Category: Articles

  • Violations by members of the SA Board of Directors

    Violations by members of the SA Board of Directors

    Today we are focusing on Article 177 of Law 4548/2018 on (criminal) “offenses by board members”, which aims, among other things, to safeguard the company’s capital and the interests of creditors.

    The provision in question criminalizes five different behaviors with a common cohesive element being the status of the perpetrator: any (even non-executive) board member. We categorize the behaviors into two sections:

    (a) The first section (§§ 1, 2 & 5) includes: (aa) the primary obligation to draw up and approve essentially accurate, non-misleading (see our related article of 17.03.2022) and by the law, in terms of their content, financial or consolidated statements of the company, management reports (which are not included in the financial statements) and any other annual report required by law and (ab) the secondary prohibition of distribution of profits or other benefits to shareholders of the company or a third party, in cases where the primary (under aa ) duty of veracity, accuracy and compliance with the law is not respected, especially when the statements in question have not been drawn up, etc.

    (b) The second section (§§ 3 & 4) includes: (ba) the prohibition of the knowing acquisition of redeemable shares or of causing the acquisition by the company of its own shares or shares of its parent company or other titles of its parent company, in violation of the law ( art . 39, 48, 49, 52 & 57) but also (bb) the prohibition of granting an advance, loan or guarantee either by charging the company, with the aim of acquiring its shares by a third party, or by charging its subsidiary, in order for a third party to acquire shares of its parent company, in violation of the law (art. 51).

    Any member of the Board of Directors who commits any of the above offenses (whether of the first or the second section) is severely punished: with imprisonment (up to 5 years) and with a fine from 10,000 to 100,000 euros.

    We consider it important to underline the evaluative asymmetry (now antinomy) which is found in this case between SAs on the one hand and Limited Liability Companies (art . 60 n. 3190/1955) and Private Capital Companies (art. 119 n. 4072/2012) on the other:

    the essentially similar acts of the first section (aa, ab), in the case of the SA are punished and even most severely, while in the cases of the LLC and the PPC they are not punished even in the least – they were misdemeanors which were abolished in their entirety.

    by no means are we insinuating a preference towards LLCs and PPCs, where, in the end, the provisions of the common Criminal Code apply.

    Nor do we give in to the temptations of an unconditional criminal intervention in the other corporate forms or an unjustified repeal of art. 177: it constitutes our moral and political defeat to comply (or not) with the law simply out of fear.

    The legislator, however, must be consistent (: not to send contradictory messages), fair (: to apply, in this case, the principle of equality) and alert (: to realize when it is skewed): otherwise, it negates the reason for the existence of the provisions that establishes and proves ineffective and unfair in regulating such a complex phenomenon as entrepreneurship.

    George Karanikolas
    Senior Associate

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (May 22nd, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Share Capital Reduction: Techniques, Conditions & Procedure

    Share Capital Reduction: Techniques, Conditions & Procedure

    In a previous article we dealt with the concept and distinctions of equity capital. But for its implementation we need planning, preparation and, of course, a “road map”. It is precisely these that will concern us here, together with the techniques and conditions of reduction. The rights and protection of lenders will be the subject of our next article.

     

    Equity Reduction Techniques

    The legislator does not detail specific reduction techniques. The theory is called upon to cover the relevant gap; there are three alternatives. Specifically:

    Reduction of the Nominal Value of Shares

    It is this particular technique that ensures, more than any other, the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. Through this, the nominal value of the shares (either in total or of a certain category) is reduced. The nominal value, however – after the reduction, cannot fall short of the, according to law, minimum of €0.04 (art. 35 §1 law 4548/2018). Any need for further reduction should be met by some other technique (from the remaining two).

    Cancellation of Shares

    The cancellation of shares naturally results in a reduction of their total number. Its direct consequence is the depreciation of the share rights, which derive from the canceled shares.

    The cancellation of shares must, in principle, be done uniformly and proportionally – for all shareholders. Possible unilateral cancellation requires: either a statutory provision (initial or resulting from a unanimous decision of the shareholders) or the consent of those affected. In any case, cancellation of shares takes place in cases of mandatory reduction .

    Consolidation of Shares

    The technique of combining shares is, essentially, a combination of the immediately preceding methods of reduction. Based on this, certain shares are cancelled. The nominal value of the balances changes, at the same time – and with a specific ratio.

    Capital Reduction Conditions & Procedure

    Given the importance of share capital, we have already pointed out that its amount, coverage , payment as well as its maintenance at specific levels are governed by specific rules. In order to prevent them from being circumvented, the reduction process requires strict rules and conditions; about them, see immediately below.

    Competent body

    The decision to reduce the share capital is the responsibility of the General Assembly (art. 117 §1 para. a’ Law 4548/2018), which decides with an increased quorum and majority (art. 29 §1, 130 §3 and 132 §2 Law 4548/2018). It is, however, possible for the statute to provide for greater percentages of quorum and majority – even unanimity (art. 130 §5 and 132 §3 Law 4548/2018).

    Unanimity, however, is required – as we have pointed out in our previous article, in the case of uneven reduction. The non-proportional, i.e. non-equal for the shareholders, reduction of the share capital (167/2012 Legal Council of the State).

    However, some cases of reduction do not require the above, increased, percentages of the General Assembly for taking the relevant decisions. The decision on the reduction is taken by the ordinary General Assembly (art. 29 §1 and 130 §3 Law 4548/2018), by simple quorum and majority, in cases of mandatory reduction; specifically:

    (a) In the case of the cancellation of shares that were not repaid – after the fruitless attempt of the SA to sell them (art. 21 §§5 & 6 and 20 §9 of Law 4548/2018 – see also our previous article).

    (b) In the case of the cancellation of the company’s own shares – if it was not possible to sell them (§§6 & 7 of article 49 of Law 4548/2018).

     

    The Invitation to Convene the General Assembly

    Content

    With the exception of the cases of taking a decision by an unsolicited & universal General Assembly or the signing of minutes without a meeting (art. 135 of Law 4548/2018), an invitation of the General Assembly is required. The specific invitation must define, at a minimum, the purpose of the reduction and the method of its implementation (Article 29 §3 Law 4548/2018). A special mention should be made, in the event that a share capital reduction in kind is to take place.

    Purpose

    The minimum, by law, content of the invitation serves a dual purpose.

    It aims, on the one hand , to inform and not surprise the shareholders, in view of the holding of the General Assembly that will decide on the reduction. The shareholders, receiving the relevant information, can consult and prepare more fully, in order to exercise their right to vote.

    It aims, on the other hand, to inform the lenders of the SA (and its potential contractors) in order to proceed (or not) to exercise their legal rights (art. 30 law 4548/2018- for which see our next article).

    Legal consequences of violation

    The possible failure to mention (or incorrect mention) in the invitation of the elements provided for by the law had the consequence, under the previous law, of the invalidity of the reduction of the share capital.

    On the contrary, as the Explanatory Report on article 29 of Law 4548/2018 points out “…the phrase…under penalty of invalidity was deleted”. Today, therefore, any omission or misstatement of information on the invitation (or on the decision) is judged on the basis of “…the general rules on defective decisions of the General Assembly”.

    The Content of the Decision of the General Assembly on Reduction

    Purpose of Reduction and Method of Implementation

    The decision of the General Assembly on the reduction of the share capital, as well as the invitation, must at least mention the purpose of the specific reduction and the method of its implementation (art. 29 §3 Law 4548/2018). The General Assembly may, however, decide otherwise as to the manner of reduction.

    Capital Reduction In Kind

    As we mentioned in our previous article, a special way of reduction is the reduction of share capital made by payment in kind. In this case, the decision of the General Assembly must accurately describe the assets that will go to each of the shareholders, to avoid any kind of doubt regarding the distribution (art. 31 §1 law 4548/2018).

    Amendment of Articles of Association

    The reduction of the SA’s share capital requires an amendment of the relevant provision of its articles of association by the General Assembly (29 §4 Law 4548/2018). In particular, the General Assembly must decide on the modification of the amount of the share capital, as it is formed after the reduction. At the same time, and depending on the technique adopted, the modification of the nominal value of the shares and/or the modification of their number. The specific amendment of the articles of association requires the approval of the Management (art. 9 Law 4548/2018).

    Minimum Reduction Limit of the Share Capital

    The General Assembly cannot, in principle, decide to reduce the SA’s share capital, so that it falls short of the minimum limit of €25,000 (art. 15 §2 Law 4548/2018). However, it can also be decided to make it (even) zero, as long as it is simultaneously decided and, subsequently, implemented to increase the share capital up to, at least, the minimum legal amount.

    However, it is possible, as an alternative, to make a decision to simultaneously convert the SA into another corporate type, which by definition will require less or no capital (article 29 §2, section a’ of Law 4548/2018).

    Means of “Blocking out” Shareholders(?)

    The decision to reduce the share capital to zero can act as a means of removing existing shareholders. Restraint in the relevant event is the right of preference in the upcoming, necessary, increase. Specifically, the law provides that in this increase “…the company’s shareholders have a right of preference according to their participation in the capital, as it was formed before the reduction.” (art. 29 §2, ed. b’ of Law 4548/2018). Despite the doubts regarding the previous regime, the Explanatory Report on article 29 states that: “…it is clarified that in case of a reduction of the capital with a simultaneous decision to increase it, the pre-emptive right of the old shareholders is not removed, even in the case that after the reduction the participation in the capital may have been zeroed out”. There is always, of course, the possibility, under certain conditions, of excluding the right of pre-emption, in this specific increase as well…

    Approval of More Classes of Shareholders

    Various categories of shareholders may participate in the SA’s share capital (e.g. preferred shareholders, holders of redeemable shares). The decision of the General Assembly to reduce the share capital may affect, directly or indirectly, the rights of one or more categories. In this case, the approval of the affected shareholders is foreseen as a condition for the progress of the relevant procedure. This approval is provided by a decision of the shareholders of the affected category, taken in a special meeting with an increased quorum and majority (art. 29 §6 Law 4548/2018).

    The General Assembly of the particular category (or possibly more categories) of shareholders only decides whether or not to grant the required approval. It does not decide on the individual conditions of the reduction, which have already been determined by the shareholders of the SA. Regarding the procedure for convening the special General Assembly, the relevant provisions for the General Assembly of Shareholders are applied accordingly (art. 29 §6 Law 4548/2018).

    Publicity of the Reduction Decision

    The decision to reduce the share capital is, as we pointed out, of particular importance both for the SA and its shareholders, but also for the SA’s lenders and business partners. Necessary, therefore, is its publicity. It takes place, given its nature as an amendment to the statute, on the website of the Business Registry, after approval by the Administration (art. 12 of Law 4548/2018). Furthermore, the law requires that the relevant decision “…be also posted on the company’s website” (art. 29 §4 in fine n. 4548/2018).

     

    Matters connected with the reduction of share capital seem, indeed, “dry” technically and, of course, tedious. They prove, however, to be particularly important to the company, its lenders, and its shareholders—so much so that they may lead to a “blocking out” of the company of some of them. Solutions exist to protect those involved. But especially with regard to the company’s lenders, see our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (May 15th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Reduction of Share Capital SA-Distinctions

    Reduction of Share Capital SA-Distinctions

    The distinctions of the various forms of reduction of the share capital of the SA seem unnecessarily technical. And so do the issues, in general, related to the reduction of the share capital. They are, however – and as a whole, important as they provide solutions to in other ways unsolvable (or even intractable) problems. We have, repeatedly, referred to the special importance of share capital in the existence and development of SAs in the context of our previous articles. Given its importance, its amount, coverage and payment as well as its keeping at specific levels are governed, as we have seen, by specific rules. Their circumvention (through the reduction of the share capital) could only take place with specific, correspondingly strict, rules (articles 29-31 of Law 4548/2018). These rules and, in general, the concept of share capital reduction, its procedure and conditions as well as its legal consequences are some of the issues that will concern us in the present, but also in our articles to follow.

     

    Share Capital Reduction Distinctions

    The reduction of share capital, depending on the purpose it pursues and the way in which it is implemented, is distinguished as follows:

    Actual & Nominal Reduction

    The distinction between real and nominal reduction is characteristic of the corresponding increase in share capital (about which our previous article ). Particularly:

    Actual Reduction

    Actual reduction takes place by returning corporate property (more commonly: money) to shareholders. Or also, after the shareholders’ partial or total exemption from the obligation to pay capital. Always, of course, under the condition of observing the conditions of the law.

    The actual reduction therefore constitutes a release of capital. It may be aimed at: (a) readjusting the capital to the real needs of the SA, (b) changing the correlation of forces and balances between its shareholders, (c) distributing property of the SA (instead of a dividend for tax purposes) to the shareholders of (or, as the case may be, to a specific shareholder thereof), (d) to increase the profitability of the equity capital of the SA.

    Nominal Reduction

    A nominal reduction, on the other hand, means the accounting reduction of the SA’s share capital. In other words, the share capital through the nominal reduction is reduced as accounting aggregates, but no payment to the shareholders follows. In other words, there is no real reduction in corporate assets.

    The need for a nominal reduction is dictated, in practice, in cases of existence of damages – not, however, temporary and limited. In these cases, the nominal/accounting reduction aims at the consolidation of the SA, the readjustment of the share capital to the (corresponding) reduced corporate property and the satisfaction, in the end, of the interests of the shareholders as well as of the legal entity itself. In fact, if such a reduction is combined with a (simultaneous) increase in the SA’s share capital, it is, as a rule, a move to consolidate it.

    Optional & Mandatory Reduction

    The decision to reduce the SA’s share capital can be either optional or mandatory.

    Optional Reduction

    The decision on the reduction and its amount constitutes, in this particular case, a business decision. It is taken freely by the competent corporate body, which evaluates the individual data as well as the, in general, needs of the business.

    Mandatory Reduction

    In some cases, however, the company’s recourse to the reduction of the share capital becomes mandatory – even by law. Such cases, e.g., constitute:

    (a) the case of the cancellation of the company’s own shares, since it was not possible for it to sell the share buybacks (§§6 & 7 of article 49 of Law 4548/2018).

    (b) the case of the cancellation of shares that were not repaid – after the fruitless attempt of the SA to sell of them (articles 20 §9 and 21 §§6 & 7 of Law 4548/2018 (see also our previous article).

    Uniform & Uneven Reduction

    The distinction between uniform and uneven reduction is considered important for reasons of expediency and whether or not to maintain the equity relationships within the SA.

    Uniform Reduction

    In principle, the reduction of share capital should comply with the principle of equal treatment of shareholders. This means that the participation of each shareholder in the capital should, in such a case, be reduced proportionally. The uniform, consequently, reduction serves not only the principle of equal treatment but also the maintenance of the existing equity balances within the SA.

    Uneven Reduction

    On the other hand, in the case of the uneven reduction, the relevant decision may lead, in essence, to the return of funds (and/or a specific asset of the SA) to a single shareholder; even to the exit from the SA of one, and only one, shareholder. In other words: in the non-proportional (and non-equal for shareholders) reduction of the share capital.

    However, it is argued (and rightly so) that a condition for such an uneven reduction (for the benefit of specific shareholders only) is the unanimous, relevant decision of the General Assembly (167/2012 Legal Council of the State).

    Reduction By Payment Of Cash & Capital Reduction In Kind

    The actual reduction of share capital, the return, i.e., of corporate property to shareholders, is further distinguished based on the type of property returned.

    Reduction With Cash Payment

    In this case (which is also the most common one) the capital reduction takes place by paying cash to the shareholders.

    Capital Reduction In Kind

    The actual reduction of the share capital can also be realized through a direct return to the shareholders of corporate property in kind. In fact, Law 4548/2018-in contrast to the previous regime, regulates the relevant case.

    This is one of the two special ways of reducing share capital (Article 31 of Law 4548/2018), as they are analyzed immediately below. More specifically: (a) the reduction by payment in kind (§1) and (b) the reduction for the purpose of forming a special reserve (§2).

     

    Special Ways of Reducing Share Capital

    Reduction By Payment In Kind

    The reduction of the share capital, with a payment in kind, can prove to be particularly beneficial not only for the beneficial shareholders but for the SA itself. Especially in cases where a large part of its assets are e.g. products, real estate, shares of other companies. In such cases, the liquidation of the assets and the reduction of the capital by payment in cash could prove not only difficult but also harmful to the SA.

    The previous regime

    The possibility of reduction by payment in kind was not specifically regulated under the previous regime. Objections regarding the permissibility of such a reduction were therefore raised by a portion of the legal theory.

    The opposite position was, however, of course also supported. That is to say that “…the reduction of the share capital of an SA by payment in kind to its shareholders, although it is not expressly provided for in the statutory law of SAs (law. 2190/1920), can be chosen, under conditions, by the competent corporate body based primarily on the interest of the company’s creditors and secondarily of its shareholders…” (167/2012 Legal Council of the State -by majority).

    The current regime

    Under the current regime, any dispute regarding the permissibility of capital reduction by payment in kind is waived. Now, as underlined in the Explanatory Report of the law on SAs (: on article 31 of law 4548/2018), “the possibility of reducing capital in kind is expressly provided for…”.

    However, a valuation of the assets to be returned to shareholders due to the reduction is required beforehand. Therefore, the provisions for the valuation of contributions in kind apply (: articles 17 and 18 of Law 4548/2018). At the same time, it is expressly provided that – apart from the exceptions of Article 18 of Law 4548/2018 – “…valuation of the contributions in kind is not required, if the shareholders unanimously decide on the way to implement the reduction” (Article 31 §1, Section c).

    Reduction for the Purpose of the Formation of a Special Reserve

    The other special way of reducing the share capital concerns the reduction for the purpose of forming a special reserve. Under the previous regime, doubts had been expressed about the permissibility of the relevant reduction method. Whereas, a relevant legislative provision was provided only for listed SAs.

    Law 4548/2018 also expressly regulated the specific method of reduction. According to the legislative provision, however, the “special reserve can only be used for the purpose of its recapitalization or its offsetting to amortize losses of the company” (Article 31 §2 in fine). This means that this special reserve cannot be distributed to shareholders. On the contrary, it increases the share capital (according to §1 of article 159 of Law 4548/2018).

     

    As mentioned in the introduction, the ways of reducing the share capital and the related distinctions seem unnecessarily technical. It is, however, particularly important to know them as they often provide us with solutions to intractable, otherwise, absolutely tangible, problems. The (legal) transfer of property from the SA to its shareholders, the reduction of the shareholding (and/or financial support) of some of them, the consolidation of the company, are some of those problems that are successfully managed by the reduction of the share capital. For the comprehensive approach to the specific subject one should talk about the techniques, the conditions and the reduction process. Also for the protection of creditors and the consequences of the reduction. And why not for depreciation purposes as well. But about them, see our next article.

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (May 8th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Non-Disclosure Agreement (:NDA)

    Non-Disclosure Agreement (:NDA)

    In a previous article we approached the content and value of business confidentiality. We have found and confirmed the value of confidential information – that is, that which falls under the trade secret. We also found and confirmed the competitive advantage that the company maintains because of the specific information. We were also given the opportunity to approach the, for this reason, multi-level legislative (civil and criminal) protection of business confidentiality. A protection that, especially for employees, is partially covered by the obligation of confidentiality – in the context of their ancillary obligations . The confidentiality agreement (:NDA) obviously comes to strengthen, in any case, the protection of business secrecy.

     

    The expansion of the protection of business secrecy

    The protection provided by the legislator to business confidentiality is, as mentioned above, multi-layered . However, it turns out, not infrequently, to be insufficient and limited. In this regard, the need for further specialization of confidential information is presented. Also, the expansion of the protection of those and of business secrecy in general.

    This can only be achieved through confidentiality agreements. These contracts have become more widely known, globally – already in our country, with the abbreviation NDA (:Non Disclosure Agreement). They aim is exactly that: the broader protection of confidential information, which, among others, is disclosed in the context of commercial transactions, contracts, partnerships and/or, most commonly, employment contracts.

     

    Legislative Basis

    The confidentiality agreement does not constitute a named contract, i.e. its individual parameters are not regulated by a specific legislative provision. However, for a long time now, jurisprudence has accepted the validity of its conclusion as well as the production of legal results and consequences from it ( ind .: 1370/2019 AP 1369/2919 Supreme Court, 14322/2019 Multimember Court of First Instance of Thessaloniki, 1219/2017 Supreme Court, 5110/2011 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens) .

    The confidentiality agreement is permitted under the freedom of contract.

    Let us recall here that the freedom of contracts is broken down into the freedom to enter into or not enter into a contract, to choose the contracting party and to determine its content. It has a constitutional basis, as it is enshrined as an individual right in article 5 §1 of the Constitution (4/1998 Plenary Session of the Supreme Court). It is also based on the provisions of Article 361 of the Civil Code – as an expression of the constitutionally guaranteed economic freedom.

     

    Definition and context

    But what are confidentiality agreements? There does not seem to exist a unanimously accepted definition.

    We could define the confidentiality agreement as the unilateral statement (or agreement) to not make specific confidential information available to any third party and for any reason other than those agreed.

    The one who undertakes the obligation of confidentiality also undertakes further, more specific, obligations. Indicative: not to disclose, reproduce or use for their own benefit (or for the benefit of a third party) confidential information, to which they gain access due to the cooperation with their counterparty. Furthermore, to take appropriate measures in order to preserve the confidentiality of the specific information.

    The undertaking of unilateral or mutual confidentiality depends on whether the disclosure of confidential information is, respectively, unilateral or mutual. Unilateral disclosure takes place in case of, e.g., a business acquisition in the context of due diligence or in the context of the employment contract. Mutual disclosure takes place, indicatively, in the event of a merger of companies and in the context of carrying out a, in this case mutual, due diligence.

    The confidentiality agreement may take the form of a stand-alone contract. It may, however, be included as a relevant clause or section in the main partnership agreement between the parties.

    The confidentiality agreement is concluded, as a rule, at the stage of negotiations ( ind .: 1370/2019 Supreme Court, 1219/2017 Supreme Court, 5110/2011 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens) or at the same time as the main contract.

     

    Pre-formulated terms or tailor-made contracts?

    As there is, in accordance with what has already been mentioned, no specific legislative regulation for confidentiality agreements, it is logical that no minimum content should be derived from the law.

    It is known that there are widely “circulating” models of confidentiality agreements with identical, to a significant extent, wording. Even freely available online. We even see these more or less identical, in terms of content, examples being used for all kinds of cases. Are they safe to use?

    One who chooses to enforce a confidentiality agreement looks to its value and to the protection of themselves and their business.

    It is (more than) obvious, however, that pre -formulated terms or, even more so, pre -formulated confidentiality agreements cannot provide the best possible, nor the minimum tolerable protection. It is recommended, on the contrary, (as, moreover, in any case of drawing up a contract) to conclude a “tailor-made” contract, which will meet the specific needs of the individuals and legal entities involved.

     

    The Content of the Confidentiality Agreement

    Regardless of any special arrangements, certain terms cannot be omitted from the confidentiality agreement. Indicative:

    (a) The categories of confidential information

    The non-disclosure agreement must specify explicitly, and as fully as possible, the specific confidential information (or categories thereof), which is disclosed (or may be disclosed) in the context of the negotiations and/or performance of the main contract (e.g. commercial cooperation) of the contracting parties.

    In this way, the obligation to maintain confidentiality – specific, in fact, information, which rests on the obligor – is made concrete.

    However, it is noted that it is not possible to identify as confidential that information that which is either not of a confidential nature or is public or easily accessible to an unspecified number of persons.

    (b) The purpose

    In the confidentiality agreement it is necessary to specify the purpose for which the receiver of the confidential information becomes a aware of specific confidential information (concerning their counterparty or a third party). In this way, the framework within which the specific contracting party is entitled to act, exclusively, is determined.

    (c) The due actions and measures to preserve confidentiality

    It is also important to refer to the permissible (and, correspondingly, non-permissible) actions in which the obligor is entitled (or, correspondingly, prohibited) to perform the duty of confidentiality – in relation to the confidential information. Indicative: possibility, possibly, of communicating the confidential information to third parties and, if so, who and under what conditions. The context, also, of their potential use or possible reproduction. Accordingly, and with regard to prohibited actions (e.g. prohibition of using confidential information for one’s own benefit or making it public).

    It is also desirable to specify, respectively, the measures to be taken by the obligor to ensure confidentiality and protect privacy.

    (d) Duration

    Determining the duration of the confidentiality agreement or related clause proves to be of major importance.

    Negotiations between the contracting parties may not be successful. It is, accordingly, possible to terminate, prematurely – for any reason, the concluded contract. Will the obligation of confidentiality be extinguished or not in these cases? It is imperative, therefore, that the duration of the confidentiality obligation be agreed upon, which may extend beyond the specific time limits.

    (e) Applicable Law and Jurisdiction of Courts

    An important term in the confidentiality agreement is also that of the applicable law and the jurisdiction of the courts. And this is because when the contracting parties are active and based in the same city, things are simple. But what will happen when a Greek company contracts with a company based in Great Britain or the USA? In those courts, will one seek compensation for damages they may have suffered? In these and similar cases, the determination of the applicable law and the competent courts, in the event of an abnormal development of the contract, is considered to be of major importance.

    (f) The consequences of the (possible) violation

    Of particular importance is, of course, the prediction of the consequences of a possible violation of the obligations undertaken (as these consequences are analyzed in particular – immediately below). It is indeed noteworthy that these consequences are exactly what the contracting parties are aiming for when they decide to enter into the confidentiality agreement.

     

    Coverage Intended; Determination Of Damages

    As already mentioned, the confidentiality of the business is protected by law. However, the parties resort to the conclusion of confidentiality agreements for reasons of optimal and more complete protection. In any case, however, the specific contracts are a means of proving the obligations of both parties. Especially because, through them, it is proven what confidential information the parties have shared.

    However, the problem becomes particularly complicated when it comes to determining the damage suffered by the contracting party due to the breach of the confidentiality obligation. The matter, then, presents difficulties, especially evidential ones. Through the confidentiality agreement it is sought to surpass these difficulties, as it is possible to agree in advance: (a) a specific method of calculating the (always difficult to prove) damage, (b) a specific amount as lump sum compensation, (c) a specific amount as a penalty clause and (d) their combination.

    More commonly, of the above, a specific amount is agreed upon as a penalty clause – although sometimes ineffectively. The amount of the latter is agreed, often, extremely high. In this way the parties intend to (also) prevent the violation of the confidentiality agreement. They aim, that is, (also) at the preventive function of the penal clause.

     

    Confidentiality contracts (NDAs, as they are most commonly known) are used more and more often in transactions; in our country as well.

    They provide adequate, preventive in particular, protection in terms of ensuring business confidentiality. And, in retrospect, the protection they provide can only be identified as of great importance.

    However, they are not treated with due care and nor are they given due value. We often come across, identical in content, texts for uses unrelated to what they can ensure.

    Time to give them their due care and value.

    And it is a given that, in this way, the contracting parties will feel (and will be) more secure: the existence of the specific contracts will act as a deterrent for potential offenders but also facilitate the proof of the damage and the imposition of the relevant sanctions.

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (May 1st, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Preemption: Limitation, Exclusion & Protection

    Preemption: Limitation, Exclusion & Protection

    In a previous article we focused on the pre-emptive right in the case of an increase of the share capital of the SA. We approached its concept and legal nature, its beneficiaries and its exercise procedure. We have seen what happens when the right is not exercised at all or partially exercised. Here, closing the section related to the pre-emption right, we will analyze its most important issues: the possibility and conditions of its limitation and exclusion (=cancellation). Also, its protection.

     

    Limitation And Exclusion Of Preemption

    The possibility of limiting or excluding the right of pre-emption is regulated in the law on SAs (Article 27 Law 4548/2018). In fact, it concerns the limitation or exclusion of this right in view of a specific increase in share capital. No, that is, of the pre-emption right as an abstract right. For this reason, after all, the possibility of limitation or exclusion cannot be provided for in the statute. On the contrary, on a case-by-case basis it is decided (or not decided) by the General Assembly or the Board of Directors, as analyzed immediately below.

    Standard Conditions

    Given the importance of the right of pre-emption, certain formal conditions must be met in order to limit or exclude it. Specifically, (a) a decision is taken by the competent body and (b) a report is drawn up by the Board of Directors.

    (a) Decision of Competent Body

    From a General Assembly with an Increased Quorum and Majority

    “By decision of the general assembly, taken with an increased quorum and majority, the pre-emption right may be limited or abolished…” (article 27 §1, section a’).

    The General Assembly, which decides on the regular increase of the SA’s share capital, also has the power to limit or abolish the right of pre-emption.

    Does the limitation or exclusion of the right of pre-emption need to be listed as a separate item on the agenda of the SA’s General Assembly? Or is it sufficient to make a decision as part of the discussion and decision to increase the share capital? The issue proves to be important as a possible decision without specific reference to the agenda could(?) lead to invalidity.

    However, jurisprudence accepts that “…The purpose of the agenda is not to create a rigid and abstract formality…Thus, there is no need for special mention in the agenda of matters which are in such a close internal relationship to the announced matters of the agenda in the transactional practice, so it cannot be considered that they go beyond this formalism. Thus, it is accepted that the decisions limiting or abolishing the pre-emption right are also considered relevant or related to the previously announced agenda items…(Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens 5182/2007 ECJ 2008.323 and the references there to theory and jurisprudence)” ( ind.: 5885/2010 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens) , NOMOS Database).

    From the Ordinary General Assembly or Board Meeting

    The law on SAs introduces a significant change compared to the previous law. It provides, specifically, authority for the body that decides on the extraordinary increase of the share capital (: the ordinary General Assembly or the Board of Directors) to also decide on the limitation or exclusion of the pre-emptive right: “the articles of association or the decision of the general assembly that provide extraordinary authority capital increase…may provide the board of directors or the general assembly…and the power to limit or exclude the preemptive right” (Article 27§4). As stated in the Explanatory Report of Law 4548/2018 on Article 27, this new regulation is “…in harmony with Article 72 of Directive (EU) 2017/1132” .

    Furthermore, regarding the quorum and majority for the relevant decision, the law follows the corresponding percentages required for the decision on the extraordinary increase. Therefore, “…the board of directors decides with a majority of…at least 2/3 of all its members, and the general assembly with a simple quorum and majority”.

    (b) Drafting of the Report by the Board of Directors

    An important condition and, in time, prior to the decision to limit or exclude the right of pre-emption, is the drafting of a relevant report by the Board of Directors.

    The Board of Directors, in particular, is obliged (Article 27§1, section b), to submit a written report to the General Assembly, in which: (a) the reasons for restricting or abolishing the right of pre-emption are stated and (b) the price (or the floor price) proposed for the issue of the new shares is justified. In more detail:

    (a) Regarding the reasons that impose the restriction or exclusion of the pre-emption right, general and vague references are not enough: the relevant decision should be adequately and specifically justified. Whereas, (b) regarding the price proposed for the new shares: it should be sufficiently justified as it will, of course, affect the position of the existing shareholders.

    The report of the Board of Directors, with the specific content, is intended to inform the shareholders in a timely and valid manner, who will then decide on the limitation or exclusion of the pre-emptive right. Most importantly: this report will form the basis of a possible judicial review, regarding the validity of the restriction or exclusion decision. And this, because the relevant judicial review will require the confirmation or not (and not an a posteriori search) of the serious grounds that justify (or impose) the limitation or exclusion of the pre-emption right and the fulfillment, in general, of the essential conditions for the taking of the relevant decision – as reflected in the relevant report of the Board of Directors.

    However, in addition to the aforementioned content of the report, additional references may be required in it. Especially in the event that the Board of Directors (and not the General Assembly) is the body that will decide the relevant restriction or exclusion. In this particular case, it is expressly provided that the report must explain why the right to be revoked is chosen to be done so by decision of the board of directors (Article 27 §4 in fine ) . This, for example, may be required by reasons of urgency – given the flexibility and speed of the Board of Directors to take decisions.

    In any case, however, “the relevant report of the board of directors and the decision of the general assembly shall be made public” (article 27 §1, section c).

    The Substantive Conditions

    As stated above, the law provides a clear record of the formal conditions for the limitation or exclusion of the pre-emption right. However, in addition to fulfilling the formal requirements, the fulfillment of the substantive conditions is also required.

    These conditions are mentioned in theory and jurisprudence. Conditions under which it is allowed to limit or exclude the right of pre-emption are “…the corporate interest, necessity and proportionality” ( ind . 265/2011 Multimember Court of First Instance of Athens) , NOMOS Database) .

    The exclusion or limitation of the pre-emption right must, first of all, serve the (always superior) corporate interest. Subsequently, it should be the most suitable and necessary means for the promotion of this interest.

    The relevant decision should have the fewest possible disadvantages for the existing shareholders. It should also serve the principle of their equal treatment (ie it is not possible to limit or exclude the pre-emption right for some of the shareholders and preserve it for others). It should not, finally, be realized in violation of a right (:281 Civil Code).

    Circumstances Not Constituting the Exclusion

    However, there are some cases, which do not constitute cases of exclusion of the pre-emption right. In particular, exclusion does not exist when:

    (a) the shares are taken over by credit institutions or investment firms, which have the right to receive securities for safekeeping, in order to then offer them to the shareholders (according to Article 26 §1). At the time when the credit institutions or investment companies will offer the above shares to the shareholders, the latter will then be able to exercise the pre-emption right.

    (b) the shares are available to the company’s staff, in the context of a free distribution of shares or stock options (Articles 113 & 114).

    The Case Of Mixed Increase

    As we saw in our previous article, the pre-emption right is basically excluded by law in case of capital increase with contributions in kind (article 26 §1, section a ) We approached this provision of the legislator as reasonable, given that the contributions in kind concern, basically, assets, which are owned by a specific, only, person. The articles of association, nevertheless, can extend the pre-emption right in cases of increase with contributions in kind (article 26 §1, section b).

    However, there is also the case of a mixed increase (article 27§3). The increase, i.e., of the share capital that takes place, at the same time, both with monetary contributions and with contributions in kind (with the self-evident obligation to value them – articles 17 and 18).

    On a mixed increase, the non-participation of the shareholders who contribute in kind in the cash increase does not constitute an exclusion of the preemptive right. It is assumed, of course, that “…the ratio of the value of contributions in kind, in relation to the total increase, is the same, at least, as the ratio of the participation in the capital of the shareholders who make these contributions” (Article 27 §3, sub .b’).

     

    Protection of the Preemption Right

    Preemption is particularly important. Its protection, in the event of its violation, is also particularly important.

    In the event, in particular, that the SA issues shares and, in violation of the right of pre-emption (or its exclusion or limitation conditions), makes them available to third parties, then the undertaking of the shares is invalid. However, this is a relative nullity, which the beneficiaries of the right of pre-emption are entitled to assert (Article 175 Civil Code). However, if the decision of the body that took the decision to limit or exclude them is (also) affected, the holder of the relevant right is entitled to claim judicially the annulment of the relevant decision (articles 137 & 138 for the General Assembly and 95 for the BoD Law 4548 /2018).

     

    The right of pre-emption in the increase of share capital proves to be extremely important for the old shareholders as, through it, their rights and legal interests are secured. However, as what (must) prevail is the corporate interest, the restriction or even the abolition of this right is provided for. Sometimes the reasons presented (: corporate interest) are true and valid and sometimes not. Sometimes they move in the direction of defending the corporate interest and sometimes in the direction of defending the interest of the majority shareholders. The (in favor of the corporate interest) documentation of the reasons for limitation or abolition as well as the necessary procedural/formal steps and conditions prove to be particularly important. In case of non-compliance, the shareholder, who consider themselves affected, has the right to appeal to the competent courts for the annulment of the relevant decisions. In order to avoid problems of this nature, which are always serious, not only absolute compliance with the “letter” of the law is required, but also the best possible compliance with its essence.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (April 24th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • False or misleading statements to the public

    False or misleading statements to the public

    The “slight reform” of the criminal provisions of the law on SAs (law 4548/2018) worked (again this time) as a follow-up: it arose as a need to harmonize with the changes in the “main” part of the legislation. This kind of thing does not alienate us. The same happened when the previous law was amended, e.g., by Law 3604/2007. And then the criminal provisions of the first did not primarily concern the author of the last. Also, under conditions, it is in principle acceptable: recourse to criminal provisions is justified only as a last resort to deal with a problem.

    In our previous article (of 6.3.22) we briefly approached the issue of criminal responsibilities in the context of the SA. Today we will begin a tour of the individual regulations, starting with the first criminal provision of article 176 of Law 4548/2018 on “false or misleading statements to the public”.

    According to the letter of the provision, the founder, the member of the board or the director of the company is punished with imprisonment, which can reach up to five years and with a (heavier compared to the past) fine (from 10,000 to 100,000 euros), if they knowingly make a false or misleading statement to the public.

    This declaration must (a) concern the coverage or payment of the capital or (b) be made for the purpose of registration in securities issued by the company and concern its elements, which have a material influence on the company’s affairs. In this context, we consider critical to underline the following:

    The semantically and evaluatively related article 56 (and article 55) of Law 2190/1920 referred exclusively to “false statements”. Article 176 now covers any “false or misleading” statement. The possible regulatory field of the provision is therefore claimed beyond “lies” and “half-truths”.

    Moreover, same as in the past, any (even a simple and non-executive) member of the board of directors can be held criminally liable for a “false or misleading” statement, made even orally.

    The fact that the statement comes from an “insider” of the company is considered so important that in some cases even estimates become suspicious, possibly criminal.

    Lastly, (unlike in the past) it is sufficient to make a false or misleading statement to the public when it concerns the coverage or payment of the capital: no further purpose is required nor does it have to be proved. The statement alone is enough.

    Conclusion: with the new article 176 of Law 4548/2018, the limits of criminally relevant statements are expanded. Therefore, all with a corporate capacity, without exception, must be particularly careful in their public statements, protecting themselves and each other.

    The principle of trust is invaluable both socially and economically. The legislator recognizes this and advocates its protection even against abstract risks. If it is ultimately “injured”, then the consequences on a financial (for the company) and legal (for the declarant) level are justifiably severe.

    Our message is therefore clear: moderation, prudence and precision in our statements!

    George Karanikolas
    Senior Associate

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (April 17th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • The Pre-emption Right Upon Capital Increase

    The Pre-emption Right Upon Capital Increase

    In a previous article we approached the issues related to the increase of the SA’s share capital. There, we were given the opportunity to ascertain the importance of the increase in its funding and, by extension, the achievement of its statutory objectives. However, as obvious as its advantages are, the associated risks are equally obvious; especially with regard to old shareholders (indicative: from the disruption of shareholder balances, unwanted changes in management, and even, in some extreme cases, the violent exit of minority shareholders from SA etc.). The specific (and not only) risks are attempted to be tamed (or even adequately managed) by the legislator through the right of pre-emption.

     

    Concept & Right Holders

    The meaning of the right of pre-emption is defined by the law itself: “In every case of capital increase, which is not done by a contribution in kind, as well as in case of issuance of bonds with the right to convert into shares, a right of pre-emption is granted to the entire new capital or the bond loan, in favor of the existing shareholders at the time of issue, according to their participation in the existing capital” (article 26§1 law 4548/18).

    This specific right is entitled to be exercised by every shareholder, who has the specific status at the time of the decision to increase the share capital. They are given, through this, the option to be provided with new shares, issued due to the increase (or issuance of convertible bonds), in number proportional to those they already own. In the event that one shareholder has the bare ownership and another the usufruct of the share, the pre-emption right is recognized to the one holding the bare ownership – with the argument that it does not constitute a fruit or benefit of the shareholder’s right (ind.: 577/2010 Official Gazette).

    This right arises in any case of increase (regular or extraordinary) of the share capital. However, the case of an increase with contributions in kind is expressly excluded. The provision seems reasonable: contributions in kind are basically aimed at assets, which belong to a specific, only, person. It is provided, however, that the statute can extend the pre-emption right in cases of increase with contributions in kind (article 26 §1, section b).

    A more specific content is provided for the pre-emption right, in the event that the SA has issued several classes of shares. Classes of shares, e.g., in which the individual rights to vote or to participate in the profits or in the distribution of the liquidation product are not identical. It is possible in this case, under the condition of a relevant statutory provision, to increase the capital with shares of only one of the categories. The pre-emption right is granted, then -in priority, to the shareholders of the category to which the new shares belong. If it is not exercised in its entirety, the remaining shareholders of the other classes are invited to exercise it proportionally.

     

    Legal Nature & Transferability

    As pointed out in the jurisprudence (3403/2006 Court of Appeal of Athens), the pre-emption right is part of the general share rights. In those, i.e., the rights that belong to all shareholders – in proportion to their participation in the corporate capital. It is characterized as a mixed share right as it gathers elements of property and administrative rights. Its exercise includes a declaration of the shareholder’s will to take over the new shares of the SA, in proportion to their shareholding. It constitutes, in essence, a legal restriction of the contractual freedom of the SA.

    However, certain issues arise regarding the transferability of this right. The right of pre-emption, until the increase of the share capital is decided by the competent body, “…constitutes an abstract latent right (preliminary) of the definitive right (of the specific definitive right of pre-emption)” (ind. 3403/2006 Court of Appeal of Athens). This abstract right is thus in a “fluid” state. More specifically: it is subject to the suspensory condition of the decision to increase the share capital.

    During the stage of the specific suspensory condition, the old shareholders do not have any claim to take up new shares. At the same time, the pre-emption right is inextricably linked to the share and cannot be separated from it. It cannot, therefore, be transferred. However, after the fulfillment of the specific suspensory condition (: decision to increase the share capital), the (conditional) beneficiaries become definitive. The specific, now, pre-emption right constitutes an independent debt right with a property character. It is therefore possible to transfer it independently.

    Part of the theory, however, characterizes this jurisprudential position as incorrect. It is argued that the abstract pre-emption right must be distinguished from the pre-emption right that concerns a specific increase, even future or contingent to take place. The latter (: a pre-emption right concerning a future or possible increase) is transferable, even before the relevant decision is taken – as a right of expectation.

     

    Second Degree Pre-emption

    An important provision of Law 4548/2018 (which is also highlighted in the Explanatory Memorandum to the law on Article 26), is the provision of the “second degree” pre-emption right to unallocated shares.

    It is specified, in particular, that if shares remain unallocated after the (non) exercise of the pre-emptive right, priority may be given “…to the shareholders, who have already exercised the pre-emptive right, as well as to other persons who generally hold convertible securities in shares”-(such, e.g., are convertible and exchangeable bonds and warrants, article 26 §4 in fine).

    The specific second degree pre-emption right may be provided for by the articles of association. However, in the event that there is no such statutory provision, its content (and the beneficiaries) are determined by the Board of Directors who will be called upon to further offer the shares that remained unallocated.

     

    Invitation to Exercise the Right

    In order to exercise the pre-emption right, the relevant invitation must precede. Also its publication in Business Registry by actions of the SA (Article 26 §3). The deadline for its exercise constitutes its mandatory content. The statute may call for further publicity.

    It is, however, possible to omit the relevant invitation and, by extension, the notification of the relevant deadline, in the following two cases: (a) if the General Assembly that decided on the increase was attended by all the shareholders – who represent the entire share capital and became aware of the deadline set for the exercise of the pre-emptive right and/or (b) if all the shareholders declared, in any way, that they will or will not exercise the relevant right. In the two specific cases, any insistence on publicity formalities would simply be formalistic and unjustified.

    Excluded from the possibility of omission, however, is the case where, in the context of a regular increase, the Board of Directors is authorized to determine the sale price of the new shares. Also, on the issue of preferred shares with the right to draw interest, the interest rate and the method of its calculation (Article 25 §2). The specific exceptions seem reasonable as, in both cases, shareholders are unaware of essential information for exercising their pre-emptive right.

    As an alternative to the publication of the invitation to the Business Registry for the exercise of the pre-emptive right, it is possible to replace it with a registered, “on receipt” letter to the shareholders; and this, without the need for a relevant statutory provision.

    The deadline for exercising the right of pre-emption starts from the knowledge of the relevant call by the shareholders, according to the above [or from the time of the relevant decision of the Board of Directors, at the earliest, in the case of its authorization in the context of a regular increase (Article 25 § 2)].

    Deadline for the Exercise

    The body of the SA (General Assembly or Board) that decides on the increase also determines the deadline within which the pre-emption right can be exercised (Article 26 §2). This deadline, however, cannot be shorter than fourteen (14) days nor exceed the deadline for payment of the increase – i.e. the four (4) months (Article 20 §2).

    In the event that the SA body that decides the increase fails to set the deadline for exercising the pre-emption right, it will be set by a decision of the Board of Directors (Article 26 §3). But always within the aforementioned time limits (:14 days to 4 months).

    Especially with regard to the determination of the deadline for the exercise of the pre-emption right by the other (other classes of) shareholders, the competent body is also defined as the one that decides on the increase. The relevant deadline cannot be less than ten (10) days. It starts the day after the expiration of the deadline for exercising the pre-emption right for the shareholders of the category to which the new shares belong (article 26 §2 in fine).

     

    Non-Exercise of the Pre-emptive Right

    As long as the (above) deadlines for exercising the right of pre-emption have not been exercised, the free offering of the shares follows – subject to the contrary provision of the articles of association (Article 26 §4).

    The competent body for the free disposal of shares is the Board of Directors. In fact, it is accepted that it is entitled to dispose of them freely even before the impractical expiry of the deadlines mentioned above. However, the existence of irrevocable declarations of all the shareholders, who did not exercise their right, that they will not exercise it is required.

    The law places a restriction on the free disposal of shares by the Board of Directors. In particular, the Board of Directors cannot dispose of the unallocated shares at a price lower than the price paid by the existing shareholders. For the rest, it proceeds with the disposal at its discretion, obviously guided by the company’s interests.

     

    The pre-emption right to increase the SA’s share capital ensures the shareholders, at the time of the relevant decision. It ensures, among other things, that their equity participation will not be reduced, without their choosing (or acceptance), the equity balances will not be disturbed, the management of the SA will not be affected. This specific assurance is critical, but not without exceptions. As for these, the critical i.e. exceptions and their consequences: our article to follow.

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (April 10th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • The Extraordinary Share Capital Increase

    The Extraordinary Share Capital Increase

    The increase of an SA’s share capital has already been the focus of a previous article. We had the opportunity, there, to point out the importance of the capital increase as a way/means of financing the SA; to also refer to the distinctions of the increase and, among others, to their regular or extraordinary nature. The regular capital increase is the one decided by the General Assembly with an increased quorum and majority. The extraordinary increase is the one decided either by the General Assembly (with a simple quorum and majority) or by the Board of Directors. Regarding the extraordinary increase, see right bellow:

     

    The changes brought about by Law 4548/2018

    The possibility of an extraordinary share capital increase was also provided for under the previous regime (Article 13 of Legislative Decree 2190/1920). As, however, it is pointed out in the Explanatory Report of Law 4548/2018 (on Article 24), the regulations previously in place were reformed. The three most important changes were the following:

    (a) The first differentiation concerns the quantitative limits for the increase of the share capital, by the Board of Directors and the General Assembly, which is set by the law: The relevant quantitative limits are increased.

    (b) The second differentiation concerns the abolition of the prohibition of an extraordinary increase, as long as there are significant amounts of reserves. [As pointed out in the Explanatory Report of Law 4548/2018, such a prohibition is not considered necessary for the protection of the share capital. In addition, a relevant prohibition is not even provided for by the Corporate Directive 2017/1132/EU (-with the regulations of which the law on SAs complies)].

    After all, the business opportunities that the SA can benefit from, through the flexibility provided by the extraordinary increase, are clearly essential even for strong SAs with potentially significant reserves.

    (c) The third differentiation concerns the unorthodox, older regulation that the extraordinary increase does not constitute an amendment to the articles of association. It is now expressly provided that the extraordinary increase of the share capital, regardless of the body that decides on it, constitutes an amendment to the articles of association. It is further clarified that it is not subject to administrative approval (Article 24 §4). The specific provision of the law clarifies the legal nature of the extraordinary increase. Since it is provided (and rightly so) that it constitutes an amendment to the statute, the body that decides should amend the relevant articles of the latter and draw up its new, codified, text. Afterwards, it will have to satisfy the necessary publicity formalities in the Business Registry, which are of a constitutive nature. These are obligations that the body that made the decision (General Assembly or Board of Directors) did not carry under the previous regime: the registration in the Business Registry was accepted to be of a declarative character.

    As for the rest, in terms of its legal nature, the extraordinary increase is the same as the ordinary.

     

    Extraordinary Increase By Decision of the Board of Directors

    In principle, the corporate body responsible for increasing the share capital is the General Assembly (Article 117 §1 para. a’ and §2 para. a). However, the General Assembly, compared to the Board of Directors, is characterized by less flexibility and speed, in terms of convening and taking a decision – especially in those cases where there is a wide or even significant dispersion in the share capital of the SA. In order to speed up the relevant procedures and deadlines, the Board of Directors is granted, under conditions, the power to increase the company’s capital. Thus, the BoD, as a more flexible (compared to the General Assembly) corporate body, can more quickly decide (as well as implement) an increase in the SA’s share capital. And this, taking advantage of favorable circumstances, covering pressing, time-consuming needs and/or choosing the optimal sale price of the shares.

    However, the possibility of an extraordinary increase in the share capital by the Board of Directors requires the fulfillment of specific conditions; depending on the provision of the relevant authority by the statute or the General Assembly of the company. Specifically:

    Authority Given By The Statute

    If the relevant possibility is provided by the articles of association, the Board of Directors has the right by its decision to increase the capital, partially or fully, by issuing new shares (Article 24 §1). This possibility is subject to time and quantitative limitations.

    Time limit: The duration of the (statutory) authorization to the Board cannot exceed five years from the establishment of the company. The relevant provision may exist in the SA’s initial (at the time of its establishment) statute or, alternatively, in a subsequent amendment thereof.

    Quantitative limit: The share capital increase decided by the Board of Directors cannot exceed three times the initial capital of the SA.

    Therefore, within the specific time and quantitative limitations, the Board of Directors can, legally, decide on one or more consecutive increases of the share capital, together with their relevant more specific conditions (e.g. sale price of the new shares). The relevant decision of the Board of Directors is taken by a majority of 2/3, at least, of all its members.

    Authority Given By The General Assembly

    The authority of the Board of Directors to increase the share capital can be provided, in addition to the articles of association, by the General Assembly of the SA (Article 24 §1, para. b). In this case the General Assembly decides with an increased quorum and majority (Article 130 §3). The relevant decision is submitted to the Business Registry.

    The time and quantitative limitations, referred to above, apply, with some variations, also in the case of the granting of authorization by the General Assembly.

    Time limit: In the case of the authorization of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly, its authority to decide the capital increase cannot exceed five years as well. The five-year period in question, however, starts from the granting of the authorization to the Board by the relevant decision of the General Assembly (and not from the establishment of the SA). Noteworthy, however, is the law’s provision that “…this authority of the board of directors can be renewed by decision of the General Assembly for a period of time that cannot exceed five years for each granted renewal.” (article 24 §1, para, c΄). The five-year time limit starts, in this case, from the time point of each renewal.

    Quantitative limit: The quantitative limitation remains similar to the case of the authority granted from the statute. With an important difference, however: the amount of the increase that the Board of Directors is entitled to decide cannot exceed three times the paid-in capital, which exists on the date the relevant authority was granted.

     

    Extraordinary Increase By Decision of the General Assembly

    The decision regarding a regular increase of the share capital is taken, as we have already pointed out, by the General Assembly, which decides with an increased quorum and majority.

    However, the General Assembly is able, also under conditions, to decide an extraordinary increase of the SA’s share capital. This possibility also aims, in this case, to facilitate the relevant procedure (Article 24 §2). A special difference of the extraordinary, in relation to the regular, increase is the fact that the General Assembly decides the increase with a simple quorum and majority (against regular increases).

    Also in the case of the extraordinary increase of the share capital by the General Assembly, the fulfillment of specific conditions is obligatory. First of them: the relevant statutory provision. There are, however, further time and quantitative limitations.

    Time limit: In the case of the extraordinary increase of the share capital by decision of the ordinary General Meeting, the time period for exercising the power to increase cannot exceed five years from the formation of the SA as well. However, no provision is made for the possibility of renewing the authority of the General Assembly.

    Quantitative limit: The increase of the share capital cannot exceed eight times the initial capital.

     

    Parallel competence of the General Assembly & Board of Directors; Prohibition of Disclosure of the Possibility of Extraordinary Increase

    The legislator adopts two more options regarding the extraordinary increase of the share capital.

    The first concerns the recognition of the parallel possibility of an extraordinary increase by both the Board and the General Assembly (Article 24 §5). In this (unusual-indeed) case, however, it is necessary to meet the, as the case may be, already mentioned conditions. Also: the individual time and quantitative limitations are examined separately for each case of increase.

    The second concerns the protection of third contracting parties (Article 24 §3) from the possible abuse of such an extraordinary increase. Specifically: it would not be unprecedented (quite the contrary) to mislead third parties or to have their expectations disappointed by the promotion of the power of the individual bodies of the SA to decide on an extraordinary increase of the share capital; a power that would possibly never be exercised by the corporate bodies, as the case may be.

    In order to avoid any negative consequences of the extraordinary increase, the legislator provides that it is prohibited for SAs, whose articles of association provide for the possibility of an extraordinary increase “…to state in any form, advertisement, publication or other document, as capital, the amount up to which the board of directors or the General Assembly is entitled… to issue new shares.” (article 24 §3).

     

    Extraordinary Vs Ordinary Share Capital Increase

    We have already seen that the General Assembly can decide on an extraordinary increase of the company’s share capital with a common (and not increased) quorum and majority. We have also seen that the Board of Directors can decide, very quickly, on an extraordinary increase with a majority of 2/3 of its members; in fact, without the need to convene a General Assembly.

    But what do the specific powers mean in prectice?

    The General Assembly, with reduced percentages, is entitled to increase the company’s share capital up to eight times the initial amount. In other words: a shareholder who directly or indirectly owns ½ of the share capital + one share has the right to decide to increase it – up to eight times the initial amount. What if they have the necessary funds while the other (co)shareholders do not? They have the power to significantly expand their own shareholding and dramatically reduce the shareholding of other shareholders – even below critical percentages.

    Under the condition of reaching the quorum of the General Assembly (1/2 or 1/5 of the total), a shareholder holding 13.34% of all shares is entitled, subject to conditions, to take a decision on an extraordinary increase up to eight times the initial of capital. In this case, as long as they have the necessary funds, a small minority shareholder can become a majority shareholder.

    On the other hand, the implementation of an extraordinary increase in the share capital by the Board of Directors may result in the rapid achievement of a specific business goal. As the convening of a General Assembly is not required, the relevant process can be accelerated at least during its convening deadlines – in the cases where we are not talking about a General Assembly where all shareholders are present. Such a fast process can prove to be valuable in cases where very quick actions are required – e.g. capitalizing on a significant business opportunity.

    Accordingly, however, a shareholder who (regardless of the number of shares the shareholder holds) has (or can convince or join) 3/5 of the members of the Board of Directors, can decide an extraordinary increase up to three times the share capital. And if, at the same time, they have the necessary funds to cover the increase, but the other shareholders do not, they can easily become, once and for all, a major shareholder or even a majority shareholder.

     

    Taking advantage of the (potential) opportunity for an extraordinary increase in share capital can prove to be a valuable tool for quickly achieving a specific business goal; for taking advantage of an important business opportunity. It is possible, however, at the same time, for it to prove to be a useful tool (or, as the case may be, dangerous – depending on the perspective) for the restructuring of shareholdings, the change of critical majorities and even the surrender of the reins of the company and its management itself.

    The introduction, therefore, of the specific discretion, the composition of the share capital and the Board of Directors itself require special attention and vigilance: they can prove to be decisive in the direction of the achievement of legitimate or illegitimate goals.

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (April 2nd, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • The Partial Payment of the Share Capital

    The Partial Payment of the Share Capital

    In a previous article we focused with the share capital of the SA. We dealt, among other things, with the meaning and importance of its payment. As we identified there, the capital both during the establishment of the SA and in the context of its increase process, is not required to be paid up in full. It is expressly and clearly stated by law that its partial payment is permissible. The partial payment, however, requires specific procedural steps, presents advantages and risks. About them, see immediately below.

     

    The advantages and the risks

    The possibility of partial payment of the share capital has significant advantages. It allows, among other things, the accumulation – even in the future – of higher sums of capital (than those which, in a different case, could be collected and paid in full from the beginning). It binds the participants (shareholders) to a specific mix of equity composition – despite the fact that the funds will not, at the time of the (co)decision, be fully available. It facilitates (but also binds) those shareholders who make the partial payment to make up the missing amount. It binds the shareholders who fully paid up their share to the participation of the shareholders who partially paid their share in the share capital at a certain percentage. It facilitates tax planning and the justification of wealth (“πόθεν έσχες”). It saves costs for the business that any process of increasing the share capital entails.

    This possibility, however, also holds risks for the SA, its shareholders and creditors. These risks concern the potential inability of the partially paying shareholders to make the full payment. For this reason, Law 4548/2018 provides, through provisions of mandatory nature, strict procedural conditions; stricter, however, are the consequences provided for shareholders who do not make (timely) payment.

     

    The Concept Of Partial Payment

    As a partial payment by law (Article 21 §1) “… is considered the payment at the establishment of the company, as well as the payment at each increase of its capital, of part of the nominal value of the share, with simultaneous assumption of the obligation to pay the remaining value of the share, in accordance with the provisions of the articles of association”.

    However, it is noted that the repayment of the due value of the share can also take place by netting.

     

    Conditions for Permissible Partial Payment

    As we have already mentioned, partial payment entails risks. In order to minimize it, the legislator provides specific conditions in order for partial payment to be accepted as valid. These conditions aim, among other things, at the transparency of the partial payment process, at ensuring the payment of the share capital and at protecting the SA, the other shareholders – and of course third parties.

    Statutory Provision

    A necessary condition, on which the valid start of the partial payment procedure exclusively depends, is the relevant provision being in the statute of the SA (article 21 §1 in fine). The more specific terms will be provided, as the case may be, either in the statute itself and/or in the decision for the increase of the share capital with its partial payment (by the body that decides on the increase: General Assembly or Board of Directors).

    Contribution In Money vs Contribution In Kind

    Partial payment can only be provided for monetary contributions. It is not possible to adopt this specific procedure in the case of contributions in kind (art. 21§2).

    The law’s prohibition seems perfectly reasonable. The agreed contribution in kind will not, as a rule, be possible to be paid in installments (transfer of, e.g., property ownership). It should be noted, however, that a necessary condition for the validity of the payment of the contribution in kind is its previous valuation (subject to the exceptions of Article 18 of Law 4548/2018). The valuation, however, is valid for 6 months (Article 17 §9). This time limitation cannot serve the partial payment of the capital as the latter extends, as a rule, over a longer period of time.

    SA With Shares Not Listed on a Regulated Market

    Only SAs with their shares not listed on a regulated market can be subject to partial payment of their shares (Article 21 §2). This prohibition is rightly intended to protect the capital market on the one hand and investors on the other: we have already mentioned the risks that partial payment entails.

    Time During Which A Share Can Be Partially Paid

    The special arrangements that apply mandatorily if the partial payment procedure is provided for include the maximum credit period for the payment of the installment or installments to repay the shares. Specifically: “The time during which the share value may remain only partially paid cannot exceed five (5) years” (article 21 §3, para. a’). The starting point of the five-year period must be considered: (a) Regarding the initial capital: the registration of the establishment of the SA in the Business Registry (b) Regarding cases of increase: the taking of the relevant decision by the competent body.

    Therefore: the due date of the individual installments cannot be determined later than five years.

    The Minimum Immediately Payable Portion of the Value of Each Share

    Furthermore, the law specifies the minimum immediately payable portion of the value of each share, which is mandatorily and immediately payable without credit. That is, within the deadlines for full payment, as provided for in Article 20 of Law 4548/2018. In particular, this part (minimum-immediately payable) “…cannot be lower than 1/4 of the nominal value of each unpaid share”. At the same time, the immediately payable part of the share cannot be less than the minimum, according to the law, nominal value of the share, i.e. 0,04€ (Article 35 §1)

    It is also clarified that in the event that shares are to be issued at a premium, “…the difference is paid in full, along with the payment of the first installment.” (article 21 §3, para. b΄).

    The Minimum Immediately Payable Portion of the Share Capital

    In addition, in the case of partial payment, the directly paid part of the capital, either during the formation of the SA or during its increase “…must be at least equal to the minimum limit defined in paragraph 2 of article 15” (article 21 §3, para. c).

    Therefore: the sum of the individual, partial payments cannot fall short of the minimum, by law, limit of the share capital (€25,000).

     

    Issued Securities

    In the event that “…share securities are issued that have not been fully paid up, the fact of the incomplete payment and the terms of the latter must be written on their front side” (Article 21 §7). This provision is, of course, intended to protect those who acquire the shares at a later time. Of course, the transferor of the specific, not fully paid-up, shares has a corresponding obligation to inform the acquirer for the share’s partial payment, otherwise there is an obligation to, at the least, compensate the latter.

     

    Consequences of Partial Payment

    As long as the above conditions are met and while the partial payment process lasts, the following applies:

    Shareholder Status

    Shareholder status is already acquired from the time of coverage of the shares (in other words: the conclusion of the contract to undertake them). This, in practice, means that any partial payment does not deprive the respective shareholder of any of the rights deriving from their shareholding status. It is pointed out, however, that for the calculation of the quorum at the General Assemblies, the law takes into account the paid-up share capital only, article 130 of law 4548/2018).

    Proration of Payments on Outstanding Shares

    In case of partial payment, the imputation of the payments of the accrued installments and payments takes place in a specific way. In particular, in the event that the respective shareholder has taken over more than one share, the payment they make is proportionally attributed to each of these shares (Article 21 §4 Law 4548/2018). Practical: it is not possible to pay off some, only, of the total of the unpaid shares.

    Full Liability for Transfer of Shares not paid for in full

    In the context of the partial payment procedure, the law specifies the liability of the transferor of unpaid shares for the remaining, unpaid and due, sum: “the transferor of a share not paid in full remains liable for the due part of the share for a period of two years from the registration of the transfer…in the shareholders’ book of the company.” (article 20 §3, par. d’).

    Therefore: Responsibility for the remaining-due part of the value of the share falls on the one who transfers; however, it also falls on the one who acquires as the latter (: acquirer) enters into the shareholding relationship. The relative liability of both (the transferor and the acquirer) is considered joint liability.

     

    The Legal Consequences of Non-Payment (On Time).

    The legal consequences for not paying an installment on time are, undoubtedly, severe (Article 21 §§5 & 6).

    Through these and the proportional imputation of payments, which we examined above, it is sought to compel the shareholder to fulfill their obligations regarding the unpaid shares.

    It is pointed out that the above provisions related to the consequences are applied proportionally in every case of late payment. Whether it is contributions in money or in kind (Article 20 §9).

     

    The specific legal consequences are, in particular, the following:

    Social Consequences

    Σωματειακού Χαρακτήρα Συνέπειες

    (a) In any case of late payment of any installment, the Board of Directors gives the shareholder a deadline of one month, with the following warning: “…in the event that this deadline has not been fulfilled, the unpaid shares will be canceled and any payments made will remain with the company as a penalty.”.

    The above deadline is inflexible and must be communicated (together with the relevant warning) by any suitable means to the shareholders who have not paid the due installment. It is even recommended, for evidentiary reasons, to keep a formal document (e.g. an extrajudicial letter or even an e-mail). However, it is noted that the imposition of the specific deadline cannot be omitted.

    (b) If the monthly deadline passes, the company takes the following actions:

    (i) It notifies the non-paying shareholder that it cancels their shares and withholds in favor of it (the company) any advances or installments paid, including any premium difference. The cancellation, in this case, does not constitute a reduction of the SA’s capital, but a termination of the non-paying shareholder’s shareholding relationship with the latter.

    (ii) It issues new shares, equal in number to those canceled and offers them to the other shareholders. If none of them buys them, they are freely available. Therefore, prior recourse to the right of pre-emption is necessary (: article 26).

    (c) Furthermore, the law provides that: “…if the shares are restricted or if their offer is wholly or partially unsuccessful, the company is obliged to reduce the capital by the amount of the nominal value of the unsold shares in the first General Assembly to be convened, even if the relevant issue is not listed on the agenda”. The specific decision of the General Assembly to reduce the share capital is taken, exceptionally, by simple quorum and majority.

    Consequences according to the Law of Obligations

    A legal consequence deriving from the Law of Obligations (:§6), is the interest on the debt of the untimely paid contribution, with the legal interest rate, until the cancellation of the shares. Furthermore, in the articles of association of the SA or in the decision on the possible increase of the share capital with its partial payment, it is possible to provide for the forfeiture of further penal clauses, in the cases of late payment. Finally, the law does not exclude the possibility of the raise of other, additional, claims by the SA against the defaulting shareholders.

    Alternative Legal Consequences

    In addition to the consequences mentioned immediately above (§§5 and 6), the Recitals of Law 4548/2018 on Article 21 provides for the following consequence (among others). The possibility, i.e., of recourse to the provisions “…for the exemption of shareholders from the obligation to pay paid and unpaid capital through reduction or depreciation of the capital” (articles 30 §4, 32 §3).

     

    The rule is the full payment of the share capital, which each shareholder undertakes to cover. An exception is, under certain conditions, its partial payment. The relevant conditions are, justifiably, extremely strict. They intend to protect, in advance, the legal entity and the third parties who look to the share capital of the SA. In case of violation of the specific conditions, the liable shareholder will lose their (partially paid) shares. However, their damages are not limited to the loss of their specific (often of significant value) assets. It also extends to the total of the money they paid for their (incomplete) repayment. However, as mentioned above, further penalty clauses and/or other claims of the company against the obligor may be in place.

    In other words: the possibility of partial payment of the share capital constitutes a significant opportunity for the shareholder to whom it is granted, but it also entails significant risks. In this regard, special attention is required to be paid to the terms set in the articles of association as well as in the decision to increase the share capital.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (March 27th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • The Share Capital Increase

    The Share Capital Increase

    In a previous article we had the opportunity to understand the importance of equity capital, as well as its differentiation from the property of the SA, which is subject to continuous-successive changes. The share capital, on the contrary, “…constitutes an “unchangeable” mathematical quantity, which is written in the company’s articles of association and which, upon its establishment, corresponds to the sum of the value of the contributions” (: Memorandum to the Law on SAs-4548/2018) . This does not mean, however, that the share capital cannot, under conditions, fluctuate. We will focus now on its growth as well as on specific, interesting (some, perhaps, critical) points of it. In other words: stay tuned!

     

    The dangers

    The increase of the share capital (with the exception of the “nominal increase” – for which see immediately below) is one of the main forms of financing of the SA: the “opposite “, so to speak, of financing through (bank) lending. The financing of the company through the increase of its share capital presents a number of advantages over its (bank) borrowing. However, as our subject is not the financing of the SA, we will limit ourselves to the most significant of them.

    Specifically: Between the investors/financiers/shareholders and the SA, an equity and not a credit relationship is created. The SA is therefore not obliged – and, in principle, not allowed – to return the capital to its investors/shareholders. But neither does it owe them interest – at least as a rule. The shareholders of the SA, on the other hand, look forward (also as a rule) to receiving, under conditions, dividends and their participation in its profits – if any. Further: increasing the share capital of the SA strengthens the latter’s solvency, as opposed to taking on debt through borrowing.

    However, it should not elude us that financing through a capital increase can lead, if the existing shareholders choose/accept/tolerate it, to the entry of new shareholders into the SA. This is especially the case when funding is sought from a crowd of funders/potential shareholders through a regulated market. The increase of the share capital of the SA is therefore possible to bring about changes, sometimes significant, in the (share) balances and the management of the company.

     

    The Distinctions Of Raising Equity Capital

    However, the term increase of share capital does not always imply a way of financing it. Let’s see why:

    Nominal & Actual Increase

    This distinction is a consequence of the distinction between equity capital and corporate property. Particularly:

    Nominal Increase

    This type of (nominal) increase in the share capital does not constitute an increase in the SA’s corporate assets. It is simply an accounting adjustment of the share capital. An adjustment to be opted by the shareholders, in order to capture the greater value, which the corporate property has acquired due to the existence of (apparent or hidden) reserves.

    In this case, the SA may increase the nominal value of its existing shares. Alternatively, however, it is possible to issue new shares and grant them, without consideration, to its existing shareholders – on the basis of their participation in the share capital. In this case, the shareholders do not pay contributions. On the contrary, “…they acquire the new shares automatically… without the need for any declaration of intent. In fact, the acquisition of the new shares by the old shareholders… is mandatory in the sense that no deviating regulation is allowed by decision of the General Assembly. or an arrangement such that this acquisition will depend on the fulfillment of conditions” (ind.: 577/2010 Court of Appeal of Thessaloniki).

    It is noteworthy that the decision on a nominal increase is taken by the General Assembly with a simple quorum and majority (Article 130 §3).

    Actual Increase

    The actual increase constitutes, at the same time, an increase in the share capital of the SA and its corporate property as, through it, new assets flow in.

    Further, the actual increase is distinguished into capital increase: (a) by capitalization of profits and (b) by payment of contributions. The conditional capital increase is also actual (: cases of issuing a convertible bond loan -article 71 and granting the option to acquire shares -article 113). The practice of advance payments to shareholders for future capital increases is a variant of the increase by contributions. Further:

    (a) Actual increase by capitalization of profits: This is the increase realized by capitalization (of the whole or part) of the net profits, to be distributed, of the SA. The capitalized profits may correspond to the minimum and/or the additional dividend of the shareholders (Article 161 §3).

    In this case, the shareholders receive no dividend or, at least, not all of it. The otherwise distributable amount is capitalized. Shares are distributed to the beneficial shareholders, in proportion to the participation of each one in the share capital.

    The decision on the specific increase is taken by the General Assembly with a simple quorum and majority.

    (b) Actual increase by paying contributions: This is an increase in the share capital by paying contributions in money or in kind.

    In this case, new shares are issued to cover the additional (numerical) value of the capital or until it is covered. These shares are taken over (:undertake contract) either by existing and/or (as the case may be) new shareholders. The shareholders are therefore obliged to pay the nominal (and/or, where applicable, the premium) value of the new shares.

    The actual increase by paying contributions will concern us below.

    Regular & Extraordinary Increase

    With the criterion of the body that decides the actual increase by payment of contributions, the latter is further distinguished into regular and extraordinary (article 23 section a’).

    Ordinary Increase: It is the increase of the SA’s share capital, which is decided by the General Assembly with an increased quorum and majority.

    Extraordinary Increase: It is that increase, which is decided either by the General Assembly with simple quorum and majority or by the Board of Directors. This particular increase, due to its special interest, will concern us in our next article.

     

    The Content of the Decision on the Increase

    The minimum content of the decision of the competent, as the case may be, body of the SA to increase its share capital is specified in the law (Article 12 §1, par. d); whether it is a regular or an extraordinary increase. The relevant decision is always published in the Business Registry.

    Specifically, in any case of capital increase, the decision of the competent body of the company must state -at least (article 25 §1):

    (a) The amount of the increase in share capital. The competent body is, in principle, free to define the amount of the increase. However, in the case of the extraordinary increase, the legislator places specific restrictions on the upper limits of the increase (Article 24 §§1 and 2).

    (b) The method of covering the increase (accordingly, i.e. if contributions are to be paid in money or in kind). In the case of contributions in kind, as we have pointed out in a previous article, the relevant decision must meet the conditions of the law (article 17).

    (c) The deadline for covering the increase (see related previous article).

    (d) The number of shares to be issued.

    (e) The type of shares to be issued: whether they are common, preferred or redeemable (nominal, in any case) shares.

    (f) The nominal value of the shares. The determination of the nominal value must fall within the limits set by the law: the nominal value of each share cannot be set at an amount lower than €0.04 nor higher than €100 (article 35 §1, section a’).

    (g) The sale price of the shares. Setting the sale price is extremely critical. Any low price compared to its true value constitutes underfunding of the SA. In addition, in case of entry of new shareholders, it constitutes a (partial at least) depreciation of the existing shares. On the contrary, any high price makes it difficult to participate in the increase and, by extension, to finance the SA.

    In any case, the sale price cannot be less than the nominal value of the share. In particular, it is provided that “…it is prohibited to issue shares below par” (Article 35 §1).

    It is possible for the General Assembly, in the case of an ordinary increase only, to authorize the Board of Directors (with the decision of the increase) in order to “…determine the sale price of the new shares, or, in the case of the issue of preferred shares with the right to draw interest, the interest rate and the method of its calculation”. The authorization is submitted to the public and its validity cannot exceed one year (Article 25 §2). This feature gives the Board the opportunity to find the most appropriate time within the year from the increase decision to determine the best possible price. If, however, the Board does not take advantage of the relevant possibility, the increase is aborted.

     

    The Approval of a Class or Classes of Shareholders

    The existence of several categories of shareholders (e.g. preferred shareholders) is often found in SAs. It is provided, for these cases, that the decision of the General Assembly for a regular or extraordinary capital increase as well as its decision granting authority to the Board of Directors for an extraordinary increase “…are subject to the approval of the class or classes of shareholders, whose rights are affected from these decisions” (Article 25 §3).

    The approval of the decision of the General Assembly, provided by a decision of the shareholders of the affected class, is taken in a special meeting with an increased quorum and majority (Article 25 §3 and 4).

     

    The Control Abuse

    The decision on the (regular or extraordinary) increase of the share capital is subject to an abuse control. According to the jurisprudence, the decision of the General Assembly on an increase conflicts with the general prohibition of the abuse of rights based on Article 281 of the Civil Code when the following conditions are met, cumulatively:

    “(a) the company does not have any special and specific need to increase its share capital,

    (b) the majority shareholders are aware that their respective minority shareholders are in fact unable to participate in the planned increase due to financial incapacity and not simply because of their opposition to the increase; and

    (c) the exclusive pursuit and purpose of the majority to achieve through the increase of the share capital is the strengthening of its own position and the corresponding weakening of the position of the minority…” (ind.: 265/2011 Court of First Instance of Athens and 155/1985 Supreme Court, 832/1976 Supreme Court).

    In case of abuse of the decision of the body that made it, it is possible to cancel it (articles 137 on the General Assembly and 95 on the Board).

     

    The Possibility of Partial Coverage

    The decision to increase the capital modifies, as we have already pointed out, the statute of the SA. The coverage of the increase follows the specific amendment. The coverage, however, may not be complete or may not occur at all. In this case the increase is aborted. However, it is possible to “rescue” the increase when it is not complete – it is sufficient for the relevant decision to provide for this possibility (Article 28).

    If partial coverage takes place, the Board of Directors is required to adjust the article of the articles of association on the capital to the amount of the partial coverage. This decision of the Board of Directors does not constitute an amendment to the articles of association.

    The law provides that the above decision is carried simultaneously with the certification of the payment of the capital. However, as we have pointed out in a previous article, the certification can also be carried out by another person (chartered accountant or auditing firm). A fact that, in this case, the law overlooks.

     

    The increase of the SA’s share capital, which concerned us above, is, in any case, a factor speaking of the health of the company. Its realization, however, always needs careful planning. Key parameters in this direction: the statutory regulations, the observance of (according to the law) procedural requirements and the relevant “strategic” choices. All of these are able to help either (purely) in the direction of strengthening the company and/or in the direction of strengthening the majority, shrinking the minority or, as the case may be, protecting the latter. The perspective will vary according to the design and interests of the one who has the ability to make decisions but also of the one who feels “affected”.

    However, the provisions of the law are important but also, to a significant extent, capable of defending individual interests.

    Especially the company’s. –

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (March 20th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

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