directors cannot be suggested against third parties in order to avoid, e.g., contractual obligations on the part of the company.

     

    The members of the Board of Directors of the SA must operate within the framework of what the law, the statutes and the decisions of the General Assembly define (a topic that will concern us in our next article). Reasonably, according to a logical sequence, decisions of the Board of Directors that go beyond the specific limits can be challenged by its members and third parties-shareholders or not). The relevant conditions and deadlines derive or are inferred from the law. However, the legal decision-making and their wording in a way that guarantees the rights of the SAs, the shareholders and, of course, the members of the Board of Directors themselves, is of priority.

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (February 26th, 2023).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Defective Board Decisions

    Defective Board Decisions

    In our previous article, we explored issues related to the conditions for valid decision-making by the Board of Directors. Possible violation of procedural conditions and/or substantive provisions leads to defective decisions. This article is about them.

     

    Necessity of Special Provisions

    Under the previous regime, the legislator did not provide for dealing with the relevant cases. However, with Law 4548/2018, firstly, a special legislative provision was established regarding defective decisions of the Board of Directors (no. 95).

    The provisions for defective decisions of the Board of Directors are not the same as those for the General Assembly. This is clearly due to the different nature of the decisions of the two bodies and in particular (as also pointed out in the Memorandum of Law 4548/2018 on Article 95):

    (a) The decisions of the Board of Directors mainly concern management issues. Therefore, it would be imprudent to subject administrative decisions to judicial review. Given the – mentioned below – rule of business judgment.

    (b) The decisions of the Board of Directors are taken by a body that is liable towards the SA. On the contrary, shareholders are, in principle, under no liability. The relative liability of the Board, therefore, can be considered as a safety net, which will adequately deal (even ex post) with the issues arising from any illegal decisions of the Board.

    (c) The decisions of the Board of Directors, once made, are executed. Therefore, it may be meaningless to consider whether or not decisions were valid. Still, even if they have been executed, the liability of the members of the Board of Directors is still in place.

    Given the above and for reasons of legal certainty on the one hand and unsafe conclusions of jurisprudence on the other, special regulation was deemed necessary to deal with the defective decisions of the Board of Directors.

    The law, in particular, distinguishes, with regard to defective decisions of the Board of Directors, between: (a) decisions with substantive defects (art. 95 §1), (b) decisions with procedural defects (art. 95 §2) and (c) decisions which resemble decisions of the General Assembly of Shareholders (art. 95 §4).

     

    Decisions With Substantive Defects

    Any decision of the Board of Directors, the content of which contradicts the law or the statutes of the SA, is invalid (art. 95 §1).

    The concept of law includes the prohibitive provisions of compulsory law. Not provisions of injunctive law, from which deviation is allowed.

    In this sense, any decision of the Board of Directors that contradicts prohibitory provisions of the Civil Code is invalid. E.g.: decisions that are contrary to accepted principles of morality (Civil Code 178, 179), decisions taken by abuse of right (:281Civil Code-subject to the consequence of the violation of 281Civil Code in the enumerated decisions of §4 of art. 95).

    The same applies to any decision that violates the provisions on the exclusive competence of the General Assembly. As expressly provided, the General Assembly is the only one competent to decide – among other things – on amendments to the articles of association, the election of Board members and auditors, the approval of the overall management and the annual financial statements, the allocation of annual profits. Therefore, decisions of the Board of Directors on these issues or others listed in the law are null and void (117 §1).

    Also invalid are the decisions of the Board of Directors, the content of which conflicts with (valid) statutory provisions or (legal) decision of the General Assembly.

    However, a decision contrary to an extra-corporate (extra-statutory) agreement is not invalid. Even if all shareholders have agreed to its conclusion.

     

    Decisions With Procedural Defects

    The Rule

    The legislator chose the rule of nullity whether it is decisions with defects in substance or defects in the process of making them. Similarly, therefore, decisions of the Board of Directors that were taken in a way that is not in accordance with the law or the statutes are invalid (art. 95 §2). Decisions, i.e., for which a procedural error occurred when they were taken.

    Such defects refer to decisions taken in violation of the:

    (a) legal composition of the Board of Directors: e.g., in violation of the provisions on quorum and majority (see Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on article 95). In this context, a decision taken with the presence of a smaller number of Board members than that provided for in the articles of association or in the decision of the General Assembly has been deemed invalid (8064/2017 Multimember Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki, NOMOS Legal Database, 2070/2011 Court of Appeal of Athens, “Dikaio Epixiriseon kai Etairion” 2011). Also, and only indicatively, a case of illegal composition of the Board of Directors is the non-representation or presence of more than half of the members of the Board of Directors. Also, the non-compliance with the minimum number of three (present or represented) members, provided for in the law (art. 92 §1).

    (b) legal convening of the Board of Directors: Such a case occurs when, e.g., the invitation was not communicated to all members of the Board of Directors. Or this was not notified within the deadline provided by the law or the statute.

    The Exemption of the Unanimous Decision of the Board of Directors

    An exception is, however, introduced to the rule of invalidity in respect of procedural violations. In particular, when a decision was taken unanimously – by all the members of the Board of Directors (present or legally represented), any invalidity is not justified (see Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on article 95). On this specific regulation, serious reservations are expressed (and rightly so). And this is because from the letter of the law, it appears that this regulation covers all procedural errors. Whether they concern the legal convocation or the legal composition.

    Such an admission, however, would constitute a deviation from more specific provisions for the Board of Directors. Those concerning the validity of off-site meetings (90 §3) or the non-listing (clearly) of the items on the agenda (91 §2 section b) – as long as all the members of the Board are present (or represented) and no one objects.

    Also, this admission is inconsistent with the provisions on quorum and majority. The violation of these, in particular, excludes the achievement of unanimity.

    Given the above, the interpretation (according to others, in particular and, according to us, more correctly: the teleological contraction) of the said provision on the exception is proposed.

    First of all, it should be accepted that this exception excludes errors concerning the legal composition of the Board of Directors. Secondly, the justification of the non-nullity of the defective decision should not be sought in its unanimous adoption. On the contrary, in the presence (and/or representation) of all the members of the Board of Directors and in the non-formulation of objection to the taking of this decision.

     

    Application by Analogy of the Relevant Provisions for the General Assembly

    Specially Regulated Decisions of the Board of Directors

    In addition to the above decisions of the Board of Directors, for certain others it is reserved (art. 95 §4), in case of their defect, application by analogy of corresponding regulations for the General Assembly (art. 137 and 138).

    In particular, these regard the following decisions of the Board of Directors, limited to those mentioned in the law:

    (a) The decision taken by a majority of 2/3 of the members of the Board of Directors, on the limitation of or deviation from the right of preference (art. 27 §4).

    It must be accepted, reasonably (given also the subordination of the case of art. 117 §2 para. a’ to the mentioned decisions of the Board of Directors), that articles 137 and 138 are applied by analogy to the previous (main) decision of the Board of Directors for an extraordinary capital increase due to the principal-subsidiary relationship that connects them.

    (b) The decision concerning the issuance of warrants (art. 56 §2).

    (c) The decision regarding the issuance of a bond loan with convertible bonds (art. 71 §1 para. b΄).

    (d) Decisions regarding capital increases or capital readjustment operations, the amendment or adjustment of provisions of the articles of association and the merger (art. 117 §2 par. a’, b’, e’).

    By taking the above decisions, the Board of Directors functions, in essence, like the General Assembly. For this reason (and with the aim of uniform treatment of decisions with a similar subject matter, regardless of the body that issues them), the legislator opts for the solution of the proportional application of the provisions for defective decisions of the General Assembly.

    Therefore, any defective relevant decisions become voidable, since procedural rules have been violated when they were taken by the Board. Otherwise they are invalid, as long as their content is contrary to the law or the statute (according to the provisions of articles 137, 138).

    The Special Case of Abuse of the Power of the Majority

    From the application by analogy to the defective decisions of the Board of Directors of the provisions for the corresponding (: defective decisions) of the General Assembly (art. 137 and 138) the case of annulment of a decision by the General Assembly which was taken by abuse of the power of the majority (art. 137 §) is expressly excluded 2, c. b’). The provision in question provides for annulment (281 Civil Code – even though it is a defect of substance).

    The legal theory is devided regarding how these decisions will be dealt with. That is, whether they will become invalid or voidable and based on which provision. The answer to the relevant question is the subject of extensive legal debate and even the contra legem interpretation is proposed.

    In any case, however, this exception would not justify any position regarding non-control of abuse of said decisions (this was also accepted under the previous law, 1408/2010 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database, 8064/2017 Multimember Court of First Instance of Thess, NOMOS Legal Database). Otherwise, an impermissible gap would be created in the protection of any minority shareholders from abusive decisions of the Board of Directors.

    Nonexistent Decision

    Contrary to the legislative provisions for defective decisions of the Board of Directors, the law (no. 95) does not deal with the case of any non-existent decisions of the Board of Directors. The application of the appropriate provisions, as the case may be, is left to the court to decide.

    These are, however, completely exceptional cases: Non-existent is (among others) the decision in which only non-members of the Board participated. Correspondingly, when a decision of the Board of Directors is taken by minutes with signatures only, and the signatures of all its members are absent (547/2019 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database, also see Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on art. 95).

     

    Particular Issues Regarding the Decisions of the Board of Directors

    Mismanagement by the Board

    It is accepted (and rightly so) that possible mismanagement on the part of the Board of Directors does not affect the validity of its decisions. Otherwise, the control of the decisions of the body in question would end up being a control of expediency and not only of legality. Such would be incompatible with the rule of board autonomy and business freedom (as it is founded on the basis of the rule of business judgment).

    After all, issues related to management by the Board of Directors are dealt with by more specific provisions and, specifically, by the provisions on the liability of the members of the Board of Directors (art. 102 and 107).

    Defects of Individual Votes

    As explicitly stated in the Memorandum of Law 4548/2018 on Article 95: “it is understood that defects in individual votes cast by members of the Board of Directors (e.g. a consultant with a conflict of interest votes) will affect the validity of the decision only if without this vote a majority would not have been formed.”

    This assumption stems from the theory of relevancy (found in German law). The content of this theory is explicitly reflected in the legislative regulation for the decisions of the General Assembly (art. 137 §5). However, its application is, reasonably, accepted -by analogy- also in the defective decisions of the Board of Directors.

    Validation of Defective Decision

    The application by analogy of §6 c’ of article 137 on the validation of a defective decision of the General Assembly to the decisions of the Board of Directors is also accepted.

    According to the opinion held in theory and jurisprudence, the Board of Directors is required to take a “newer decision”, freed, this time, from any defect (876/2010 Supreme Court, 2182/2013 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). Reasonably, confirming the previous one, without the defect. Otherwise, it would be a new decision, which would render the possibility of validation irrelevant.

    This validating decision – with regard to the invalid and voidable decisions that have been judicially annulled – does not have retroactive effect. As it is accepted that the private will cannot cure any invalidity (2182/2013 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). Whereas, in a different case, the purpose of the invalidity would be defeated (907/2000 Court of Appeal of Piraeus, 134/2014 Single Membered Court of Appeal of Thrace, NOMOS Legal Database).

    The Board of Directors that made the defective decision becomes the competent body for issuing the validating decision.

     

    The signatory has repeatedly expressed the opinion that the Board of Directors is, for many reasons, the most important (although not the hierarchically superior) body of the SA. Its decisions are therefore of particular importance and value both for the SA itself and for its members. Therefore, it became necessary to establish a special regulation to deal with its defective decisions. However, more important than the subsequent management of any related problems is their avoidance and prevention. Otherwise, we get involved in legal actions, but more on those, in our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (February 19th, 2023).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Minutes of the Board of Directors

    Minutes of the Board of Directors

    In our previous article , we dealt with issues related to the conditions for valid decision-making by the Board of Directors. At the present article we will look into their recording in the minutes.

     

    Minutes of Board Meetings & Decisions

    Book of Minutes

    As provided by law, the discussions and decisions of the Board of Directors are summarized in a special book, which can also be kept electronically (art. 93 §1 a’). This is the board’s minutes book. It also contains the list of members who attended (or were represented) at each meeting of the Board of Directors (art. 93 §1 paragraph d). This particular book constitutes a special commercial book, which is mandatorily kept at the headquarters of the SA – just like the books of shareholders and minutes of the General Assembly.

    The book in question is, at the same time, among the additional books or records, which entities, such as SAs, are required to keep, based on the legislation on Greek accounting standards (law 4308/2014).

    Adherence to the Board of Directors minutes book aims at the best possible organization of the company. Also, in the transparency of corporate affairs.

    A corresponding book of minutes is also kept regarding the decisions of the General Assembly (art. 134). In fact, the law provides the possibility of uniform observance of both the minutes books of the Board of Directors and of the General Assembly. However, this possibility concerns, exclusively, SAs whose shares are not listed on a regulated market (art. 93 §4).

    Compliance & Content Liability

    The responsibility for keeping the board minutes book is borne by the  .

    This book records, in summary, the (possible) discussion of the members of the Board of Directors, the voting on the agenda items as well as (especially) the decisions taken on them.

    The chairman of the Board of Directors is not obliged, in principle, to record in the minutes the distinct, individual opinion of each member of the Board of Directors. They are obliged to register a summary of it, if requested (art. 93 §1 sub. b). Such a registration will, however, take on special significance in some special cases. When, e.g., questions are raised regarding the liability of the members of the Board of Directors (art. 102 et seq.).

    The chairman of the Board of Directors is entitled, however, to refuse the (otherwise mandatory) registration of the opinion of the member of the Board of Directors who requested it (art. 93 §1 paragraph c). This can happen when—beyond all doubt— (a) the opinion expressed refers to matters clearly outside the agenda, or (b) its content is clearly contrary to accepted principles of morality or the law. Such a case also exists when the member of the Board of Directors attempts to disclose, without sufficient justification, business secrets of the company (see Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 93).

    Signing of Minutes

    Under the previous law (as it applied after the amendment of Law 3604/2007), the minutes were signed by the chairman of the Board of Directors (or another person designated by the articles of association). There is now an obligation by law (corresponding to the one existing before Law 3604/2007) for the signing of the minutes by all the members of the Board of Directors who attended the meeting (art. 93 §2 paragraph a).

    Any refusal to sign by a member of the Board of Directors is noted in the minutes, which are signed by the other directors (art. 93 §2 section b). Failure, therefore, to sign does not invalidate the relevant decision (6884/1995 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens).

    Issuance of Copies of Minutes

    Copies of the minutes are issued, officially, by the chairman of the Board of Directors or “another person” to be appointed. The “other person” is defined by the statute or decision of the Board of Directors and can even be a third party who is not a member of the Board of Directors. Possibly, in fact, more than one person who will act on their own or not (art. 93 §2 ed. c΄).

    Obligation to validate the above copies (e.g. certification of the original signature of the president or by a competent Authority or a lawyer), in principle, does not exist.

    Ratification, however, will be required, since it is a decision of the Board of Directors to grant a power of attorney (art. 216 et seq. of the Civil Code, when required by law). In this context and the (special) decision of the Board of Directors that authorizes the submission of a criminal record, in which case it is considered necessary according to jurisprudence to have the signature of the representative members of the Board of Directors certified by a lawyer.

    Submission of Proceedings to the Business Registry

    The law requires submission to the competent service of Business Registry of the copies of the minutes of the Board of Directors, for which there is an obligation to register (according to art. 12 or other provisions). The submission must take place within 20 days of the corresponding meeting of the Board of Directors (art. 93 §3).

    The rules for publicity in the Business Registry, regarding SAs, are found, in general, in articles 12-14 of Law 4548/2018, in combination (and) with the provisions of Law 4919/2022. The publicity in the Business Registry is, however, of a declarative (and not a constitutive) nature.

    The following must, among other things, be published in the company’s section of the Business Registry: (a) the minutes of the formation of the Board of Directors in a body and (b) the minutes of any “reorganization” thereof. Also, (c) the minutes of the decision of the Board of Directors for the appointment of a substitute body (1204/2000 Supreme Court) – reasonable, after all, given that the Board grants, in this case, “organic” authority. The SA, on the contrary, is not obliged to a corresponding registration, in case the Board of Directors, by its decision, grants a simple power of representation (according to the CC).

    Legal Consequences of (Non/Faulty) Keeping of the Minutes

    Evidential Value

    The keeping of the book of minutes is of evidentiary value only. The evidentiary value in question is equivalent to that of other commercial books (art. 444 §1, 448 of the Civil Code): they are full proof of what is written in them. However, counter-evidence is allowed (448 Code of Civil Procedure, 6884/1995 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens). In addition, it is possible for them to constitute complete proof in favor of the one who observes them, under the conditions of the law (art. 445 Code of Civil Procedure).

    Non/Defective Keeping of the Minutes

    The substance and validity of the decisions of the Board of Directors do not at all depend on the preparation or not of the relevant minutes. Much more, it is not affected by any faulty keeping of them.

    Consequently, any omissions or defects regarding the observance of the protocol do not lead to the invalidity of the corresponding decision of the Board of Directors. The decision in question, on the contrary, produces results from the moment of its adoption (286/1980 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database).

    Burden of proof

    The SA bears the burden of proof that the decisions of the Board of Directors took place on the date and time indicated in the minutes book (93 §2 ed. d). The relevant provision aims to prevent the (not rare in practice) alteration (especially pre-dating or post-dating) of the records. A similar provision also exists for PCCs (art. 66 of law 4072/2012) – (see Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on art. 93).

     

    Minutes By Simple Signatures

    Concept – Purpose

    Law 4548/2018 preserved the -already protected (under art. 21 §5 of law 2190/1920)- possibility of taking decisions by the Board of Directors with minutes signed by all its members, without holding a meeting (art. 94). To be precise: this possibility was strengthened (see Memorandum of law 4548/2018 on article 94).

    The decision-making process is facilitated, modernized and adapted to the needs and rhythms of the time. After all, the times when the meeting of the members of the Board of Directors (even via video call) turns out to be, in fact, particularly difficult.

    In terms of consequences and results, the endorsement of the minutes of the Board of Directors by simple signatures is, by law, fully assimilated to a decision taken in the context of a meeting (according to art. 91). These are, therefore, two mutually exclusive but entirely equivalent ways of making decisions by the management of the SA (art. 94 § 1 ed. a’).

    It is noted, moreover, that all SAs (registered or not) can make use of the relevant discretion. In contrast to the possibility of taking a decision by circulation by the General Assembly, which is offered only to non-listed SAs (art. 136).

    Conditions – Decision Making Process

    No Statutory Provision Obligation

    In contrast to decision-making by teleconference, decision-making by signature, by circulation, of the minutes of the Board of Directors is provided by law; it does not require a statutory provision (8064/2017 Multimember Court of Fist Instance of Thessaloniki, NOMOS Legal Database). The proposal to use it belongs to the discretion of each member. Usually: the president will make it.

    Lack of a Meeting

    A conceptual feature of decision-making in the above manner is the non-convening of a meeting of the members of the Board of Directors. On the contrary, any decision is taken by signing the minutes by all members. The recording (and taking), in particular, of the relevant decision by the minutes passing and being signed by each member one by one is simple – and yet necessary.

    Signing of Minutes

    The members of the Board of Directors (and/or their representatives) successively sign the minutes one by one. Where each of them is, is of no concern. The signing of the minutes by all, without exception, the members serves a dual purpose:

    (a) A necessary condition for taking a decision is fulfilled (art. 94 §1 paragraph c): any non-signature on the part of even one advisor renders the relevant decision non-existent, which in turn does not bring about legal consequences (549/2016 Court of Appea of Thessaloniki, NOMOS Legal Database).

    (b) At the same time, the vote of the members (or even their abstention from voting) on the respective issue is declared. The decision, therefore, although it must be signed by everyone, it is possible that it will not be taken unanimously and voted for. For this reason, after all, the law speaks of recording in the minutes the majority decision of the members of the Board of Directors (art. 94 § 1 ed. b’). The decision is, to be precise, some pre-formulated (in terms of its content) minutes. The latter is, usually, the result of some earlier -informal- agreements between the members of the Board of Directors of the SA.

    Entry in the Book of Board Minutes

    Obligation to comply with formalities of invitation and notification of agenda items is not understood in making a decision by simple signatures. However, the relevant minutes are registered in the aforementioned special book of minutes of the meetings and decisions of the Board of Directors (art. 94 §3).

    Use of E- mail or Other Electronic Media

    As expressly provided, the signature of the advisors (or their representatives) may be replaced by electronic means. For example, by sending e-mails. However, a relevant statutory provision is required (art. 94 §2).

     

    The minutes of the Board of Directors record the decisions and, possibly, the related discussions between the members of the Board of Directors. And, although decisions are valid from the moment they are made, the importance and value of practices is easily perceived. Serious matters, such as the legalization of the SA for important transactions, for the submission of crimes for important criminal proceedings arise from the observance of the necessary formalities. Issues of responsibility of the members of the Board of Directors as well as the opinions they expressed will arise from the minutes- either exculpatory or aggravating. The drafting, therefore, of the minutes cannot (and should not) be treated as a “standard” procedure – especially when conflicting interests are represented on the Board of Directors or different “factions” are represented in the shareholder structure. From the minutes, finally, the possibly defective decisions of the Board of Directors will also emerge. But more on that on our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (February 12th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Board Decisions: Valid Taking & Representation

    Board Decisions: Valid Taking & Representation

    We have already established the critical role of the Board of Directors for the SA. We referred, in the context of our related article, to the beginning of its collective action. The legal making of its decisions requires a number of conditions. On them, but also on the representation of its members, the present article.

     

    The Principle Of Collective Action Of The Board; Its Assurance.

    From the principle of collective action of the Board of Directors mentioned in the introduction (art. 77 §1 ed. b’ of Law 4548/2018) it follows that the specific body acts, in principle, collectively. Ensuring the possibility of the participation of all the members of the Board of Directors proves, in this regard, to be particularly important. Let it be reminded, parenthetically, that from the principle in question, statutory deviations are tolerated (: the common practice) [ ind.: the appointment of a substitute body and the sovereignty of the president’s vote in the event of a tie (art. 92 par. 2 sub. b’)].

    In order to ensure the participation of all the members of the Board of Directors in the decision-making process, specific conditions must be met: the existence of a legal composition and the concentration of the quorum and majority prescribed by law and/or the articles of association. If a decision is taken, without observing them, the consequence is that it becomes defective (according to art. 95). In fact, it results in the absolute nullity of the decision (art. 174 CC), which is considered as if it did not take place (art. 180 CC).

    A later legal administration, however, can retroactively enforce invalid acts of the previous non-legal one, by approving them (ind.: 966/2014 Court of Appeal of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database). The same goes in the case of a subsequent approval by the same body, which legally meets and takes a decision.

     

    Conditions for Valid Decision Making

    Legal Composition of the Board of Directors

    In order for the composition of the Board to be legal, it is required that: (a) the election or appointment of the Board does not contravene the law and (b) the number of members of the Board, as determined by the articles of association or the General Assembly, does not exceed the limits of the law and the statute – and neither falls short of them. The number of members of the Board of Directors (see for reference) cannot, by law, be less than three or exceed fifteen (art. 77 §3).

    During the term of office of the Board, a member or members may lose their status in any way. In this case, in order for the composition of the Board to be legal (from that point on), their substitution or replacement is required (art. 81 and 82, respectively). This, of course, does not exclude a statutory provision for the continuation of the operation of the Board of Directors without replacing the missing ones (art. 82 §2). It is sufficient that the remaining members are more than half of those elected/appointed. Additionally: that they are no less than three.

    Quorum

    By Law

    A prerequisite for the valid decision-making of the Board of Directors is the observance of the quorum, required by law (art. 92 §1 ed. a’). The Board is in a quorum and meets validly-by law, when at least half plus one of its members are present (:50%+1 advisors). Any fraction is omitted (art. 92 § 1 sec. b).

    In no case, however, is it possible (here as well) for the number of advisors who are either present or/or represented to fall short of three. The older rule, which required, in any case, the physical presence of three members, was deemed unnecessary, since even in the case of the minutes signed in circulation (art. 94) the members of the Board of Directors can all be represented (see in this regard, Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on Article 92).

    By the Statute

    The provision for the legal quorum is of mandatory nature, in the following sense: It determines the minimum quorum percentages for making a valid decision of the Board of Directors. Determining, therefore-based on a statutory provision, lower percentages for the formation of a quorum than those required by law is not tolerated.

    The articles of association, however, may require higher quorum percentages than those provided for in the law (: art. 92 §1). In fact, it is argued (not without objections) that the articles of association may require the presence/representation of all the members of the Board of Directors (: 100% of the advisors) for the formation of a quorum.

    Basis of Calculation

    To find the number of advisors required to form a quorum of the Board of Directors, the basis of calculation is the total number of its members. The specific number is determined, as a rule, by the articles of association. It is specialized, alternatively, by the General Assembly within the minimum and, respectively, maximum limits that may be set by the statute (art. 77 §3).

    A condition for the formation of a legal quorum is the possibility to participate in the meeting of the Board of Directors of all its members. This means that in the event of a member losing their specific capacity, it does not matter if the remaining members of the Board of Directors are sufficient to form the required quorum. This is because the condition of the legal composition of the Board of Directors is not met (1408/2010 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). It is, however, possible for the number of remaining members of the Board to be the basis for gathering the required quorum. This, provided that the continuation of the operation of the Board of Directors is allowed by the statutes – without the replacement of any missing members.

    In the case of an impediment to the participation of a consultant in the decision-making of the Board of Directors, the specific member is not included in the determination of the quorum. Without, in fact, the need to substitute them. This occurs in case of a conflict (in the obstructed person) of own and corporate interests (855/2007 Court of Appeal of Athens, 6648/1999 Court of Appeal of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database). Possible participation of the obstructed party in the taking of the contested decision results in its nullity. Much more so, when the vote of the disqualified person was a decisive for the taking the relevant decision.

    Time of the Calculation of the Quorum

    The start of the discussion of the Board of Directors marks the time of verification of the required quorum in each case. Mandatory, however, for the legitimacy of the decision of the Board of Directors, that its percentage be maintained throughout the meeting.

    Majority

    Majority set by the Law

    The final condition for the valid decision-making of the Board of Directors is the observance of the required, by law, majority. The decisions of the Board of Directors are validly taken by an absolute majority of those members who are present as well as those who are represented during the meeting of the Board of Directors (art. 92 § 2 paragraph a). Those cases where the law itself defines otherwise are excluded from this rule. Indicative: the requirement of an increased majority (2/3 of all the members of the Board of Directors) for the decision to make an extraordinary increase in the share capital of the SA (art. 24 §1).

    Majority set by the Statute

    Deviations from the specific rule can also be introduced by the statute by claiming increased (: exclusive) percentages for making a specific decision. Or even unanimity (with the existence, however, of an opposing position on the matter). What is certain, however, is that the introduction of relevant statutory provisions for all decisions of the Board of Directors (especially unanimity), will make decision-making more difficult and, at times, impossible.

    Calculating method

    The majority required for a decision by the Board of Directors is calculated based on the persons/members of the Board. Each director has (by law) one vote (principle of equality of board members).

    An exception is brought about by any statutory provision for overriding the vote of the  . Only, however, if there is a tie (art. 92 §2 ed b) A related clause aims to remove situations of inability to make corporate decisions (“deadlock”). Statutory clauses that, possibly, refer, e.g., to overriding, in general, the vote of the president or member of the Board of Directors (ind.: depending on the method of their election/appointment) are not legal.

    To calculate the majority, the votes of the present and represented members are counted. In the minority, on the contrary, the blank votes and those of the abstaining members are included (apart from the votes that express positions different from the majority).

    A case of non-counting of a member for the calculation of the required majority constitutes, as happens in the calculation of the quorum, the case of the existence of a voting obstacle in the person of the member (ind.: art. 66 CC and 97 §3).

    Waiver of the right to vote is not possible.

     

    Representation of Members

    In General

    The presence in person of the advisors at the meetings of the Board of Directors is not necessary for their participation. The members of the Board of Directors, as already mentioned, have an (inalienable) right to participate in it and to exercise the right to vote (also) by proxy. In this way, the conduct of the discussions of the Board of Directors body is simplified and issues of actual impossibility of representation of its members are resolved.

    The possibility of representation constitutes a compulsory right and cannot be abolished by the statute (6884/1995 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database).

    Conditions

    It is not necessary to follow specific formalities for the representation to be valid. Necessary, however, is the cumulative occurrence of the following conditions: (a) representatives of advisers are appointed, exclusively, among the (regular or substitute) members of the Board of Directors (art. 92 § 4) and (b) each adviser can, validly, represent one, only, other advisor (art. 92 § 3).

    Representation Content

    The power of representation is exercised, in principle, within the limits and orders that may have been provided by the represented person. However, a vote of the representative contrary to the instructions they received from the represented member is considered (and correctly) as not rendering the decision of the Board defective. Even if the representative’s vote was decisive for achieving the majority (application by analogy of art. 128 §3).

    However, the case of the presence of an obstacle regarding the participation of the representative (e.g. conflict of interest) is different. In this case, the represented person must provide the representative with a special instruction regarding the exercise and content of the vote (5834/1991 Single Member Court of First Instance of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database).

    Participation with a representative in a meeting of the Board of Directors remains unacceptable, however, when the represented member faces an obstacle to participation (e.g. conflict of interest).

     

    Although not the highest hierarchically, it could certainly be argued that the Board is the most important body of the SA. Its involvement, moreover, in defining the strategy, approving the business plan, budget, financial statements and, in general, in making important decisions is all the proof one needs. However, precisely because of the importance of the Board of Directors, it is understandable that the participation of its members should be protected by all means, and so must the alignment with what the law and the statute require for its operation. As, in fact, the law provides sufficient, relative, leeway, the statute must be adapted to the needs of each SA and, first of all, to the rules set by its shareholders. The decisions taken by the Board of Directors must be recorded, for the aforementioned (and many other reasons), in its relevant minutes. About them, however, see our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (February 5th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • President, Convocation and Board Meetings

    President, Convocation and Board Meetings

    We have already examined the important role of the Board of Directors in our previous article. We were also concerned with its function and members; the rule and exceptions as to the manner of electing members and their alternates; the conditions of eligibility and the defects of their election or appointment. Finally, the scope of the powers of the Board of Directors and the possibility of appointing substitute bodies. In the present article, we will look into issues related to the convening of the Board of Directors: the place, the time and the conditions for a legitimate convening. Also, its head: the Chairman of the Board and their role.

     

    The Chairman of the Board

    Generally

    The role of the chairman of the Board of Directors is critical for the operation of the Board of Directors.

    Under the previous regime, matters relating to the chairman of the board (and their deputy) were tackled in practice on the basis of, usually, relevant statutory provisions. Under the current regime, it was considered appropriate to have such provisions in the relevant law, for the sake of completeness and to avoid disputes, taking into account: (a) the existence of scattered references in the law on SAs to the powers of the chairman (and his deputy) and (b) the lack of provision for the case of non-appointment of a president (see Explanatory Report n. 4548/2018 on article 89).

    The relevant legislative provision (art. 89 n. 4548/2018) regulates issues related to the election (or appointment) of the president and their deputy, their replacement as well as the powers of the president.

    Election/Appointment of Chairman (And Deputy) of the Board

    As provided in the law (art. 89 §1), the president is (usually) elected by the Board of Directors, at its constituent sitting. Their election may be subject to certain conditions, provided for in the articles of association.

    It is possible to appoint the first president from the statute-during the founding stage of the SA. Also by the General Assembly during the election of the members of the Board. It is therefore clearly concluded that the chairman of the board must also be a member of it. There is, however, an important exception: if there is no president (nor a deputy), the shareholder with the largest number of voting rights can temporarily act as president (art. 89 §1). The purpose of this regulation is to deal with emergency situations that arise in the absence of the president (and their deputy). The duties of the said (temporary) chairman may be to convene the Board of Directors for the election of a (new) chairman and to issue copies of the Board and General Assembly minutes.

    The articles of association, the General Assembly and/or the Board of Directors may also elect a deputy president (usually: vice-president), in order to replace them in cases of unavailability or absence.

    Replacement

    The Board of Directors can (art. 89 §2) replace the president and their deputy – at any time.

    In order to take the relevant decision of the Board of Directors, as long as there is no more specific regulation, a simple quorum and majority is required (according to art. 92 §§1 and 2). However, in case the president and the deputy have been designated by the statute or the General Assembly, then an increased quorum (2/3 of all members) and a majority (2/3 of those present) are required for the decision to replace them.

    If the president (or their deputy) is replaced (or resigns), they still remain an ordinary member of the Board.

    Responsibilities

    The chairman of the Board of Directors exercises the powers provided by the law and the statutes (art. 89 §3). Their responsibilities are mainly of a coordinating nature regarding the functioning of the Board. The president convenes the Board of Directors and determines the agenda (art. 91 §2). They are charged with the authority to receive requests to convene the body. They decide on the entry of an opinion in the minutes of the Board of Directors and issues copies thereof (art. 93 §§1 and 2 respectively). They give the floor to the substitute members to speak to the Board (81 §3). The vote of the president prevails, in case of a tie, for the decision of the Board of Directors – as long as there is a relevant statutory provision. The chairman of the board, in one sense, can be granted a veto right when making decisions of the board.

    In addition to the above, important powers for the operation of the Board, the chairman of the Board signs the amended statute (art. 4 §3). Receives requests to convene the General Assembly (art. 121 §2 and 141 §1). Is the temporary president of the General Assembly until the election of the final president (art. 129). Signs the balance sheet (art. 147 §1).

    The chairman of the board may also be the managing director of the SA (or have such responsibilities, as executive chairman) – unless, however, it is provided otherwise, such as e.g. in financial institutions.

     

    Board Meeting Place

    Physical session

    According to the general rule, the Board of Directors must meet in the municipality where the seat of the SA is located (art. 90 §1). In the articles of association, it is possible to provide for another place of meeting of the Board of Directors – even abroad (art. 90 §2). In case of more alternates, the choice of the place of the meeting of the Board of Directors rests with the president who convenes it. The Board of Directors, however, validly meets in any (other) place, as long as all its members are present or represented and no one objects (art. 90 §3). Similarly, in this case, the choice of the place of meeting belongs to the chairman of the Board of Directors. The latter must, however, ensure, in advance, the consent of the members of the Board of Directors for the off-site meeting.

    Video conference

    If there is a relevant statutory provision, the invitation to a meeting of the Board of Directors may stipulate that it will be held by teleconference (art. 90 §4) with respect to some and/or all of its members. In this case, the invitation must include the necessary information and technical instructions for the members’ participation in the meeting. The Board of Directors can also meet this way (as a whole), as long as all its members agree – regardless of a lack of a relevant statutory provision.

    Each member of the Board of Directors is entitled, subject to conditions (art. 90 §5), to demand the holding of the meeting by teleconference only for them. Specifically, if: (a) they reside in a different country from the one where the meeting takes place or (b) there is another important reason, in particular illness, disability or epidemic.

     

    Frequency of Board Meetings

    In terms of the frequency of the meetings, there is no provision for a minimum number or for meetings at specific, regular intervals. The Board of Directors meets whenever the law, the statutes or the needs of the company require it (art. 91 §1).

     

    Convocation of the Board of Directors

    Power of Convening & Invitation

    The Board of Directors, as we have already established, is convened by the chairman or their deputy (art. 91 §2, section a’) or, in their absence, by the majority shareholder (art. 89 §1).

    For the legal convening of the Board of Directors and, by extension, its valid decision-making, a timely invitation of its members is required: (a) two working days before the meeting or (b) five working days, if the meeting is to be held outside of the company’s headquarters (art. 91 §2, section a’). For these deadlines, the day of the invitation and the day of the meeting of the Board of Directors are not taken into account. It is not necessary to publish the invitation to the General Assembly, nor to officially serve the invitation to the members of the Board of Directors with a bailiff (according to art. 122 et seq. of the Civil Code). It is sufficient to notify it in any convenient way (4377/2004 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens) – e.g. to the e- mail that has been provided to the SA.

    Furthermore, the items on the agenda must be clearly stated in the invitation. Issues that are not listed on the agenda can be the subject of a decision if all the members of the Board of Directors are present or represented and no one objects to the decision-making on them (art. 91 §2, section b).

    Convening at the Request of Two Board Members

    The initiative, competence and authority to convene the Board of Directors and determine the agenda items does not belong, exclusively, to its president. The convening of the Board of Directors may be requested by at least two of its members with a (preferably written) request to the president or their deputy. The latter two are required to convene the Board of Directors in a timely manner, so that it meets within seven (calendar) days from the submission of the application.

    If the Board is not convened (by the president or their deputy) within the specified seven-day period, the requesting members are allowed to convene the Board themselves. The relevant invitation can be addressed to the other members within five days after the previous seven-day period has passed. If the five-day deadline elapses, it is considered that they (the requesting members) have waived their right to convene it.

    Differentiation of Conditions and Deadlines for Convening the Board of Directors

    In derogation of the publicity formalities and the deadlines set by the law (no. 91), it is possible, with a statutory provision, to shorten the deadlines for convening the Board of Directors as well as to define other formalities. The specific possibility concerns, exclusively, non-listed SAs. In any case, however, any statutory regulations should not make it more difficult, in the end, to convene the Board of Directors.

     

    The role of the President of the SA Board is pivotal for the functioning of the body and, ultimately, of the SA. They ensure, among other things, the convening, meetings and smooth operation of the Board. In the case, however, that they are unavailable, unable or refuse to fulfill their duties, the law provides important freedoms and adequate safeguards. Their utilization is imposed not only through the activation of the other members of the Board of Directors and, possibly, the shareholders, but also through the appropriate statutory regulations. It is a given that all this will work in favor of the SA. They will also contribute to the smooth and optimal taking of the appropriate decisions of the Board of Directors, which, however, will be further explored in our next article.=-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 29th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Internal Audit and Executive Committee of the SA

    Internal Audit and Executive Committee of the SA

    In our previous article, we were concerned with the possibility (but also the need) of delegating part of the (organic) power from the Board of Directors to its substitute bodies. In this context, the existence of an Executive Committee, which can and should function as a mini Board of Directors, being accountable to it. On the occasion of the substitute bodies of the Board of Directors, we also found the value of designing a secure system of commitment and representation of the company; for the protection, in advance, of the SA and the persons involved. The (always valuable) possibility of establishing an Internal Audit of the SA is moving in the latter direction. On them, the present article.

     

    Internal Auditors

    In General

    The subject of risk management of the SA (: enterprise risk management – part of which is the internal control of the SA) is extremely important and particularly broad. We limit ourselves in the present article -out of necessity, to the provisions of the law on SAs (art. 87 §1 c. b. law 4548/2018) for the establishment of an internal control system. The articles of association of the SA, according to the law, may allow the board of directors (or, as the case may be, compel it) to delegate its internal control to one or more non-members. The use of this discretion, especially for non-listed SAs, can (and should) work as a tool for modernization and transparency. Much more so if its nature, share composition or management and representation system require it.

    Conditions

    (a) Statutory provision: First of all, a necessary condition for the Board of Directors to delegate internal control (to one or more persons) is the existence of an explicit, relevant, statutory provision. The relevant assignment by the Board of Directors will appear as optional or mandatory, depending on what is defined in the articles of association.

    However, for specific categories of SAs, the operation of an independent internal control unit escapes the statutory powers. It is, on the contrary, imposed by special legislative provisions. This applies, mainly, to listed SAs (art. 15 and 16 of Law 4706/2020 on corporate governance), companies in the general financial sector (e.g. credit institutions) and enterprises of public interest (art. 44 Law 4449/2017). In the latter cases, the further expansion of the content and scope of the internal auditors’ powers will remain at the initiative of the shareholders.

    However, there should be no confusion between internal auditors and external auditors. The latter are exclusively responsible for carrying out the regular-annual audit of the company’s financial statements, where required.

    (b) Qualification of internal auditors: A further condition is the assignment of internal audit to third parties who are not members of the Board of Directors. On the contrary, the possibility of delegating the internal control of the company to members of the Board of Directors, as it was foreseen under the previous regime (art. 22 §3 sec. c’ of Law 2190/1920), has now been abolished. The purpose of this repeal is to avoid situations of conflict of interest. Also, the assurance of impartiality and independence in the person of the auditors in the exercise of their powers (see, in this regard, Explanatory Report of Law 4548/2018 on art. 87).

    Not having the status of a member of the Board of Directors is, therefore, a condition for the legal establishment of the internal audit service. The corresponding ones, of course, also apply to the special categories of SAs mentioned above.

    Responsibilities

    The responsibilities of internal auditors are not specified in the law. First of all, they are assigned the power to carry out financial audits in the SA. It is argued, however, that their role is not exhausted, exclusively, in their capacity as auditing bodies for financial matters. On the contrary, they take on the position of the Board of Directors (according to the proportional application of the above provisions for listed companies) and certain supervisory duties. In particular, they become responsible for the protection of the lawful operation of the SA and the protection of its interests.

    Their authority (more precisely: their obligations) includes -indicatively- the monitoring of the implementation of the statutory provisions and legislative obligations. They must, moreover, report to the Board any incidents of conflict of interest (between the members of the Board and the company) in order to take the appropriate measures. They cooperate, if deemed necessary, with the competent supervisory authorities. In any case, internal auditors should have access (also) to the company’s confidential information.

    Internal Auditors-SA Relationship

    Internal auditors (unlike substitute bodies) do not exercise organizational powers of management and representation. On the contrary there exists, between them and the SA, exclusively, some kind of contractual relationship (ind.: provision of independent services, dependent work). They report to the Board of Directors.

    Sub-delegation on the part of the auditors of their responsibilities is possible, only, by power of attorney. The appointment of substitute bodies by them is beyond their powers.

     

    Executive committee

    In General

    In addition to the internal auditors, in the same provision regarding powers, we find an important innovation: the possibility of setting up an executive committee within the Board of Directors of the SA (art. 87 §4 Law 4548/2018). As expressly provided, by provision of the articles of association or by decision of the Board of Directors, if the articles of association allow it, it is possible to set up an executive committee. This committee is assigned specific powers or responsibilities of the Board. Members of the executive committee can be both members of the Board of Directors and third parties (see, in this regard, Explanatory Report of law 4548/2018 on art. 87).

    With this specific provision the permissibility of setting up such committees was clarified and their role was established. The permissibility of their establishment and operation was disputed under the previous regime. It was questioned, in particular, whether the possibility of delegating powers of the Board of Directors to specific members could also include the creation of a committee with the ability to make decisions (see in this regard, Explanatory Report to law 4548/2018 on art. 87). It should be clarified, however, that (even under the prevailing legislative framework) in practice such bodies existed and successfully, as a rule, operated and made decisions.

    Deviating, therefore, from the standards of the – otherwise established in Greece – monist system, the operation of the executive structure in question in the context of the SA seems to resemble the binary system of corporate governance (which is made up of two bodies: the supervisory and managerial).

    Conditions of Establishment

    Statutory provision: The establishment of the executive committee could only require a special statutory provision. This may also concern (apart from what is permitted by its constitution) other, individual, issues. E.g.: its composition, responsibilities, tasks and the way of making decisions. Also, any other matter concerning its operation. It is noted that, as we have already pointed out in our previous article, the specific possibility of “direct” statutory regulation of such issues is not omitted in terms of the company’s Board of Directors (with the exception of the composition and powers of the first Board of Directors).

    It is not excluded, however, that both the decision on the formation and the individual operational issues of the executive committee belong to the Board itself. A previous/relevant statutory provision is also required in this case.

    Responsibilities

    If it is not explicitly defined, the assigned duties of the said committee seem to belong to the “executive” powers of the Board. In accordance with what applies to substitutes, it is prohibited to delegate to the executive committee powers that belong, by law, to the Board of Directors as a collective body (incl.: approval of the transfer of reserved shares, certification of the payment of share capital). However, it is not possible to assign supervisory powers to the executive committee.

    Decision-making power does not, however, rest with the individual members of the executive committee. On the contrary, the committee is competent as a (collective) body. Therefore, it constitutes, in this case, a “substitute body” of the Board of Directors.

    The delegation of powers to the executive committee does not overturn the given responsibility of the Board and its members. The Board remains charged with the duty of overseeing corporate affairs. Also, with the task of supervising the actions of its individual members – of course he executive committee included.

     

    Distinctions of Board Members

    Especially with regard to listed SAs, the members of the Board of Directors are distinguished, by law, based on their duties into executive, non-executive and independent (art. 5 et seq. of Law 4706/2020). The topic here is also extremely extensive. We limit ourselves, out of necessity, to the absolutely necessary.

    A similar arrangement for the distinction of the members of the Board of Directors does not exist for non-listed SAs. It is possible to proportionally apply the provisions on the need for executive, non-executive and independent members of the Board of Directors (but also on corporate governance-in general) to non-listed SAs as well. As long as there is a relevant statutory provision (art. 87 §5). In this case, the supervisory and sanctioning powers of the Capital Market Commission do not apply to the SAs in question.

    However, in relation to the common SAs, any executive committee is usually mostly accompanied by executive members of the board.

    The role of the executive members of the Board of Directors is crucial. They are involved in the day-to-day management of the company and are responsible for the implementation of the corporate strategy. They are, however, supervised during the exercise of their duties by the non-executive and independent members.

     

    The operation of the SA Board of Directors can be assisted, under certain conditions, by an executive committee. The latter will, in this case, be included in the making of important decisions. In this case, the risks will be limited by assigning them to individual representatives. The operation of a potentially multi-member Board of Directors will be relieved, making its operation more flexible and efficient. All this, however, is not enough! The (internal) control of the SA and the corresponding framework to ensure its lawful and in accordance with the statute and the law operation is necessary; in fact, regardless of legal obligations which (in the vast majority of SAs) are lacking.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 22th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Responsibilities of the Board of Directors: Assignment to Members or Third Parties

    Responsibilities of the Board of Directors: Assignment to Members or Third Parties

    In our previous article we dealt with the important role of the Board of Directors. We examined, among other things, his powers and powers; additionally: the scope of his powers. We referred to the principle of the collective action of the Board (art. 77 §2 ed. 2 of law 4548/2018) but also to its deviations; for the possibility, e.g. of delegation of powers of the Board of Directors, to individual members or third parties. In the present article we will examine the specific deviations from the rule.

     

    Appointment of Substitute Bodies

    In General

    In general, the principle (under domestic law) that the Board of Directors acts collectively applies. This particular principle, however, is not without exception. It is possible, e.g., for the Board of Directors to delegate the powers of management and representation of the SA to one or more persons (natural or legal). Members or not. The specific persons are referred to, collectively, as “substitutes” or “subordinates”.

    The delegation of powers of the Board of Directors to substitute bodies constitutes, in practice, the rule under which it operates: the Board of Directors operates through its substitute bodies. This seems reasonable. In this way, the everyday operations of the SA is simplified. The speed of its transactions is ensured. The exercise of the tasks and work of the Board of Directors becomes more efficient. Complex issues are easier to manage.

    Conditions

    The delegation of (organizational) powers to substitute bodies requires compliance with the publicity formalities provided for (not, however, necessary for its validity). Presupposed, however, are cumulatively: the existence of a special statutory provision (art. 87 §1 ed. a΄-1096/1976 plenary session of the Supreme Court) and a relevant decision of the Board of Directors. In more detail:

    (a) Statutory Provision: The requirement for the existence of a special statutory provision as a condition for the delegation of organizational powers to substitute bodies does not derive only from the law on SAs (: art. 87 §1 ed. a’). Corresponding provisions are also found in other laws (: art. 65, 67 and 68 CC-1085/2019 QUALEX Legal Database). The provisions, however, of the law on SAs prevail over those, as they are more specific (1510/2006 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database).

    In the absence of a special statutory provision, any delegation of power of representation to a member of the Board of Directors or a third party is equated with the granting of a power of attorney (art. 211 et seq. CC -1252/2016 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database).

    The articles of association may define the areas for which the Board of Directors will be entitled to delegate management and representation powers. It is also possible to set additional conditions. To limit, e.g., the pool of possible substitute persons by excluding, for example, third parties. Adherence to such terms will constitute an additional condition for the legality of any assignment. The articles of association can, at the same time, define the way of action of the substitute bodies (e.g. with the cooperation of several persons or for specific transactions only).

    It is not excluded that the appointment of substitute bodies by the Board of Directors is defined by the statute as mandatory/obligatory. However, there is a difference of opinion as to the binding nature of such an appointment. According to the jurisprudence (and the correct) opinion, it is accepted that the Board must comply with the statutory “order” (ind. 7119/2004 Court of Appeal of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database). In theory, on the other hand, it seems to hold the position that the Board of Directors retains the discretion to choose whether to make a substitution and, if so, which individual persons to appoint.

    However, the condition of the special statutory provision is open to deviations. Among other things: (i) the judicial appointment of a special representative of the company to conduct judicial proceedings to annul a decision of the Board of Directors (art. 137 §3) and (ii) the judicial appointment of a special representative of the company to bring a lawsuit against members of the Board of Directors (art. 105).

    (b) Decision of the Board of Directors: As long as the required statutory provision/possibility exists, the relevant decision of the Board of Directors for the transfer of its powers can take place.

    It is noted, however, that any delegation by the Board of Directors to another body (e.g. the General Assembly or a third party) of its authority to be substituted (the Board of Directors) in the exercise of its powers is invalid. This prohibition, in fact, seems reasonable as it goes against the principle of its autonomy. Besides, the Board of Directors is the most suitable body, not only to assign and identify its substitute persons, but also to distribute – at its discretion – the responsibilities between them.

    Also, for the same reasons, the direct delegation of responsibilities to members of the Board of Directors or third parties is excluded by the statute. And even more so on the basis of an extra-company agreement (68/2014 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). However, it is permissible, exceptionally, to appoint the first Board of Directors upon the establishment of the SA. Also, the performance of individual offices (incl.: president, vice-president, managing director or authorized advisor). And the same goes for the delegation of responsibilities to its members or third parties. The Board of Directors, of course, can (also in the latter case) proceed, at any time, to redistribute and/or revoke the specific offices and responsibilities (art. 87 §3). Any limitation of its specific right will be null and void.

    (c) Publicity: The validity of the appointment of a substitute body does not require the observance of specific formalities. The special provision of the articles of association and the relevant decision of the Board of Directors recorded in the minutes are sufficient. The latter is not required to be formally stated (1085/2019 QUALEX Legal Database). It is sufficient that such a will clearly emerges from the delegation decision (:in this context it is argued, rather extremely, that even the implied delegation of powers is valid).

    However, the observance of publicity formalities is deemed necessary for opposing the assignment against bona fide third parties. The relevant publication is for informational purposes only.

     

    Appointment Of Substitute Bodies

    The Nature of Powers

    The decision of the Board of Directors to appoint substitute bodies entails the assumption by them of individual powers (: organizational) of management and representation of the SA. The specific substitute bodies have authority through the law and the statute and their link with the SA is the same as that of the Board of Directors (1086/2019 Supreme Court, QUALEX Legal Database).

    Substitute bodies become, in other words, bodies of the company. Equal, in fact, to each other, as all substitute bodies are assimilated in terms of powers (and therefore responsibility), regardless of their status as members of the Board of Directors or not. An organic relationship is created between them and the SA. Hence the name “substitutes” or otherwise “subordinates”.

    In a logical sequence, therefore, the bodies in question do not act as trustees/representatives of the SA; a special power of attorney is not required for the exercise of management acts.

    The Responsibilities

    The transfer of powers can, in principle, concern all or part of the powers of the Board of Directors. The responsibility of the substitute may include the business of one or more category of acts (conclusion of contracts with customers, banking transactions) or specific, only, acts (e.g. conclusion of a specific, only, contract). In the latter case, however, there is no need to comply with publicity formalities.

    Substitution, however, is excluded for those powers of the Board of Directors that are assigned by law and concern, exclusively, its action as a collective body. Indicative: (a) the authority to approve the transfer of restricted shares (art. 43) and (b) the certification of payment of the capital (art. 20).

    From the articles of association or, more commonly, from the decision of the Board of Directors, it is expected to become clear whether the substitute bodies will act individually or collectively. Otherwise, the collective representation rule will apply.

    The Relationship of Actions of Substitutes & the Board

    The substitute bodies have parallel authority with the Board of Directors to exercise the powers assigned to them (330/2006 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). Hierarchically higher and, at the same time, the main body of management and representation of the SA remains, in any case, the Board of Directors. The substitutes, therefore, act independently, but must not ignore the Board. Thus, the autonomy they have in the context of their organic relationship with the company is limited.

    The Board of Directors is entitled and obliged to supervise the substitute bodies. At the same time, it is entitled to be informed about the progress of the corporate affairs it has assigned to them. It is also entitled, of course, to modify (even revoke) their powers.

    The Duration of Powers

    The term of office of the substitute bodies (it is assumed that) follows the term of the Board by which they were appointed. Therefore, in the prevailing opinion, the power given will be shorter or equal in duration to the term of the said Board. Reasonably so, as the delegation of their responsibilities takes place within the framework of a decision of a specific Board of Directors. The opposite point of view is also supported – not correctly in our opinion: of absolute independence and lack of connection between the bodies in question and the Board of Directors, in terms of the temporal scope of their powers.

    Therefore, the termination of the term of the Board of Directors (or any recall of its members) will automatically bring about corresponding consequences for the substitute bodies.

    The Board of Directors has, as already mentioned, absolute power to revoke the substitute bodies. If the revoked person is a member of the Board of Directors, the powers assigned to them will cease, but the status of the member will remain.

    In principle, the General Assembly does not have the power to revoke the substitute bodies. If the General Assembly revokes, however, members of the Board (as always, only it has the right to act) any parallel status as substitute bodies will be automatically revoked. It is noted, however, that if it is a third (non-member of the Board of Directors) substitute body, appointed with the establishment of the SA (art. 87 §3), the General Assembly has the power to revoke it by simply amending the relevant statutory regulation.

    Ability to Further assign powers

    The substitute body may further delegate all or part of the responsibilities assigned to it to other members of the Board of Directors or third parties. As long as there is (art. 87 §2): (a) Absence of a relevant statutory prohibition (: negative prerequisite) and (b) Provision in the decision of the Board of the possibility of further assignment (: positive prerequisite).

    The further assignment takes place under the same conditions as those required for the assignment. At the same time, the further delegation of powers from substitute bodies to other “sub-substitutes” implies, for them, the acquisition of organizational powers of the company. They clearly exercise their powers alongside the substitute bodies and are subject to the supervision of the latter.

     

    The operation of the SA would prove, practically, unfeasible in the event that collective, exclusive action of the members of the Board of Directors would be required to take any decision related to its daily operations. Therefore, the assignment of responsibilities (by the Board of Directors) to substitute bodies is absolutely necessary. Correspondingly, however, of significant importance is the design of the company’s engagement and representation system. Not (only) for the alignment with corporate governance rules (and the always valuable ESG criteria) but also, in particular, for the safety of the company and those involved. In the context, however, of this and also of the possibility of establishing an Internal Audit and an Executive Committee, about which, however, see our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 15th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • The scope of the authority of the board of directors

    The scope of the authority of the board of directors

    The important role of the Board of Directors has already concerned us in our previous article. We referred there, among other things, to the management duty of the Board. Also, to the scope of its powers and responsibilities. We closely approached its responsibilities for management and representation of the SA (: internal relations and relations with third parties – respectively). Here, too, we will be looking into the specific powers in light of the rule of the unlimited and unrestricted power of representation.

     

    The Responsibilities of the Board of Directors

    While examining the responsibilities of the Board of Directors, we were already explored the relevant provisions of the law (art. 77 §1 Law 4548/2018). According to them, the SA is managed by the Board of Directors. The content of the administration is the management as well as its judicial and extrajudicial representation. Every management act belongs to the management of the SA. Also: every act of representation constitutes, at the same time, an act of management. Every act of management, however, does not constitute an act of representation.

    However, the other provisions of the law also apply. Among them is the one (art. 86§1) which provides that the Board of Directors is competent to decide on every act concerning the management of the company, the management of its property and, in general, the pursuit of its objectives. As far as the fulfillment of the corporate purpose is concerned, the management of the SA is the function that tends, primarily, to its realization – in the narrow sense.

     

    The Corporate Objectives

    The term “corporate objective” has two meanings.

    In its broadest sense, the corporate objective is what determines the general direction of the SA: it refers to the type of its activity. On the other hand, the exercise of administration and management are carried out with the aim and goal of realizing, as already noted, the corporate objectives – in the narrow sense of the term. The implementation and promotion, i.e., of the object of the corporate activity, as described in the company’s articles of association.

    In this specific sense, it is accepted that the corporate objective is not limited only to acts that fall clearly within the exercise of the corporate activity. It includes, on the contrary, an expanded area of actions that serve the long-term goals of the business, based on the perception of transactions. According to the jurisprudence, such actions constitute, indicatively, the acceptance of bills of convenience or the provision of guarantees in favor of a third party (67/2019 Court of Appeal of Dodekanisa, QUALEX Legal Database).

     

    Board Actions unrelated to the Corporate Objectives

    The Rule of Unlimited Power of Representation

    The rule of the unlimited representation power of the Board of Directors is based on the law (art. 86 §2). It aims, in fact, at the protection of third parties and transactions.

    According to the specific regulation, acts of the Board of Directors, even if they do not serve the corporate objectives (either in its broad and/or narrow sense), bind the company vis-à-vis third parties. This rule is not, however, without any exceptions.

    The national legislator made use of the exemption provided by the first corporate Directive (2009/101/EC). The Directive in question allows, in particular, an exemption from the commitment of the company from acts outside the corporate purpose in the event that the third parties were, in fact, aware of the relevant violation. And this knowledge can either be proven or indirectly inferred from the fact that the third party could not, given the circumstances, ignore it (see Explanatory Report law 4548/2018 on art. 86).

    The national legislator, contrary to the previous law (2190/1920), did not provide for an exception in the case where the third party should have known of the excess exercise of power. That is, they deleted the phrase “or should have known”, which also included third parties who were not aware of the excess of the corporate objective because they did not exercise due diligence. And this is because the specific possibility did not seem to be in line with the aforementioned Directive (see Explanatory Report of law 4548/2018 on art. 86).

    The non-commitment of the SA (according to the prevailing opinion in the legal theory), does not occur only in the cases of knowledge by the third party of exceeding the corporate purpose, but also in the cases of their gross negligence.

    It is noted, further, that the SA itself bears the burden of proving the incidents that cancel its commitment. The specific, indeed, burden of proof is justified by the purpose of the rule of the unlimited power of representation: the protection, i.e., of third parties and transactions (art. 86 §2. ed. b). However, in cases where there is a clear excess of the corporate purpose, it is accepted that proof of knowledge on the part of the third party is not required. In the case, e.g., of the sale of all the company’s assets (4839/1979 Court of Appeal of Athens, “Epitheorisi Emporikou Dikaiou”, 1980, 249, which concerns the sale of raw materials and equipment of an LLC).

    In fact, it is expressly provided that the mere observance of the publicity formalities regarding the company’s statute or its amendments does not constitute proof of the knowledge of the third party (art. 86 §2. ed. c).

    It is argued, reasonably, however, that the protection of the third party (even a bona fide one) does not reach, in any case, to the point of binding the SA (also) for actions for which by law the board cannot bind the company. In the case, e.g., when actions are exclusively in the competence of the General Assembly.

    Legal Consequences

    If the Board of Directors acts in excess of the corporate purpose and the third party-dealer is in bad faith regarding the fact of the excess, concerns arise regarding the legal consequences.

    From a point of view, the contract that the Board of Directors enters into with the bad-faith third party is of absolute nullity. The SA is not bound in this case. And in fact, anyone can invoke the invalidity.

    From another point of view, the invalidity is relative in favor of the SA: only it is able to project and implement it.

    According to a third point of view, however, the provisions of the law (229 et seq. CC) regarding the abuse of power of attorney should be applied, in this case-analogously. According to it, a contract of the Board of Directors, in excess of the corporate purpose with a bad-faith third party, is pending for as long as the Board of Directors does not decide for or against it. Specifically, in the event that the General Assembly, with an increased quorum and majority, approves the above contract, it becomes effective and binds the SA. However, if the SA expressly decides not to approve it, it is not bound.

    It should be noted that the SA can take action against the members of the Board of Directors who act in excess of the corporate purpose – as long as the conditions of the law are met (art. 102).

     

    Restrictions From the Articles of Association or the General Assembly

    The Rule of Unrestricted Power of Representation

    The law, in addition, is what establishes (article 86§3) the rule of non-limitation of the organic power of representation – aiming, likewise, at the protection of third parties and transactions. It provides, in particular, that limitations of the authority of the Board of Directors by the statute or by a decision of the General Assembly are not opposed by third parties. Even if they have been made public.

    This provision takes into account the limitation of administrative authority that becomes permissible. In particular, the members of the Board of Directors are obliged to observe the limitations of their authority, whether they are set by the statute or by the General Assembly.

    Legal consequences

    However, in case of non-observance of these restrictions by members of the Board of Directors, they are not opposed to third parties – even if the latter were aware of them. These restrictions have – as a rule – effect only in the context of internal relations.

    The specific regulation (no. 86§3) does not provide for an exception to the non-limitation rule. It is important, however, to note that its absolute and unexceptional wording creates risks for the SA: even in the case of collusion between the Board of Directors and a third party with the aim of not complying with any restrictions, the SA (should be) bound by the carried out transaction with the third party acting in bad faith. Such an approach would, obviously, be dangerous for the SA. The teleological contraction of the provision in question is argued, and rightly so: bad faith third parties should not be protected by the non-limitation of the power of representation.

     

    The protection of those acting in bad faith vis-à-vis the SA should not prevail over the latter. And rightly so. Consequently, acts of the Board, even outside the corporate purpose, bind the company against those who either did not know or were unreasonably unaware of the relevant excess. At the same time, limitations of the power of representation of the Board of Directors set by the statute or the General Assembly will (and must) be opposed against those, only, who operate based on bad faith and with intent to harm the interests of the SA. But often the boundaries between good and bad faith are, unfortunately, indiscernible. Therefore, special attention is required in transactions of particular importance and/or value. The risks, otherwise, will not be negligible for the SA, the (bona fide) third parties and the transactions themselves. –

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 8th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

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