Category: Articles

Warrants

A. Introductory

Warrants are a modern financial instrument, known to those who teach economics, but also to those involved with stock markets around the world. Warrants, little known to the general public, may be a means of attracting financing but also of supporting business development. Their operation is twofold: On the one hand, they align the expected future positive course of the company with the individual interests of third parties directly or indirectly involved. On the other hand, they broaden the framework of those who “struggle” for the success of the corporate venture – which is now becoming a common goal for more. Warrants may prove to be more attractive than issuing preference shares or convertible bonds.

But let’s get to know them better.

B. Getting acquainted with warrants, national and international experience

What are the warrants

Under the Law on Sociétés Anonymes (Article 56 par.1), warrants are the securities issued by a société anonyme and confer the right to the of the beneficiaries (: option) to acquire (more precisely: to buy) shares of its (of the issuer-in this case we are talking about corporate warrants).

Reasonably, though, one could support that lawyers are not the most competent ones to talk about what warrants really are. This is because, in a wider (and correct) view, it is a stock derivative that creates the right (but not the obligation) to buy (or sell) a share at a specific price (: “exercise price”), before its expiration (an indicative definition can be found here: https://www.investopedia.com/terms/w/warrant.asp ). Thus, the institutional framework that governs the operation of warrants affects, on a multi-level basis, not only the operation of a société anonyme, but also the relationships formed around it. The relevant regulations could not therefore be missing from the new law on Sociétés Anonymes (Articles 56 to 58). It could also be impossible not to be of the concern of the legal community of the country. [The most complete, at present, work in our country is: “Warrants corporate and covered”, John Linaritis, Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2018)].

The use of warrants in the context of the recapitalization of Greek banks (2012-2013)

The experience of the recapitalization of Greek banks is the one that first brought us into contact with warrants (precisely with covered warrants – in contrast to the aforementioned corporate warrants). The relevant legislative framework was already in place in 2010 (from article 7a par. 1 and 2 of law 3864/2010, as it was in force with subsequent amendments of the years 2012-2013), before being replaced by Article 2 of law 4254/2014. It was further specified by the relevant Ministerial Council Acts No. 38/2012, 6/2013 and 43/2015.

The attempts to attract private investors to recapitalize systemic banks have been achieved (even partly) through the use of warrants as “sweeteners” (as per the international terminology).

Thus, those who decided to participate in the recapitalization of Greek banks during the period 2012-2013 were found to have warrants in their hands. Accordingly, on the basis of the MCA 38/2012, the holders of the warrants received from the Financial Stability Fund (FSF) free of charge, one Warrant for each common share of the Credit Institution they acquired. There was provision in this MCA for the readjustment of the number of shares attributable to each warrant “in the case of corporate actions”. The relative provision was further specified,by the MCA 43/2015.

The beneficiaries of the warrants, thus, acquired the right to exercise them fifty-four (54) months from the date of issue of the securities – half – yearly. The exercise price of the warrants was set at the acquisition price of the respective shares by the FSF, plus an interest rate of 3% and a margin (proportional to time when the exercise of the relevant right) on the number of shares that the holder of the warrant was entitled to acquire while exercising the right.

The valuation of warrants

Since 1973, the “Black-Scholes” model has been adopted (with various supplementary interventions and adjustments) in the international literature on the valuation of warrants. This model takes into account: (a) three basic parameters for determining their value: the exercise price, the remaining time to the maturity date and the stock price of the share; and (b) at least three additional financial parameters: the expected dividend yield, the risk-free interest rate, and the expected volatility of the underlying share.

In practice, however, for all of us non-economists: When the share price at the time of the exercise of the relevant right (i.e. that acquired by the warrant at the time of its acquisition) falls short of the amount to be paid (per share) for its exercise, it makes no sense to put any other parameter in the equation. This was done in the aforementioned case of bank recapitalization: The share price of systemic banks was downgraded, in contrast to the warrant exercise price, which was initially agreed on a constant basis over the individual periods of potential exercise.

Thus, individuals who participated in the recapitalization of systemic banks received warrants, but they never exercised their right because the share price to which they were quoted was clearly lower than their warrants.

This particular project was not to be successful.

Exercising rights from warrants and related questions

Regarding listed companies (as referred to above “systemic” banks), the aforementioned reasoning seems as self-evident and simplistic: Why exercise my warrant right when it is financially advantageous to buy the corresponding stock from the stock market with a smaller cost?

But does the same also happens with non-listed companies? In those that their shares are not traded on a regulated market, so they are not freely available? And what happens when they can only be available in the context of a free transaction where the vendor’s and buyer’s “declarations of will” are identical?

And, ultimately, the key question: Are warrants a failed and non-functional institution? Or can it be used multilevel in the context of boosting entrepreneurship? The answer to the specific, nodal questions is attempted below.

The potential use and utilization of warrants

The range of potential exploitation of warrants seems almost inexhaustible.

Warrants can be an instrument (but most of all: a motivation) for business financing – it is not accidental that the term “sweetener” already mentioned and internationally used: I am currently participating in a share capital increase and I am excited that in the (near or far) future I will have, IF I choose, on favorable terms (in relation to the then data), an additional number of shares.

This logic may prove attractive not only to attract equity start-ups but also to correspondingly growing and / or simply healthy businesses. On the other hand, it may prove to be appealing in the attempt to provide capital support to companies with liquidity & solvency problems and the inability or difficulty of drawing external financing or (joint) capital support. It is a strategy tool for venture capital, for individual investors, but also a tool for individual shareholders’ personal strategies.

Moreover, it is not possible to disregard the potential use of warrants as a motivation for those who run the company, executives, associates, suppliers or creditors. And with regard to the latter (suppliers or creditors) – in addition as a means of partial or total repayment or favorable settlement of financial obligations.

In all the above cases, warrants can have a dual function: (a) To align the (prospective) future positive course and prosperity of the company with the individual interests of third parties directly or indirectly involved (and not only shareholders) but also (b) To broaden the framework of those who (for tangible reasons of immediate interest) “struggle” for the success of the corporate venture that is now becoming a common goal.

In all these cases, warrants may prove, multi-level, to be (and are) more attractive and preferable to the issue of preferred shares or convertible bonds.

C. The approach (and regulation) of warrants by the law on the SAs

Bearing in mind the above mentioned (under A) introduction, the choice of the relevant Legislative Committee (and of course of the Greek legislator) for integrating warrants into the regulatory field of the new Law on Sociétés Anonymes can be more clearly understood.

Option to issue warrants

By the provision of Article 56 par. 1 of the new law, the General Assembly shall be the competent body for the issue of the warrants, which shall decide with increased quorum and majority. A simple quorum and a majority of the General Assembly or a decision of the Board of Directors is sufficient if there is a relevant statutory provision (paragraph 2 applying mutatis mutandis the provisions for the extraordinary increase of the share capital – according to article 24).

Individual decision parameters of the competent body

The relevant competent body of Société Anonyme in its decision to issue warrants (which is subject to the publication of the law on the increase of the share capital) includes the following:

(a) the time, the manner, the price for the issue of the warrants and the method of payment
(b) the time limit and other conditions governing the exercise of the right which the warrants incorporate
(c) the category and number of shares to be issued after any exercise
(d) the value or method of calculating the value of shares to be paid when exercising the right
(e) the number of shares to which each warrant is entitled to acquire
(f) adjusting the terms of the warrants and of their rights in the case of corporate actions; and
(g) any other relevant detail

Other issues related to the issue of warrants

Existing shareholders at the time of the issue of the warrants retain a relevant pre-emption right at the time of their issuance (Article 56 par.6) and reasonably as their future exercise would disrupt any equity balances. At the same time, it is possible to recognize (Article 56 par.7) the option of partial coverage of the warrants for which the issuance will be decided (in proportion to the application of Article 28 for the partial coverage of the share capital increase). Finally, it is stipulated (Article 56 par. 8) that the relevant warrants are nominal – reasonably also in this case as the shares of the Sociétés Anonymes can only be nominal.

Acquisition of own warrants by the company (Article 57)

The Société Anonyme cannot cover its warrants or take warrants of its own or its parent company.

However, the Company may acquire warrants of its own (except in the case of a successor or a gratuitous cause) following a decision by the Board of Directors to: (a) justify the company’s interest; (b) record the purpose and (c) determine the maximum number of warrants to be acquired; (d) the duration of the approval (max 12 months); and (e) the minimum and maximum value of the acquisition.

For the particular decision of the Board of Directors, a certified auditor’s report is required on the reasonable value of the acquisition. This specific value may not result in a reduction in the share capital to lower levels than those specified in the provision of Art. 159 §1.

In the event that the issuer decides to acquire (and ultimately acquires) its own warrants in order to amortize them, it is obliged to immediately cancel it. Also, when the issuer acquires its own warrants either due to a succession or by a gratuitous cause, it is obliged to take a decision, within one month, either to cancel or to resell them. In any case, however, of an acquisition by the company of its own warrants (in contravention of the specific provisions) is obliged to transfer them not later than one year after their acquisition.

Exercise of warrant rights (Article 58)

The right resulting from warrants is, as already mentioned, a right of option. This means that the exercise of the right by the beneficiary is unilateral. The sole condition for its exercise is the payment to the company (in advance) of a given price.

The nominal value of the shares to be issued may not, however, exceed the sum of the amount paid on the acquisition of the warrants and that paid in the exercise of the right in question.

However, when the relevant right arising from the warrants be exercised, there is an increase in the share capital. In this increase, the old shareholders have no right of preference. The Board of the Directors is obliged to adjust, within two months, the share capital of the company.

Finally, it is noted that the provision of a reserve to the issuing company is mandatory as long as the warrants remain valid. This reserve cannot be distributed and is at least equal to the value paid when the warrants were issued.

D. Epilogue

From the above, I do not think there is any doubt that the incorporation of warrants into national law provides an important (multi) tool for Sociétés Anonymes. An important tool for financing and for facilitating their financing, for creating incentives to help their productive, efficient and ultimately optimal operation and development. Above all, however, it is a tool that widens decisively the circle of natural persons and legal entities directly and indirectly (more or less) associated with it while, at the same time, with many interests in achieving the corporate objectives.

It is up to businesses, entrepreneurs, financial (but especially our legal) advisors to optimize their use.

Stavros Koumentakis
Senior Partner

P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 27th, 2019).

January 27, 2019
The new law on SAs: Issuing restricted stocks

Is it an option of the law or a minimum guarantee of the (founding and other) shareholders and of the smooth operation and continuity of the société anonyme?

Past experience

It is well known that the Société Anonyme has always been (and remains by law) a capital company. In our country, however, it continues to have, in general, strong personal attributes.

Founding (and non) shareholders always have a lot of concerns. One such is the possibility that one of the other shareholders (with whom they shared the “common dream”) would transfer its shares to a third party irrelevant to the original group. Possibly malignant and / or competitor. Where data permitted, we proceeded with statutory provisions based (primarily) on the needs of the main shareholder or, better, of the shareholder who had chosen us as his lawyers.

These provisions were aimed at protecting the remaining shareholders from the potential surprise of the emergence of a new “partner”. An associate with whom the old shareholders owed (regardless of their personality and intentions) to coexist and co-create.

These provisions usually referred to the recognition of the preference rights of the remaining shareholders when a shareholder externalized his intention to transfer his shares. Even more so: when the shareholder had already pre – arranged, with a proposed acquirer, the transfer of his shares. Sometimes even the architectonic proceedings that were chosen were intended to make a potential transfer of shares de facto impossible. Especially in the event that a specific shareholder would not approve it.

The possibility of denying the requested authorization and the “red line” to the restrictions that can be set.

The law on sociétés anonymes accepts, in the provision of Article 43, that the competent body of the company (Board of Directors or General Assembly) may refuse to approve the requested transfer. Hence, not arbitrarily but under a respective statutory provision (paragraph 1).

The same provision (paragraph 2) introduces a systematic (but indicative) list of some restrictions that are possible but also tolerable on the basis of the Articles of Association to be borne by the company’s shares. For these restrictions, however, there is a significant, twofold, “red line” as it is not acceptable: (a) to make the requested transfer impossible; (b) for a quarter to expire without the company responding to a request of this respect, from the shareholder.

In the event of a violation of the aforementioned “red” line, the company is obliged to buy the shares for which the request itself, in accordance with the procedure provided by the law. The relevant provision (Article 45) provides for the mediation of a court decision, the determination of the redemption price through this court decision, the possibility of the mediation of an expertise. Also, the threat of a company’s dissolution in the event of non-compliance with what said (court decision) orders.

Restrictions and bodies of approval

The respective provision of the law on Sociétés Anonymes refers to some more common restrictions that may be set in the Articles of Association with regard to the transfer of shares. This reference is indicative, as there is no restriction other than the pre-mentioned “red line”.

The involvement of a company’s statutory body has always been (and still remains) already) given and necessary when there is a statutory provision on the future transfer of shares (based on a predetermined procedure). The General Assembly or the Board of the Directors (most commonly the last) was chosen as the body that would give the necessary approvals. Thus, the shareholder who had the majority of the votes in the General Assembly or of the members of the Board of Directors was the regulator of the relevant issue. The absolute, more or less, archon!

Certainly, with the new law, things are not different. And this is reasonable.

Potential restrictions

The provision of art. 45 par. 2 provides for, indicatively, certain restrictions that may be imposed on a possible transfer of shares.

In this context, the obligation of the shareholder requesting the transfer to offer the shares to the other shareholders or to some of them (paragraph 2, case a -recognizing their right of preference) is accepted. It is also defined as tolerable, the mandatory transfer of said shares, ONLY, to the one who will be indicated by the company (paragraph 2, case b).

More interesting, at a legal and practical level, are the other two restrictions. The ones met in international terminology as Tag Along Right (par. 2, case 3), and Drag Along Right (par. 2, case d) as potential and tolerable constitutional provisions. Those which, we, with some originality and sometimes moving hand over hand, incorporated as statutory provisions or arrangements for an extraterrestrial shareholders’ agreement.

In the first case (: Tag Along Right), the third-party potential share buyer is obliged to acquire a corresponding number of shares of other shareholders (and not only of the one with whom he initially “agreed with”).

In the second case (: Drag Along Right) the remaining shareholders undertake the obligation to co-transfer to the third-party corresponding number of shares with the transferor.

Experience has shown that these alternatives have often successfully tackled and resolved complex problems in respect with the relationship between shareholders.

Statutory regulations

The Company’s Articles of Association may (or not) provide for the existence of restrictions, such as above, in respect of share transfers. In the affirmative, it must regulate “the procedure, the conditions and the time limit within which the company approves the transfer or indicates a buyer”. In the event that such a period has elapsed, the requested transfer is free. Hence, if there is a transfer of shares in breach of the statutory provisions, the transfer is declared null and void.

Abolition of transfer restrictions.

Possible existing statutory restrictions on the transfer of shares do not apply unconditionally. Like, e.g. in the event of a shareholder’s death. Also, in case of attachment of his property, bankruptcy or other collective proceedings of transfer of his property. In such cases, it is possible to be statutorily provided: (a) the designation of a purchaser within one month starting from the company being informed of the respective event – the price is determined by the court or, alternatively, (b) the preference right of the other shareholders.

The reasons for the abolition of the statutory restrictions as well as the statutory provisions for the respective management of such events are assessed as perfectly reasonable. The latter even ensure the company’s continuity within what the founding (or the subsequent) shareholders had envisaged.

Corresponding (potential) restrictions also on bonds

Respective restrictions with those mentioned above may be made by the decision of the competent body when a convertible bond is issued.

In conclusion

The statutory restrictions regarding the transfer of the shares of a société anonyme contribute effectively to the smooth operation of the company when one of the shareholders expresses the wish to transfer its shares.

The relevant statutory provisions should, however, be reasonable and not lead to dead ends (since they will be self-defeating). Additionally: not to create the background of extortionate behavior by any of the shareholders.

The new law provides us with the right tools.

It is up to us to use them appropriately, along with the past experiences.

Stavros Koumentakis
Senior Partner

Υ.Γ. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper on Sunday, 20th of January 2019.

January 20, 2019
Technology at the service of the Société Anonyme
At the risk of “betraying” my age, I have to quote that I learned to typewrite in the early 1980s. One, newer then, Olivetti was the one which tolerated me (the younger ones and the eager may navigate to the internet for the relevant pictures).

At that time, if anyone was talking about technology, perhaps we would have thought, if we thought, the (electric) typewriters (with the “ball”) that were to follow.

At that time, we would notthing of internet, of the e-mail or of the teleconference.

At that time, it was not possible to imagine how technology could be used by a société anonyme or by a law firm (there were not even law firms then).

But there have been almost forty years since then.

The changes, since then, sweeping.

Also in the law of Societes Anonymes!

(refer to The new law on Sociétés Anonymes and Sociétés Anonyme: The new law).

The recent law

The recent law (4548/2018) for sociétés anonymes provides a wealth of opportunities related to the exploitation of technology. Which, without a doubt, make our lives (entrepreneurs, accountants, lawyers) easier. Helping to the more efficient and effective operation of the société anonyme.

It is noteworthy, however, that the use of technology is not required by law. In a number of provisions, the law regulates the option of statutory provisions for technology’s exploitation.

The ability to exploit technology

Solely indicatively, may one refer to the provisions of the new law that refer (provided of course that there are corresponding statutory provisions) to:

In the operation of the Board of Directors
- The possibility of the Board of the Directors having meetings by teleconference (Article 90).
- The possibility of decision making by the Board of Directors by means of email exchange (Article 94).
In exercising shareholder rights
- The ability of the shareholders: (a) to request information by email for the forthcoming General Meetings of the companies (article 122) but also (b) to be sent to them the subject to a vote by the ordinary General Assembly financial statements of the company (Article 123).
- The obligation for companies to comply with such requests.
In the procedures of the General Assembly
- The ability of shareholders to participate in a General Meeting (Article 125) on-line (real-time) by audiovisual or electronic means.
- The ability of shareholders to participate in a vote of a General Assembly from a distance that is preceded by a “letter” vote (Article 126). This particular ability is exploited: (a) by the availability of issues and ballot papers via the Internet and (b) by filling in the ballot papers electronically. It is noted that when a distance voting takes place, it is compulsory that the vote be (reasonably) an open one (Article 131) but also that the company ensures the identity of the participant in the process as well as the electronic or other connection.
- The ability of non-shareholder-members of the Board of the Directors, auditors or third parties to participate in a General Meeting by electronic means (Article 127)
- The ability of shareholders to appoint, recall and replace (by electronic means) their representatives (Article 128)
- The ability to hold General Meetings without a meeting (Article 135) when all shareholders have communicated to the company their e-mail addresses. In such cases, the proposal of the Board of Directors is sent electronically to the shareholders along with: (a) a draft decision, (b) the relevant suggestion of the Board of Directors, (c) the way of declaring acceptance or refusal but also the deadline for shareholders’ reply / vote (7-30 days). [In such a case, shareholders are also entitled to submit information requests electronically within three days of receipt of the Board’s proposal. These requests are required to be answered within two days of receipt].
- The ability of countersigning General Meeting minutes without a meeting (Article 136), together with the ability to replace shareholders’ signatures by e-mail.
In the Shareholders’ Unions
- The ability to provide information from Shareholders’ Unions (Article 144) via the internet on the rights of shareholders, investors, and the ways of, among others, namely conciliation.
The (necessary but also rational) use of technology and its capabilities.

Almost one hundred years since the first law on sociétés anonymes (2190/1920) and almost forty years since I learned to type, are so many.

So (I think) I have the right to “strongly qualify” to encourage (also) the exploitation of the latest law on the use of technology.

The legal background exists.

What remains is the (evaluated but also rational) incorporation of the respective options in the articles of association of the sociétés anonymes – which in any case must be aligned with the new data and the requirements of the law.

Stavros Koumentakis
Senior Partner

P.S. A short version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (13 January 2019).
January 13, 2019
Sociétés Anonymes: The new law

The agreements of an SA with its main shareholders, the members of its BoD and with related parties: The correction of the “wrongly raised” issues

The seriousness of the matter and how the new law on SAs deals with it

The issue of the agreements signed between a Société Anonyme and its main shareholders, members of its Board of Directors and related parties is one of the most important issues that the new Law (Law 4548/2018) was required to deal with for Sociétés Anonyme.

Our work with this particular issue

This particular issue has already been addressed in the recent past (in the column “Business: Law and Practice” in the Sunday edition of the newspaper Makedonia on 18.11.2018), but also in a previous article on the blog of our law firm.

In summary, in the above-mentioned article on the blog, among other things, we mentioned: “Based on the options of the new law it is NOT entitled to participate in the decision-making process in the Board of Directors and the General Assembly the member of the BoD or any shareholder, who derives interest (directly or indirectly) from the particular transaction. It is noteworthy that the final decision belongs to the General Assembly, which is convened on this issue at the request of 5% (only) of the share capital. Only the remaining shareholders – in practice, i.e. ONLY the (usually one) minority shareholder – can vote in this particular General Assembly”.

This choice … is expected to lead to exactly the opposite effects to those that the Legislative Committee was looking at: The privilege of 5% minority shareholders to decide unilaterally on the matters relating to the company’s relations, for example, with the shareholder of the majority is expected to lead to abusive (and / or extortionist) behaviors.

…Therefore, there is no doubt that there is a strong need to find a different solution. For example, to return to the former (safer and fairer) “regime” (article 23a of Law 2190/1920): Shareholders who derive interest from a contract are entitled to participate in the General Assembly that will provide the final approval, but the authorization to conclude it will be provided only if the 1/3 of the share capital represented in it does not oppose.

The activation

This issue was a matter of particular concern for a Body of our city (which, for reasons of modesty, has asked for its involvement not to be mentioned). We worked together to achieve the best solution. With our law firm’s letter dated 6.11.2018, we recommended the amendment of the critical provision (Article 100 (5)) of the new law.

In the Body’s letter dated 13 November 2018, addressed to the competent ministers, there was asked for the pre-existing legislative provisions on non-listed companies to be reintroduced. It mentioned, among others:

“It is therefore necessary to return to the previous regime (article 23a of Law 2190/1920) according to which the shareholders affected by the decision may take part in the General Meeting in question, but the authorization to conclude the contract will only be given if the 1/3 of the share capital represented in the General Assembly does not oppose…

In the context of the above, there is no doubt that there is an urgent need to restrict the provision for the application of Article 100 (5) of Law 4548/2018 to listed companies and to amend it as soon as possible as the new law comes into effect on 1.1.2019”.

The response of the political authorities

We are accustomed to addressing to the “ears of those who will not listen” when we rush to the competent authorities for any issues – sometimes critical. In this case, however, the prementioned activation seems to have been completely effective. Through an amendment that has already been submitted to Parliament for voting, it is expected that paragraph 5 of article 100 4548/2018 be amended in the proposed direction.

The Explanatory Memorandum for the amendment of article 100 of Law 4548/2018

This explanatory memorandum verbatim states:

“7. With paragraph 7, paragraph 5 of Article 100 of Law 4548/2018 is amended in order to alleviate the consequences of the full ban to vote for the shareholder who will participate in the General Assembly that will provide the authorization in order for the company to conclude a transaction with a related party, should (this shareholder) be this related party. While Directive 2017/828 provides that in this case the shareholder does not have the right to vote, thus, it allows the provision of interim solutions if the interests of the minority are protected. Given that the abstraction of the vote applies, in accordance with the Directive, only to listed companies, it is appropriate not to apply the prohibition to non-listed companies, while for those listed there is an intermediate system where voting rights are preserved in the assembly provided that the independent members of the BoD have reached a majority agreement on the granting of the authorization. It is added that in every case (both listed and non-listed companies), the minority of 1/3 of the capital represented in the meeting has the right of veto to the granting of the authorization, as provided for in Article 23a (3) of Law 2190/1920. It should be kept in mind that according to par. 4 of article 100 of law 4548/2018, if, prior to the general assembly’s decision, the transaction has already been concluded, a minority of 1/20 has the right of a veto”.

The introduced amendment and the amendment to the disputed (problematic) provision

The introduced amendment verbatim states:

“7. At the end of paragraph 5 of Article 100, paragraphs are added as follows:

“This does not apply (a) to companies with shares not listed on a regulated market and (b) to listed companies if the authorization of the Board of Directors pursuant to paragraph 1 was granted with the agreement of the majority of its non-listed members. In any event, the authorization by the general meeting is canceled if shareholders representing one third (1/3) of the capital represented in the meeting object to it”.

The problem “with the potentially dramatic consequences”: NO longer exists

The aforementioned activation (with the assistance of our Law Firm) proves to have had the desired effect: The problem “with the potentially dramatic consequences” (i.e. the 5% minority being a regulatory factor for critical decisions with the assumption that the company and shareholders will be involved in long-standing litigation) will not exist since the very beginning of the implementation of the new law.

We can be both happy and proud.

Congratulations, however, must be given to those who have decided to activate while refusing to submit to (the usual) practices of introversion.

Stavros Koumentakis
Senior Partner

Υ.Γ. A short version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (December 30, 2018).

December 30, 2018
GDPR: The Next Day. The Regulation in the context of employment
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text] The European Regulation “on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data”, adopted on 27 April 2016, is directly and across the board applicable (throughout Europe) since 25.5.2018.

Basic declarations

It is a “convenient” myth that we (should) expect for the Greek legislation to decide on how we adapt. There is a draft law (its consultation was completed in March 2018), but it has not yet been adopted nor is necessary to be. The Regulation applies as is.

It is accurate and not a (malicious) exaggeration that all businesses process personal data. Sometimes even “sensitive”: Like those of their employees. Thus, businesses need to adapt according to their strengths and (in particular) depending on the potential impact of the data leakage they process, that is, depending on the number and degree of “sensitivity” of the data.

It is also accurate that the Regulation is not entirely clear on all points. However, we have been armed with the relevant interpretative tools. Such as, for example, the views of the Working Party of the 29-member Group of Member States’ Data Protection Authorities.

The role of GDPR in employment relationships

What is the role that GDPR plays in the relationship between the Employer and the Employee and which are the main obligations of a business?
1. To train the Employees on the processing of third-party data it processes in the context of the provision of its services, in the wide sense of awareness and cultivation of new habits.
2. To re-approach the employment contracts with the addition of the employee’s obligations with regard to the development of a new corporate culture. (Which is) The adaptation of a new modus operandi, as such is required as mandatory by the Regulation.
3. First of all, to inform employees on the processing of their data. In particular: for the categories of their data to be collected, their retention time, the purpose and the legitimate basis for their processing, their possible transmission to other organizations (or other countries), and above all for their rights as identified in Articles 15 to 22 of the General Regulation.
The consent

It is thus very important to be noted that the employers are obligated to inform their employees on the processing of their personal data which are necessary, thus, not to obtain their consent. Such consent would be contrary to the spirit (objective) of the Regulation for the following two reasons:

(a) Consent must be the “last resort” of a legitimate base for processing as it presupposes true freedom of choice and is revocable. It would be misleading make an employee think that if he/she does not give or withdraw his/her consent, it is possible for the employer not to ask for or delete the necessary personal data of his/hers: In fact, the labor and insurance legislation as well as the performance of the employment contract impose the processing of specific personal data of the employee.

(b) Consent must be given freely. The relationship between the employee with the business is characterized by a certain imbalance of powers, leading to a “forced” and therefore to an illegal consent.

GDPR is a cumbersome Regulation which, however, carries a significant gift: Extrusion into a change of mentality.

Petrini Naidou
Senior Associate

P.S. This article has been published in Greek in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (December 23, 2018)
December 23, 2018
Corporate Governance: Competitiveness and Growth

[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text] Corporate Governance is, in general, a set of principles and rules that must govern certain areas of the organization, operation and management of a Société Anonyme. But how are they related to Competitiveness and Growth?

The Regulations of Corporate Governance Codes

In the Greek Corporate Governance Code, these rules refer to the Board of Directors, internal control, fees and shareholders.

The Corporate Governance Codes are not mandatory unless some of their provisions (or all of them) have the form of the law (e.g. some of the provisions of Law 3016/2002 on listed companies, of the recent Law 4548/2018 concerning the reform of the law of Sociétés Anonymes, the commonly known law 2190/1920).

Objective and Purpose of Corporate Governance: The Component of Competitiveness

The purpose of Corporate Governance under the Greek Code is “to promote good governance in the conviction that it will enhance the long-term success and competitiveness of Greek companies”.

The reference to enhancing competitiveness is not accidental: We can be sure that there would be no investor to invest in a company that operates with the well-known methodology of most (family) businesses in Greece. A methodology in which the entrepreneur identifies the fund of the company with his “pocket”. The company, with his home.

To what extent is the entrepreneur willing to retreat from unwavering practice and habits of years?

Necessity and value of Corporate Governance. From theory…

Regarding the necessity and value of Corporate Governance, a great deal has been written. In the preface to the Greek Code of Corporate Governance, Iakovos Georganas (then President of HELEX – for the older the “Patriarch of the Hellenic Capital Market”) states: “… Strengthening corporate governance is a prerequisite for creating an attractive investment climate in Greece, as in every country and the adoption of the Code by the companies, helps restore investors’ and lenders’ trust, attract domestic and foreign capital, and enhancing business competitiveness …”.

…to practice. Indicatively: Roots Programme

Helping businesses to grow but also boosting their competitiveness requires, among other things, access to low-cost investment funds. The Athens Stock Exchange is pursuing an important step in this direction, through the Roots programme, which, with a modern methodology, attempts to facilitate the access of small and medium-sized companies to investment funds. Already, on 13.5.2018, the first event took place at the Thessaloniki Stock Exchange Center, with recipients, innovative startups and promising small and medium-sized companies in Northern Greece. Companies that think they have an interesting investment proposal and are looking for investors. “The success of the companies that will join this program will be judged by their ability to raise the funds needed to implement their investment proposal, meeting the requirements of organization, transparency and good corporate governance under the conditions demanded by investors”, says the President of HELEX Mr. Socrates Lazaridis.

Once again, corporate governance!

Is (quite) clear?

Without good corporate governance, there is no access to finance!

Without funding, there is no way for growth!

Stavros Koumentakis
Senior Partner

Υ.Γ. The article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (December 16, 2018)

December 16, 2018
Earnouts: Opportunity for Business Agreements or a “stumbling block”?
[vc_row][vc_column][vc_column_text] To its basic structure, earnouts are agreements concluded between (usually) a seller and a buyer of a company. It is mainly found in M&A agreements or as a tool to promote startup financing.

When an earnout is agreed on, the buyer agrees to pay, in addition to the cost of acquiring a company itself, a “bonus” – under certain conditions.

The necessity

When there are strongly conflicting interests (and usually there are), a deal is almost never easy to be achieved. The seller will always claim that its company is worth more, while the buyer will claim the exact opposite. Of course, no one is able to prove the company’s “actual” value. Earnout comes in to solve this problem.

Earnouts

The logic is simple: The sale of a company, if an earnout is included, is agreed at a price closer to what was offered by the buyer. Nonetheless, the seller will not suffer a loss in case the company is actually worth more than what the buyer was initially offering. To achieve that, both the buyer and the seller set specific targets for the company. In case the targets are achieved, the seller will have “proved” that its company is worth more than what it has already received, and therefore will be entitled to receive a beforehand agreed upon bonus.

This bonus will not necessarily be a specific amount: Its type and method of calculation are left to the discretion of the parties (e.g. it can be agreed that if the sold company has a certain revenue in z years, the seller of the company shall remain its CEO for x years with a salary amounting to y).

Examples:
- The seller will receive a percentage (e.g. 2%) of the company’s profits for the next three years.
- The seller will be the company’s CEO for four years following its buy-out, during which, if certain revenue goals are achieved, the seller will get a bonus for every 10% the company’s revenue has exceeded that of the previous year.
It truly can be anything. If the seller is confident about the capabilities of its company, it is easy to take the risk that his fee be dependent on his company’s performance.

This is, of course, a simplified approach.

Risks and Opportunities

While earnouts seem to be simple and attractive, they entail many risks. What if, in our first example, the buyer makes sure that the profits of the company for the first few years after the buy-out are hidden, by exaggerating, say, the costs? One solution would be for the seller to remain in the company’s management, as in our second example. Another would be that the earnout will depend on other factors such as, for example, the company’s turnover or it position in the market.

Earnouts are introduced as an attempt to solve the problem of pre-sale moral hazard. Prior to the sale, the seller will try to inflate the value of the company, while the buyer will try the exact opposite. Earnouts successfully, in my opinion, address this matter. But earnouts themselves will introduce a “new” moral hazard, after the sale of the company. After the sale, the buyer will try to “hide” the factors that will trigger the earnout while the seller will try to highlight them.

It is obvious that earnouts have to be tailored to any case, in order for all parties involved to be as secured as possible. Nevertheless, with the right planning (when negotiating as well as drafting the agreement), earnouts can solve problems that may otherwise prevent a deal from closing.

I believe we all agree that the most important job lawyers have is to close the deal their clients want closed, while, of course, protecting them. Earnouts are a good way to save an otherwise “dead” deal: when without an earnout the buyer and the seller do not have the same perspective, earnouts give both parties time to “look through each other’s eyes”. And, ultimately, make profitable business transactions.

Lida Koumentaki
Junior Associate

Υ.Γ. The article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (December 9, 2018).
December 10, 2018
Acquisitions: Is it enough just to shake hands on?

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Acquisitions and business development

The procedure of a company to acquire another of the same industry or of an industry in which it would like to expand its business, is connected to its growth.

In procedural terms this is one of the agreements “concluded” between those who have the authority to do so: The, normally, strong party (that is, the acquiring party) and the, normally, weak one (that is, the party to be acquired).

In any case, the “acquiring company” aims to its further (direct) development, utilizing the structures, the staff, the activity and the customer base of the acquired company.

The risks of an acquisition

The acquisition of a company, however attractive it may be, poses significant risks to the acquiring party, buyer. What are these risks? Legal, economic, tax risks and so on.

These exact risks the person who is interested in acquiring must explore and consider and the assess whether to proceed to the next steps.

At this point, specific consultants are, perforce, involved in order to carry out the necessary legal, financial, tax, technical audits (or, as per the international terminology: legal, financial, tax, technical due diligence).

And it is true that we have all heard of acquisitions where the entrepreneurs simply “shook hands on the deal” in the view that “everything is ok” or that they would not face serious or just unmanageable problems. Such a choice certainly could not be classified as wise as no one would want to find himself in difficult (or unmanageable) situations: If the new owner, for example, subsequently found out that a third party has initiated actions for significant amount of money against the acquired company or that there are legal actions challenging the ownership of the shares that have been transferred or that a tax audit has never been carried out in that company or that the lease of the main premises expired only a month ago …

No one, I’m sure, would want to find himself in such situations. No one would want to risk his financial position because he did not carry out audits or because the audits conducted were proved defective.

Standard audits

The various audits explore certain areas of the company’s life and activity and are intended to reduce the business risk of the acquiring party. Indicatively:

Legal audit: There are analyzed (indicatively) the data concerning the company itself, its holdings, its assets (movable, immovable, intangible), its labor relations, its legal cases, its relations with the authorities (fulfillment of its obligations linked to its activity),

Financial Audit: The company’s financial statements are audited, and the correctness of their representation is verified, the accounting books and data are checked, the potential “gray” areas are searched (and clarified), the existence (or non-existence) of financial problems is confirmed. (Or, in another, most modern version of EY Canada: “The diligence exercise probes deeply into the quality and sustainability of earnings by examining underlying risks and exploring previous financial performance to determine whether it can reasonably be expected to continue, and to understand how changing circumstances and trends may impact the future of the business”)

Tax Audit: There is an audit on tax liabilities and corresponding outstanding issues of the company

Technical Audit: All issues of technical nature related to the operation of the company are checked; it is differentiated according to its subject.

The acquisition contract

Upon the completion of the above audits, is the maximum possible assurance for the acquiring party achieved? Apparently not as the “gentlemen’s agreement” should be followed by the relevant contract, which will contain the important parameters of this agreement. Indicatively:

(a) The price and method of payment (provided, of course, that there has been the company’s value assessment)

(b) Any supplemental agreements relating to parameters for increasing, under condition, the price and / or other earnings,

(c) Shareholders’ individual rights (when the transferor remains with a minority stake in the acquired company, e.g. tag and drag along rights, management issues, a shareholder agreement beyond the company’s Statute),

(d) The obligations undertaken by the acquiring party in relation to the transferor (e.g. exemption from bank guarantees, removal of any charges/mortgage prenotations in personal property),

(e) The assurances and warranties provided by the acquired party, with regard to the data and the information provided,

(f) Penalties in the event of ex-post liabilities occurring prior to the transfer, and so on.

It is obviously NOT enough just to shake hands on!

The acquisition of a company is undoubtedly an important stop for the company itself, for the transferor and, of course, for the acquiring party. The risk that the latter assumes should be reasonable and measurable. And its safeguards should be the best possible.

Stavros Koumentakis
Senior Partner

Υ.Γ. A brief, Greek version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA newspaper (December 2, 2018)

December 2, 2018
Transactions using an electronic signature

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Conducting transactions using an electronic signature:

Its legal significance

The legislative framework for electronic signature

The electronic signature is a mathematical system of electronic data used to prove the authenticity of a message or document.

The concept of e-signature was introduced into the Greek legal system by P.D. 150/2001, which incorporated Directive 1999/93 / EC. The latter set the legal framework for the use and legal validity of the e-signature. This Directive was repealed by Regulation 910/2014 (“eIDAS Regulation”), which regulates, also in our country, the issues of e-signature.

Types of electronic signature

The Regulation introduces, among other, new regulations for electronic transactions – the distinction between “electronic signature”, “advanced electronic signature” and (for the first time adopted) “qualified electronic signature”. The latter is based on a qualified certificate for electronic signature. This certificate is issued (and it is unique for any person or legal entity) only by the Qualified Trust Services Providers, which have been recognized as such by the competent supervisory body (in Greece, such is the Hellenic Telecommunications & Post Commission).

In the broad sense of e-signatures, there is also included the “digitized signature”, i.e. the digital image of the handwritten signature. The latter is laid usually by using a special pen on a tablet. With the pen the signatory marks (“draws”) the image of his signature. The “digitized signature” is widespread in banking (known as e-signature).

Various electronic applications (already) enable traders to put their “digitized signature” in electronic documents.

The legal effects and the importance of electronic signature

According to the above Regulation, the qualified e-signature has legal validity equivalent to the handwritten signature. At the same time, however, the legal validity and admissibility of e-signature as evidence in legal proceedings is maintained. This despite the fact that the (simple) e-signature does not meet the requirements of the qualified e-signature.

The above legislative provisions are of particular legal significance: The person who lays a qualified e-signature cannot contest the legal consequences of his signature. Every other e-signature produces – in principle – the legal consequences of the handwritten signature. However, it is permitted for the signatory to prove that he is not the signatory and that he is not bound by it.

The differentiation in reliability and consequently in the legal “gravity” of the above signatures arises from the Greek legislation: Public organizations are obliged to use only a qualified e-signature, and only with this it is possible to participate in an e-procurement.

Should we finally choose to use it?

In the context of ever-increasing electronic transactions, the use of all types of electronic signatures has considerable advantages. The speed in the completion of a transaction, reduced costs, environmental protection are only some of them. Of course, the assurance of its credibility depends on the technical means used each time.

It is very important for the enterprises to get a full picture of the different types of electronic signatures as well as of the consequences of their use. This particular road seems to be safer for their business interests in a constantly evolving environment.

Evdokia Kornilaki
Senior Associate

Υ.Γ. This article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper, on 25th of November 2018

November 26, 2018
The New Law On Societes Anonymes

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At Koumentakis & Associates Law Firm we have a deep faith in the values and benefits of preventive law practicing. We are not limited to just good conventional predictions and / or developing the right strategy in our clients’ affairs. We are proceeding with the evaluation of the adverse effects of existing legislation and, consequently, with proposals for legislative interventions to prevent them.

This includes the comments of Stavros Koumentakis, Senior Partner of our firm, on the (unfortunately poor) predictions while implementing the new Law on Sociétés Anonymes regarding its provisions for contracts between their shareholders and their directors.

The risk of abuse of existing legal options by shareholders of the minority acting in bad faith is (more) visible. Our proposed legislative intervention has already been adopted by FINF (Federation of Industries of North Greece) and has been properly processed.

The public debate has opened!

THE NEW LAW ON SOCIETE ANONYMES

The Contracts Of The S.A. With Main Shareholders, Members Of The Board Of The Directors And Related Parties: The Problem With The (Potential) Dramatic Consequences

A. INTRODUCTION: THE VIEW OF THE COMPANY

1. The New Law On Societes Anonymes

With the recent law (L. 4548/2018), a commendable effort to reform the law of Societes Anonymes as well as the replacement of a hundred-year (old) statute were concluded. Changes are, in some sections, sweeping. The (careful) adaptation of the articles of association of Societes Anonymes should take place in 2019. However, the effect of the provisions of this law begins immediately: from 1.1.2019.

2. The Contracts Of The S.A. With Main Shareholders, Members Of The Board Of The Directors And Related Parties

One of the most important issues that the new law is regulating is the conclusion of these contracts.

The matter has already been dealt with by the European Union legislator in Directive 2017/828: thus, this concerns exclusively companies listed on a regulated market. The new law adopts (Articles 97, 99 et seq.) the provisions of this Directive for all companies. Is this right for non-listed?

3. The Options Of The New Law And The (Dramatic) Risks For The Shareholders Of The Majority

Based on the options of the new law it is NOT entitled to participate in the decision-making process in the Board of Directors and the General Assembly the member of the BoD or any shareholder, who derives interest (directly or indirectly) from the particular transaction. It is noteworthy that the final decision belongs to the General Assembly, which is convened on this issue at the request of 5% (only) of the share capital. Only the remaining shareholders – in practice, i.e. ONLY the (usually one) minority shareholder – can vote in this particular General Assembly.

This choice (as it appears) is intended to protect the minority shareholders and the company itself from the unfair influence of the persons entitled to make decisions on its behalf.

Unfortunately, it is expected to lead to exactly the opposite effects to those that the Legislative Committee was looking at: The privilege of 5% minority shareholders to decide unilaterally on the matters relating to the company’s relations, for example, with the shareholder of the majority is expected to lead to abusive (and / or extortionist) behaviors.

The possibility, which tacitly is given to the majority shareholder (even if it owns 95% of the share capital of the SA) to defend himself with (multiannual and costly) legal actions, does not ensure his own interests nor the company’s.

4. The Solution of the “Gordian Knot”

Therefore, there is no doubt that there is a strong need to find a different solution. For example, to return to the former (safer and fairer) “regime” (article 23a of Law 2190/1920): Shareholders who derive interest from a contract are entitled to participate in the General Assembly that will provide the final approval, but the authorization to conclude it will be provided only if it 1/3 of the share capital represented in it does not oppose.

This particular issue poses serious risks to the smooth operation of Sociétés Anonymes.

The solution should be simple and immediate!

Otherwise: The only ones to be happy shall be the malignant shareholders of the minority and their lawyers (and of course, the lawyers of the shareholders of the majority) ….

Β. THE DATA FROM A LEGAL POINT OF VIEW – THE PROPOSED SOLUTION

1. Preamble

1.1 According to the chairman of the legislative committee on the reform of the law of SA Prof. Evangelos Perakis (Evangelos Perrakis “The New Law of the Société Anonyme”, Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2018, p. 59) “two major issues of great difficulty were the subject of the new law … the question of the remuneration of the members of the board of directors … and the issue of related party transactions … of those transactions that are suspected of occurring through the unfair influence (and for the benefit of) persons controlling or managing the company …”

1.2 The Legislative Committee, which has been set up for this purpose, successfully completed the titanium project of the transition from hundred-year (old) statute (L.2190/1920) to a modern statute (Law 4548/2018) that will govern the operation of the Société Anonyme. However, in such a large project it would be impossible to avoid problems; some, indeed, serious.

2. Related Party Transactions Management – Selected Solutions

2.1 The way selected by the Legislative Committee for dealing with the above mentioned (under 1.1) significant problems and finally adopted by Law 4548/2018 is basically reflected in the provisions of Art. 97, 99 & 100 as well as to that of Art. 109.

2.2 The rule in Art. 99, par. 1, L. 4548/2018 provides for the prior authorization by the Board of Directors of the Société Anonyme for the purpose of concluding contracts with related parties (members of the BoD of the company, persons controlling the company, close members of their family, the legal entities controlled by them, General Directors and Managers of the company etc-99 par. 2)

2.3 The rule in Art. 97, par. 3, L. 4548/2018 provides that when there is a conflict of interest between the members of the Board of Directors (or the aforesaid, under 2.2, related persons) and the Société Anonyme, these members are NOT entitled to vote. As a matter of fact, if failure to vote concerns so many members so as not to have a quorum, the issue is referred to the General Assembly. However, even if the number of remaining members is adequate for the decision by the Board of Directors to be taken, a minority shareholder holding 1/20 (i.e. 5%) of the share capital may impose (in any event) the convening of a General Meeting with the subject of the provision of or not of the relevant approval (Article 100 (3)).

2.4 In the event that the person directly or indirectly involved in the conclusion of the contract happens to be a shareholder, the votes corresponding to his shares are not counted either in the quorum formation or in the majority (Article 100 (5)). Equally, however, neither the votes corresponding to the shares of the related parties are counted. Therefore: The minority shareholder of 5%, for example, (whether acting in good faith, or not), and he ALONE is the one who will take the decision concerning the shareholder of the majority – 95%, for example, after taking into consideration his personal view, and of course his personal interest, and not necessarily that of the company.

2.5 The choices of the new law (L. 4548/2018) and especially the abovementioned deprivation of the right to vote are based on the provision of Art. 9c (4) of Directive 2007/36 / EC (inserted by Directive 2017/828).

2.6 [As an aside, it is to be noted that the rule of Art. Article 99 (3) of Law 4548/2018 provides for a series of exceptions to the application of the above formal (and in our view problematic) procedure. From these exceptions, it is, in our view, to be proved more important in practice the exception provided in case (f): from the generally risky and problematic procedure are excluded the contracts of the company concluded with other directly or indirectly controlled ones, which are concluded with the objective of the interests of the company or from which the interests of the company and of the at shareholders of the minority are not jeopardized. This case is expected to be popular in practice, but it is quite vague as to its specific criteria while it concerns only part of the disputed transactions].

2.7 The above mentioned regarding the deprivation of the voting rights in the Board of Directors and the General Assembly, unfortunately also apply when remuneration is to be paid to the members of the Board of Directors in the framework of a special relationship (in the framework, for example, of the most commonly selected contracts of employment, management contracts or mandates – Article 109 (3)): In such cases, the SOLE member to decide is the shareholder of 5% and not the 95% shareholder (if the latter is also the member of the Board of Directors whom concerns the discussion of the fees to be paid).

2.8 Conclusion: In any of the above cases (: conclusion of a contract between the SA and related parties and / or members of the Board of Directors – the contracts for their remunerations included), and of course also in a number of others, is shown the absolute contradiction that the one to whom the power to take a potentially very important decision within a SA, is not the shareholder of 95% but the one of 5%.

3. The Scientific Approach

3.1 On the basis of what Prof. Evang. Perakis mentions (Evang. Perakis, “The New Law of Societe Anonyme”, Nomiki Bibliothiki, 2018, p. 63): “In any case, deprivation of the right to vote may be considered to be an excessive measure because of its possible consequences, as for example the ability of an obstructive minority of 1/20 of the share capital to seek for a General Assembly to convene in order to reject itself the transactions with shareholders – members of the management of the company with whom they have bad relations while the latter will be unable to vote. It must therefore be accepted that the refusal of the minority to grant the license to conclude the contract should also be reviewed under the provision of Article 281 of the Civil Code”.

3.2 The proposed by Professor Evang. Perakis solution (the judicial ascertainment of the abusive refusal of the shareholder holding the 5%) seems to refer the issue in the distant future and at considerable cost to the companies involved and, above all, to uncertainty as to the outcome. Business decisions, however, should not wait for long lasting legal procedures. It is widely known (to all, lawyers, entrepreneurs, “institutions”, etc.) what it means to wait for the issue of a final judgment (first instance proceedings, appeal) and / or an irrevocable decision on any matter; a fortiori, a judgement on the ascertainment (or not) of the abusive exercise of a right.

4. The Ratio of the Regulations of Directive 828/2017

4.1 The ratio of the regulations of Directive 828/2017 (beyond any doubt) is to ensure: (a) the smooth and unhindered operation of the companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market as well as the adequate management and performance of the company and (b) the encouragement of the long-term active participation of the shareholders and the improvement of the transparency between companies and investors; as it is already apparent from the recitals 2 and 3. The ultimate goal seems to be the smooth functioning of the “markets” in view of the participation of large sections of the population in Europe and of their general effect on the individual national economies. Particularly, in relation to the transactions of these companies with related parties, “adequate protection of the interests of the company and the shareholders who are not related, including minority shareholders” (recitals 42 and 43) is also sought.

4.2 These objectives and, more generally, the provisions of Directive 828/2017 refer explicitly to “listed” companies and do not extend to “non-listed” companies. This choice of the EU legislator is not accidental: If the reasons for the specific arrangements for “listed” companies were at the same or at a similar level as in the case of “unlisted”, it would be obvious that the latter would also be included (even with minor variations) in the regulatory scope of the Directive.

5. The Greek Reality

5.1 The rule of the Directive, as already mentioned, refers ONLY to the listed companies. However, it was consciously chosen by the relevant Legislative Committee to extend to the non-listed, ignoring the harsh Greek reality that has at least two strands:

(α) Until 2007, the creation of a single-member Société Anonyme was not allowed. Until then, we used to set up Sociétés Anonymes by providing a small percentage (for example 5%, and why not!) to a friend of the exclusive shareholder. Obviously, no one was aware that the percentage of 5% would be able to gain power in “life and death” …

(b) The shares of unlisted Sociétés Anonymes usually belong to a narrow circle of persons (members of the same family, close relatives or friends), whereas as a rule one person is the main shareholder and “runs” the company. Shareholders with small shares in the share capital either acquired them by transfer from the main shareholder or participated in the formation of the company (in both cases with or without payment of the corresponding “price”, having full knowledge of who is managing the company) or, finally, due to succession. Vesting them with the same heightened protection that the shareholders of the “listed” companies need due to the wide dispersion of their shares would not only be unjustified but would also turn these shareholders into potential blackmailers of the majority while it would undermine the proper operation of company and could even lead it to complete depreciation.

5.2 In view of this, the extension by Law 4548/2018 of the provisions of Article 9c (4) of the Directive (Articles 99-101 of Law 4548/2018) also to the “unlisted” companies not only is no self-evident but it is also lacking convincing justification. The legitimate weighting of the interests of the regulated entities in every legislation does not seem to justify the extension but, on the contrary, it fails to appreciate or, at the very least, does not adequately assess the reality of the “unlisted” companies mentioned above in 5.1 Thus, the reasons for the specific arrangements for “listed” companies do not apply neither in the same nor to a similar extent for “unlisted” companies”, which makes the Greek legislator’s choice for “expansion” to the latter problematic.

6. The Proposed Solution

The aforementioned leave no doubt that there is a major need to restrict the application of the provision of Art. 100 par. 5 of Law 4548/2018 to the listed companies and to amend it (before the beginning of the implementation of the new law-1.1.2019, with the additions in bold) as follows:

“Article 100 ….. Par.5.

(a) For a company with shares listed on a regulated market, in the case where the transaction concerns a shareholder of the company, that shareholder does not participate in the vote of the general assembly and is not counted for the formation of the quorum and the majority. Similarly, no other shareholders with whom the counterparty is linked by a relationship under Article 99 (2) shall participate in the vote.

(b) For a company with shares not listed on a regulated market, in the case where the transaction concerns a shareholder of the company, that shareholder participates in the vote of the general assembly and is calculated for the formation of the quorum and the majority. Similarly, other shareholders with whom the counterparty is linked by a relationship subject to paragraph 2 of Article 99 shall likewise participate in the vote. In that case, however, the provisions for the quorum and the majority of Articles 130 (3) and 132 (2) shall apply.”

7. Moral

This piece of legislation (Law 4548/2018) seems to be legally in order. It will be tested along the way. It is appreciated successfully.

The Legislative Committee seems to have done a great job. Its President continues to be, for us all, a teacher.

However, despite all these, it is a fact that the aforementioned provision of Art. 100 par. 5 seems (and is) problematic with regard to non-listed companies.

Its amendment is desirable, as above.

Stavros Koumentakis
Senior Partner

P.S. A shorter, Greek version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA newspaper (November 18, 2018)

November 18, 2018

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