Author: skoumentakis

  • Internal Audit and Executive Committee of the SA

    Internal Audit and Executive Committee of the SA

    In our previous article, we were concerned with the possibility (but also the need) of delegating part of the (organic) power from the Board of Directors to its substitute bodies. In this context, the existence of an Executive Committee, which can and should function as a mini Board of Directors, being accountable to it. On the occasion of the substitute bodies of the Board of Directors, we also found the value of designing a secure system of commitment and representation of the company; for the protection, in advance, of the SA and the persons involved. The (always valuable) possibility of establishing an Internal Audit of the SA is moving in the latter direction. On them, the present article.

     

    Internal Auditors

    In General

    The subject of risk management of the SA (: enterprise risk management – part of which is the internal control of the SA) is extremely important and particularly broad. We limit ourselves in the present article -out of necessity, to the provisions of the law on SAs (art. 87 §1 c. b. law 4548/2018) for the establishment of an internal control system. The articles of association of the SA, according to the law, may allow the board of directors (or, as the case may be, compel it) to delegate its internal control to one or more non-members. The use of this discretion, especially for non-listed SAs, can (and should) work as a tool for modernization and transparency. Much more so if its nature, share composition or management and representation system require it.

    Conditions

    (a) Statutory provision: First of all, a necessary condition for the Board of Directors to delegate internal control (to one or more persons) is the existence of an explicit, relevant, statutory provision. The relevant assignment by the Board of Directors will appear as optional or mandatory, depending on what is defined in the articles of association.

    However, for specific categories of SAs, the operation of an independent internal control unit escapes the statutory powers. It is, on the contrary, imposed by special legislative provisions. This applies, mainly, to listed SAs (art. 15 and 16 of Law 4706/2020 on corporate governance), companies in the general financial sector (e.g. credit institutions) and enterprises of public interest (art. 44 Law 4449/2017). In the latter cases, the further expansion of the content and scope of the internal auditors’ powers will remain at the initiative of the shareholders.

    However, there should be no confusion between internal auditors and external auditors. The latter are exclusively responsible for carrying out the regular-annual audit of the company’s financial statements, where required.

    (b) Qualification of internal auditors: A further condition is the assignment of internal audit to third parties who are not members of the Board of Directors. On the contrary, the possibility of delegating the internal control of the company to members of the Board of Directors, as it was foreseen under the previous regime (art. 22 §3 sec. c’ of Law 2190/1920), has now been abolished. The purpose of this repeal is to avoid situations of conflict of interest. Also, the assurance of impartiality and independence in the person of the auditors in the exercise of their powers (see, in this regard, Explanatory Report of Law 4548/2018 on art. 87).

    Not having the status of a member of the Board of Directors is, therefore, a condition for the legal establishment of the internal audit service. The corresponding ones, of course, also apply to the special categories of SAs mentioned above.

    Responsibilities

    The responsibilities of internal auditors are not specified in the law. First of all, they are assigned the power to carry out financial audits in the SA. It is argued, however, that their role is not exhausted, exclusively, in their capacity as auditing bodies for financial matters. On the contrary, they take on the position of the Board of Directors (according to the proportional application of the above provisions for listed companies) and certain supervisory duties. In particular, they become responsible for the protection of the lawful operation of the SA and the protection of its interests.

    Their authority (more precisely: their obligations) includes -indicatively- the monitoring of the implementation of the statutory provisions and legislative obligations. They must, moreover, report to the Board any incidents of conflict of interest (between the members of the Board and the company) in order to take the appropriate measures. They cooperate, if deemed necessary, with the competent supervisory authorities. In any case, internal auditors should have access (also) to the company’s confidential information.

    Internal Auditors-SA Relationship

    Internal auditors (unlike substitute bodies) do not exercise organizational powers of management and representation. On the contrary there exists, between them and the SA, exclusively, some kind of contractual relationship (ind.: provision of independent services, dependent work). They report to the Board of Directors.

    Sub-delegation on the part of the auditors of their responsibilities is possible, only, by power of attorney. The appointment of substitute bodies by them is beyond their powers.

     

    Executive committee

    In General

    In addition to the internal auditors, in the same provision regarding powers, we find an important innovation: the possibility of setting up an executive committee within the Board of Directors of the SA (art. 87 §4 Law 4548/2018). As expressly provided, by provision of the articles of association or by decision of the Board of Directors, if the articles of association allow it, it is possible to set up an executive committee. This committee is assigned specific powers or responsibilities of the Board. Members of the executive committee can be both members of the Board of Directors and third parties (see, in this regard, Explanatory Report of law 4548/2018 on art. 87).

    With this specific provision the permissibility of setting up such committees was clarified and their role was established. The permissibility of their establishment and operation was disputed under the previous regime. It was questioned, in particular, whether the possibility of delegating powers of the Board of Directors to specific members could also include the creation of a committee with the ability to make decisions (see in this regard, Explanatory Report to law 4548/2018 on art. 87). It should be clarified, however, that (even under the prevailing legislative framework) in practice such bodies existed and successfully, as a rule, operated and made decisions.

    Deviating, therefore, from the standards of the – otherwise established in Greece – monist system, the operation of the executive structure in question in the context of the SA seems to resemble the binary system of corporate governance (which is made up of two bodies: the supervisory and managerial).

    Conditions of Establishment

    Statutory provision: The establishment of the executive committee could only require a special statutory provision. This may also concern (apart from what is permitted by its constitution) other, individual, issues. E.g.: its composition, responsibilities, tasks and the way of making decisions. Also, any other matter concerning its operation. It is noted that, as we have already pointed out in our previous article, the specific possibility of “direct” statutory regulation of such issues is not omitted in terms of the company’s Board of Directors (with the exception of the composition and powers of the first Board of Directors).

    It is not excluded, however, that both the decision on the formation and the individual operational issues of the executive committee belong to the Board itself. A previous/relevant statutory provision is also required in this case.

    Responsibilities

    If it is not explicitly defined, the assigned duties of the said committee seem to belong to the “executive” powers of the Board. In accordance with what applies to substitutes, it is prohibited to delegate to the executive committee powers that belong, by law, to the Board of Directors as a collective body (incl.: approval of the transfer of reserved shares, certification of the payment of share capital). However, it is not possible to assign supervisory powers to the executive committee.

    Decision-making power does not, however, rest with the individual members of the executive committee. On the contrary, the committee is competent as a (collective) body. Therefore, it constitutes, in this case, a “substitute body” of the Board of Directors.

    The delegation of powers to the executive committee does not overturn the given responsibility of the Board and its members. The Board remains charged with the duty of overseeing corporate affairs. Also, with the task of supervising the actions of its individual members – of course he executive committee included.

     

    Distinctions of Board Members

    Especially with regard to listed SAs, the members of the Board of Directors are distinguished, by law, based on their duties into executive, non-executive and independent (art. 5 et seq. of Law 4706/2020). The topic here is also extremely extensive. We limit ourselves, out of necessity, to the absolutely necessary.

    A similar arrangement for the distinction of the members of the Board of Directors does not exist for non-listed SAs. It is possible to proportionally apply the provisions on the need for executive, non-executive and independent members of the Board of Directors (but also on corporate governance-in general) to non-listed SAs as well. As long as there is a relevant statutory provision (art. 87 §5). In this case, the supervisory and sanctioning powers of the Capital Market Commission do not apply to the SAs in question.

    However, in relation to the common SAs, any executive committee is usually mostly accompanied by executive members of the board.

    The role of the executive members of the Board of Directors is crucial. They are involved in the day-to-day management of the company and are responsible for the implementation of the corporate strategy. They are, however, supervised during the exercise of their duties by the non-executive and independent members.

     

    The operation of the SA Board of Directors can be assisted, under certain conditions, by an executive committee. The latter will, in this case, be included in the making of important decisions. In this case, the risks will be limited by assigning them to individual representatives. The operation of a potentially multi-member Board of Directors will be relieved, making its operation more flexible and efficient. All this, however, is not enough! The (internal) control of the SA and the corresponding framework to ensure its lawful and in accordance with the statute and the law operation is necessary; in fact, regardless of legal obligations which (in the vast majority of SAs) are lacking.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 22th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Responsibilities of the Board of Directors: Assignment to Members or Third Parties

    Responsibilities of the Board of Directors: Assignment to Members or Third Parties

    In our previous article we dealt with the important role of the Board of Directors. We examined, among other things, his powers and powers; additionally: the scope of his powers. We referred to the principle of the collective action of the Board (art. 77 §2 ed. 2 of law 4548/2018) but also to its deviations; for the possibility, e.g. of delegation of powers of the Board of Directors, to individual members or third parties. In the present article we will examine the specific deviations from the rule.

     

    Appointment of Substitute Bodies

    In General

    In general, the principle (under domestic law) that the Board of Directors acts collectively applies. This particular principle, however, is not without exception. It is possible, e.g., for the Board of Directors to delegate the powers of management and representation of the SA to one or more persons (natural or legal). Members or not. The specific persons are referred to, collectively, as “substitutes” or “subordinates”.

    The delegation of powers of the Board of Directors to substitute bodies constitutes, in practice, the rule under which it operates: the Board of Directors operates through its substitute bodies. This seems reasonable. In this way, the everyday operations of the SA is simplified. The speed of its transactions is ensured. The exercise of the tasks and work of the Board of Directors becomes more efficient. Complex issues are easier to manage.

    Conditions

    The delegation of (organizational) powers to substitute bodies requires compliance with the publicity formalities provided for (not, however, necessary for its validity). Presupposed, however, are cumulatively: the existence of a special statutory provision (art. 87 §1 ed. a΄-1096/1976 plenary session of the Supreme Court) and a relevant decision of the Board of Directors. In more detail:

    (a) Statutory Provision: The requirement for the existence of a special statutory provision as a condition for the delegation of organizational powers to substitute bodies does not derive only from the law on SAs (: art. 87 §1 ed. a’). Corresponding provisions are also found in other laws (: art. 65, 67 and 68 CC-1085/2019 QUALEX Legal Database). The provisions, however, of the law on SAs prevail over those, as they are more specific (1510/2006 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database).

    In the absence of a special statutory provision, any delegation of power of representation to a member of the Board of Directors or a third party is equated with the granting of a power of attorney (art. 211 et seq. CC -1252/2016 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database).

    The articles of association may define the areas for which the Board of Directors will be entitled to delegate management and representation powers. It is also possible to set additional conditions. To limit, e.g., the pool of possible substitute persons by excluding, for example, third parties. Adherence to such terms will constitute an additional condition for the legality of any assignment. The articles of association can, at the same time, define the way of action of the substitute bodies (e.g. with the cooperation of several persons or for specific transactions only).

    It is not excluded that the appointment of substitute bodies by the Board of Directors is defined by the statute as mandatory/obligatory. However, there is a difference of opinion as to the binding nature of such an appointment. According to the jurisprudence (and the correct) opinion, it is accepted that the Board must comply with the statutory “order” (ind. 7119/2004 Court of Appeal of Athens, NOMOS Legal Database). In theory, on the other hand, it seems to hold the position that the Board of Directors retains the discretion to choose whether to make a substitution and, if so, which individual persons to appoint.

    However, the condition of the special statutory provision is open to deviations. Among other things: (i) the judicial appointment of a special representative of the company to conduct judicial proceedings to annul a decision of the Board of Directors (art. 137 §3) and (ii) the judicial appointment of a special representative of the company to bring a lawsuit against members of the Board of Directors (art. 105).

    (b) Decision of the Board of Directors: As long as the required statutory provision/possibility exists, the relevant decision of the Board of Directors for the transfer of its powers can take place.

    It is noted, however, that any delegation by the Board of Directors to another body (e.g. the General Assembly or a third party) of its authority to be substituted (the Board of Directors) in the exercise of its powers is invalid. This prohibition, in fact, seems reasonable as it goes against the principle of its autonomy. Besides, the Board of Directors is the most suitable body, not only to assign and identify its substitute persons, but also to distribute – at its discretion – the responsibilities between them.

    Also, for the same reasons, the direct delegation of responsibilities to members of the Board of Directors or third parties is excluded by the statute. And even more so on the basis of an extra-company agreement (68/2014 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). However, it is permissible, exceptionally, to appoint the first Board of Directors upon the establishment of the SA. Also, the performance of individual offices (incl.: president, vice-president, managing director or authorized advisor). And the same goes for the delegation of responsibilities to its members or third parties. The Board of Directors, of course, can (also in the latter case) proceed, at any time, to redistribute and/or revoke the specific offices and responsibilities (art. 87 §3). Any limitation of its specific right will be null and void.

    (c) Publicity: The validity of the appointment of a substitute body does not require the observance of specific formalities. The special provision of the articles of association and the relevant decision of the Board of Directors recorded in the minutes are sufficient. The latter is not required to be formally stated (1085/2019 QUALEX Legal Database). It is sufficient that such a will clearly emerges from the delegation decision (:in this context it is argued, rather extremely, that even the implied delegation of powers is valid).

    However, the observance of publicity formalities is deemed necessary for opposing the assignment against bona fide third parties. The relevant publication is for informational purposes only.

     

    Appointment Of Substitute Bodies

    The Nature of Powers

    The decision of the Board of Directors to appoint substitute bodies entails the assumption by them of individual powers (: organizational) of management and representation of the SA. The specific substitute bodies have authority through the law and the statute and their link with the SA is the same as that of the Board of Directors (1086/2019 Supreme Court, QUALEX Legal Database).

    Substitute bodies become, in other words, bodies of the company. Equal, in fact, to each other, as all substitute bodies are assimilated in terms of powers (and therefore responsibility), regardless of their status as members of the Board of Directors or not. An organic relationship is created between them and the SA. Hence the name “substitutes” or otherwise “subordinates”.

    In a logical sequence, therefore, the bodies in question do not act as trustees/representatives of the SA; a special power of attorney is not required for the exercise of management acts.

    The Responsibilities

    The transfer of powers can, in principle, concern all or part of the powers of the Board of Directors. The responsibility of the substitute may include the business of one or more category of acts (conclusion of contracts with customers, banking transactions) or specific, only, acts (e.g. conclusion of a specific, only, contract). In the latter case, however, there is no need to comply with publicity formalities.

    Substitution, however, is excluded for those powers of the Board of Directors that are assigned by law and concern, exclusively, its action as a collective body. Indicative: (a) the authority to approve the transfer of restricted shares (art. 43) and (b) the certification of payment of the capital (art. 20).

    From the articles of association or, more commonly, from the decision of the Board of Directors, it is expected to become clear whether the substitute bodies will act individually or collectively. Otherwise, the collective representation rule will apply.

    The Relationship of Actions of Substitutes & the Board

    The substitute bodies have parallel authority with the Board of Directors to exercise the powers assigned to them (330/2006 Supreme Court, NOMOS Legal Database). Hierarchically higher and, at the same time, the main body of management and representation of the SA remains, in any case, the Board of Directors. The substitutes, therefore, act independently, but must not ignore the Board. Thus, the autonomy they have in the context of their organic relationship with the company is limited.

    The Board of Directors is entitled and obliged to supervise the substitute bodies. At the same time, it is entitled to be informed about the progress of the corporate affairs it has assigned to them. It is also entitled, of course, to modify (even revoke) their powers.

    The Duration of Powers

    The term of office of the substitute bodies (it is assumed that) follows the term of the Board by which they were appointed. Therefore, in the prevailing opinion, the power given will be shorter or equal in duration to the term of the said Board. Reasonably so, as the delegation of their responsibilities takes place within the framework of a decision of a specific Board of Directors. The opposite point of view is also supported – not correctly in our opinion: of absolute independence and lack of connection between the bodies in question and the Board of Directors, in terms of the temporal scope of their powers.

    Therefore, the termination of the term of the Board of Directors (or any recall of its members) will automatically bring about corresponding consequences for the substitute bodies.

    The Board of Directors has, as already mentioned, absolute power to revoke the substitute bodies. If the revoked person is a member of the Board of Directors, the powers assigned to them will cease, but the status of the member will remain.

    In principle, the General Assembly does not have the power to revoke the substitute bodies. If the General Assembly revokes, however, members of the Board (as always, only it has the right to act) any parallel status as substitute bodies will be automatically revoked. It is noted, however, that if it is a third (non-member of the Board of Directors) substitute body, appointed with the establishment of the SA (art. 87 §3), the General Assembly has the power to revoke it by simply amending the relevant statutory regulation.

    Ability to Further assign powers

    The substitute body may further delegate all or part of the responsibilities assigned to it to other members of the Board of Directors or third parties. As long as there is (art. 87 §2): (a) Absence of a relevant statutory prohibition (: negative prerequisite) and (b) Provision in the decision of the Board of the possibility of further assignment (: positive prerequisite).

    The further assignment takes place under the same conditions as those required for the assignment. At the same time, the further delegation of powers from substitute bodies to other “sub-substitutes” implies, for them, the acquisition of organizational powers of the company. They clearly exercise their powers alongside the substitute bodies and are subject to the supervision of the latter.

     

    The operation of the SA would prove, practically, unfeasible in the event that collective, exclusive action of the members of the Board of Directors would be required to take any decision related to its daily operations. Therefore, the assignment of responsibilities (by the Board of Directors) to substitute bodies is absolutely necessary. Correspondingly, however, of significant importance is the design of the company’s engagement and representation system. Not (only) for the alignment with corporate governance rules (and the always valuable ESG criteria) but also, in particular, for the safety of the company and those involved. In the context, however, of this and also of the possibility of establishing an Internal Audit and an Executive Committee, about which, however, see our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 15th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • The scope of the authority of the board of directors

    The scope of the authority of the board of directors

    The important role of the Board of Directors has already concerned us in our previous article. We referred there, among other things, to the management duty of the Board. Also, to the scope of its powers and responsibilities. We closely approached its responsibilities for management and representation of the SA (: internal relations and relations with third parties – respectively). Here, too, we will be looking into the specific powers in light of the rule of the unlimited and unrestricted power of representation.

     

    The Responsibilities of the Board of Directors

    While examining the responsibilities of the Board of Directors, we were already explored the relevant provisions of the law (art. 77 §1 Law 4548/2018). According to them, the SA is managed by the Board of Directors. The content of the administration is the management as well as its judicial and extrajudicial representation. Every management act belongs to the management of the SA. Also: every act of representation constitutes, at the same time, an act of management. Every act of management, however, does not constitute an act of representation.

    However, the other provisions of the law also apply. Among them is the one (art. 86§1) which provides that the Board of Directors is competent to decide on every act concerning the management of the company, the management of its property and, in general, the pursuit of its objectives. As far as the fulfillment of the corporate purpose is concerned, the management of the SA is the function that tends, primarily, to its realization – in the narrow sense.

     

    The Corporate Objectives

    The term “corporate objective” has two meanings.

    In its broadest sense, the corporate objective is what determines the general direction of the SA: it refers to the type of its activity. On the other hand, the exercise of administration and management are carried out with the aim and goal of realizing, as already noted, the corporate objectives – in the narrow sense of the term. The implementation and promotion, i.e., of the object of the corporate activity, as described in the company’s articles of association.

    In this specific sense, it is accepted that the corporate objective is not limited only to acts that fall clearly within the exercise of the corporate activity. It includes, on the contrary, an expanded area of actions that serve the long-term goals of the business, based on the perception of transactions. According to the jurisprudence, such actions constitute, indicatively, the acceptance of bills of convenience or the provision of guarantees in favor of a third party (67/2019 Court of Appeal of Dodekanisa, QUALEX Legal Database).

     

    Board Actions unrelated to the Corporate Objectives

    The Rule of Unlimited Power of Representation

    The rule of the unlimited representation power of the Board of Directors is based on the law (art. 86 §2). It aims, in fact, at the protection of third parties and transactions.

    According to the specific regulation, acts of the Board of Directors, even if they do not serve the corporate objectives (either in its broad and/or narrow sense), bind the company vis-à-vis third parties. This rule is not, however, without any exceptions.

    The national legislator made use of the exemption provided by the first corporate Directive (2009/101/EC). The Directive in question allows, in particular, an exemption from the commitment of the company from acts outside the corporate purpose in the event that the third parties were, in fact, aware of the relevant violation. And this knowledge can either be proven or indirectly inferred from the fact that the third party could not, given the circumstances, ignore it (see Explanatory Report law 4548/2018 on art. 86).

    The national legislator, contrary to the previous law (2190/1920), did not provide for an exception in the case where the third party should have known of the excess exercise of power. That is, they deleted the phrase “or should have known”, which also included third parties who were not aware of the excess of the corporate objective because they did not exercise due diligence. And this is because the specific possibility did not seem to be in line with the aforementioned Directive (see Explanatory Report of law 4548/2018 on art. 86).

    The non-commitment of the SA (according to the prevailing opinion in the legal theory), does not occur only in the cases of knowledge by the third party of exceeding the corporate purpose, but also in the cases of their gross negligence.

    It is noted, further, that the SA itself bears the burden of proving the incidents that cancel its commitment. The specific, indeed, burden of proof is justified by the purpose of the rule of the unlimited power of representation: the protection, i.e., of third parties and transactions (art. 86 §2. ed. b). However, in cases where there is a clear excess of the corporate purpose, it is accepted that proof of knowledge on the part of the third party is not required. In the case, e.g., of the sale of all the company’s assets (4839/1979 Court of Appeal of Athens, “Epitheorisi Emporikou Dikaiou”, 1980, 249, which concerns the sale of raw materials and equipment of an LLC).

    In fact, it is expressly provided that the mere observance of the publicity formalities regarding the company’s statute or its amendments does not constitute proof of the knowledge of the third party (art. 86 §2. ed. c).

    It is argued, reasonably, however, that the protection of the third party (even a bona fide one) does not reach, in any case, to the point of binding the SA (also) for actions for which by law the board cannot bind the company. In the case, e.g., when actions are exclusively in the competence of the General Assembly.

    Legal Consequences

    If the Board of Directors acts in excess of the corporate purpose and the third party-dealer is in bad faith regarding the fact of the excess, concerns arise regarding the legal consequences.

    From a point of view, the contract that the Board of Directors enters into with the bad-faith third party is of absolute nullity. The SA is not bound in this case. And in fact, anyone can invoke the invalidity.

    From another point of view, the invalidity is relative in favor of the SA: only it is able to project and implement it.

    According to a third point of view, however, the provisions of the law (229 et seq. CC) regarding the abuse of power of attorney should be applied, in this case-analogously. According to it, a contract of the Board of Directors, in excess of the corporate purpose with a bad-faith third party, is pending for as long as the Board of Directors does not decide for or against it. Specifically, in the event that the General Assembly, with an increased quorum and majority, approves the above contract, it becomes effective and binds the SA. However, if the SA expressly decides not to approve it, it is not bound.

    It should be noted that the SA can take action against the members of the Board of Directors who act in excess of the corporate purpose – as long as the conditions of the law are met (art. 102).

     

    Restrictions From the Articles of Association or the General Assembly

    The Rule of Unrestricted Power of Representation

    The law, in addition, is what establishes (article 86§3) the rule of non-limitation of the organic power of representation – aiming, likewise, at the protection of third parties and transactions. It provides, in particular, that limitations of the authority of the Board of Directors by the statute or by a decision of the General Assembly are not opposed by third parties. Even if they have been made public.

    This provision takes into account the limitation of administrative authority that becomes permissible. In particular, the members of the Board of Directors are obliged to observe the limitations of their authority, whether they are set by the statute or by the General Assembly.

    Legal consequences

    However, in case of non-observance of these restrictions by members of the Board of Directors, they are not opposed to third parties – even if the latter were aware of them. These restrictions have – as a rule – effect only in the context of internal relations.

    The specific regulation (no. 86§3) does not provide for an exception to the non-limitation rule. It is important, however, to note that its absolute and unexceptional wording creates risks for the SA: even in the case of collusion between the Board of Directors and a third party with the aim of not complying with any restrictions, the SA (should be) bound by the carried out transaction with the third party acting in bad faith. Such an approach would, obviously, be dangerous for the SA. The teleological contraction of the provision in question is argued, and rightly so: bad faith third parties should not be protected by the non-limitation of the power of representation.

     

    The protection of those acting in bad faith vis-à-vis the SA should not prevail over the latter. And rightly so. Consequently, acts of the Board, even outside the corporate purpose, bind the company against those who either did not know or were unreasonably unaware of the relevant excess. At the same time, limitations of the power of representation of the Board of Directors set by the statute or the General Assembly will (and must) be opposed against those, only, who operate based on bad faith and with intent to harm the interests of the SA. But often the boundaries between good and bad faith are, unfortunately, indiscernible. Therefore, special attention is required in transactions of particular importance and/or value. The risks, otherwise, will not be negligible for the SA, the (bona fide) third parties and the transactions themselves. –

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (January 8th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Defects in Election/Appointment of SA Representatives

    Defects in Election/Appointment of SA Representatives

    In a previous article we dealt with the election of the members of the Board of Directors: the rule (election by the General Assembly) and its exceptions. We also dealt with the conditions for electing and appointing members of the Board of Directors. But what happens when there are defects in the election or appointment of the members of the Board of Directors and/or the representatives of an SA?

     

    The unenforceability of Defects

    Reasons, of any nature, that make the election/appointment of the members of the Board of Directors and the representatives of the company defective are not presented against to bona fide third parties. On the contrary, such defects burden the company itself. A prerequisite: (a) the observance of the relevant publicity formalities on the part of the SA and (b) the ignorance of third parties regarding the relevant internal defect (art. 84 – which maintains the provision of article 7 e of the previous law 2190/1920 and is simply transferred systematically to the chapter on the Board; see ret., Memorandum to Law 4548/2018 on Art. 84).

    With the specific legislative choice/regulation (: manifestation of the general principle of legal certainty) the (justifiably) increased trust of third parties who do business with the SA is protected; the trust they demonstrate in the content (: truth and legality) of the defective but nonetheless published company’s data. The transactional risk is therefore borne by the SA itself. This seems fair, as oversights and irregularities in the appointment of the administration can be due even to a decision (or omission) of the highest organ of the SA, the General Assembly. The protection of third parties necessarily (and rightly so) prevails.

     

    Application conditions

    Representatives: Organic Power of Attorney & Publicity

    The scope of the provision covers the representatives of the SA; the persons, i.e., who have been granted (organic) authority to represent the SA and their election/appointment is submitted to the publicity formalities of the law (: art. 12 law 4548 /2018).

    The concept of the representative of the SA includes the members of the company’s main representative body: the members, i.e., of the Board of Directors. In fact, regardless of the way they are elected or appointed (ie: by the General Assembly, directly by a shareholder, by the original articles of association or by a court decision). Also, the substitute members of the Board of Directors and substitute bodies (: representatives of the SA – members of the Board of Directors or third parties). Also, the liquidator (according to art. 167§ 5) and the bankruptcy trustee (who has authority to manage the corporate property).

    On the other hand, they do not fall under the above concept of the representative of the SA and, therefore, under the protection of the law (art. 84) regarding the representatives of the SA. Those, i.e., who have not been granted (organic) power of representation but operate for very specific actions on the basis of a power of attorney, granted to them by the material authorities (according to art. 211 et seq. of the Civil Code). In this case, both the power of attorney and the power granted to them to act in the name and on behalf of the SA are not submitted to the public.

    Bona fide third parties

    The protection of bona fide third parties by law (: art. 84) concerns those who are, in fact, third parties vis-à-vis the SA. As third parties are understood, initially, those who maintain business relations with SA and trust the publicity of the Business Registry. A third party, in this sense, can also be considered a shareholder of the company, who transacts with the SA. However, if it is proved that they knew of the defectiveness of the appointment, they are not protected by the law. This happens, e.g., in the case of their active participation in the election of the defectively appointed representative.

    In order for the third party to benefit from the protection of the law, they must, in addition, be in good faith. It is required, that is, that they were not aware, during the critical time of their dealings with the SA representative, of the latter’s appointment defect. Possibility of knowledge of the relevant defect (and not positive, ultimately, knowledge – even if it is due to gross negligence of the third party), does not suffice.

    The company bears the burden of proof of knowledge. Subsequent knowledge or bad faith of the third party neither affects the data nor harms them.

    Defect of Election/Appointment

    The protection of the law for the bona fide third party is activated in cases of defect in the election or appointment of the representative of the SA. However, the law does not define what constitutes a defect. We should consider as such any legal reason that makes the appointment or, respectively, the election of a representative of the SA non-existent, invalid or voidable: any defect that can be traced, in time, to the election or appointment and/or their acceptance by the representative in question.

    Legal reasons that constitute a defect are the legal incapacity of the appointed member of the Board of Directors and the existence of obstacles to their election/appointment; the defectiveness of the decision of the General Assembly on the election of the Board of Directors; the defectiveness of the declaration of the will of the shareholder in case of direct appointment of a member of the Board of Directors (Art. 79) ˙ the defectiveness of the declaration of will of the one who appoints a substitute member (art. 87 §2).

    It is noted, lastly, that any error in the court decision which appoints members of the Board of Directors (art. 78 §2 in combination with art. 69 CC) – which justifies the exercise of an appeal, does not constitute a defect in the sense of the law (art. 84).

    Publicity

    Publicity is an additional condition for the application of the law (art. 84) and, consequently, for the protection of the bona fide third party. Specifically, the prior observance of the required formalities (declarative and not constitutive) publicity for the election or appointment of the representatives or liquidators of the SA (: “positive” publicity).

    It is noted that commercial publicity, in general, takes place for the SA and the obliged persons by: (a) the registration or entry of deeds, elements or data in the Business Registry and (b) the simultaneous publication, on the website of the Business Registry, as the case may be, either in whole or in part, of the act or of the element that was registered, or with a reference to the registration of acts and elements for which an obligation of commercial publicity is foreseen (art. 17 of Law 4919/2022).

    As long as the specific publicity procedure for the election or appointment of the SA representatives is observed, any defect in the appointment cannot be brought against third parties who trusted this publicity. Any publication, however, does not imply the cure of the defect that has become known.

    And looking at the same issue from a different perspective: reasonably, the SA is not entitled to object against third parties for any act/fact that, although it should have been, was not published in the Business Registry (: “negative” publicity). The SA is not entitled, e.g., to object to a bona fide third party who traded with its representative who was replaced by another one- without the required publicity formalities having taken place. In this way, third parties are similarly protected from facts they are justifiably unaware of, trusting the inaction of the Business Registry.

     

    Legal Consequences

    In the event that the aforementioned conditions are cumulatively met (: observance of publicity formalities on the part of the SA and ignorance of the third parties as to the relevant internal defect), the defective appointment of a representative of the SA cannot be opposed to third party who transacted with them. In this context, the SA is bound by the acts/declarations of will (express or implied) of its defectively appointed representatives. As an exception, no binding results will be produced for the SA, in the event that “positive” knowledge of the defect on the part of third parties is proven.

     

    It is normal for defects to intrude, sometimes, in the election or appointment of members of the Board of Directors and/or representatives of the SA. In the event that a bona fide third party transacts with them the SA is bound, as long as the (due) publicity formalities have been observed. And on the other hand: the SA cannot oppose to third parties important corporate events that were not published by law (replacement, e.g., of its representatives). Therefore, given that the responsibilities of the SA may prove to be extremely important and broad, the care that should be exercised in these matters should be correspondingly greater. As far as, however, the matters related to the commitment and representation of the SA are concerned, we will look into them in our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (December 30th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Conditions for Eligibility of members of the SA Board of Directors

    Conditions for Eligibility of members of the SA Board of Directors

    In a previous article we dealt with the election of the members of the Board of Directors: the rule (election by the General Assembly) and its exceptions. Can everyone be elected as a member? And if not, what are the conditions for electing (or appointing) Board members? The present article holds the answers.

     

    Conditions for Board Eligibility

    By the law

    The law on SAs introduces a single limitation (art. 83 §1, law 4548/2018) to the discretion of the General Assembly and the shareholder making a direct appointment (art. 79): the existence of full legal capacity for natural persons who are elected/appointed (according to art. 127 of the Civil Code). Limited legal capacity is not enough (Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 83).

    However, additional special conditions, inabilities or incompatibilities are foreseen in individual provisions of the legislation. The specific provisions are not affected; they remain in force (art. 83 §3, section a’). Such arrangements are found in specific forms of companies, such as e.g. credit institutions. Incompatibilities mentioned in the position of the ordinary members of the Board of Directors, the managing director or the representative (according to article 87 §2) are also provided for certain professions (e.g. prosecutors, judges or secretaries of courts are not allowed to be members of the Board of Directors). Also, with regard to listed SAs, a series of irreconcilables for the independent non-executive parties is established by the special, relevant legislation (art. 9 Law 4706/2020).

    It should be clarified here that the law does not impose restrictions on the election or appointment of a member of the Board of Directors, related to citizenship (: local or foreign natural or legal person), residence (: in Greece or abroad), existence (or non) shareholding.

    By The Statute

    Additional eligibility conditions may, by express legislative regulation (art. 83 § 3 sec. b’), be specified in the SA’s statutes-original or by amendment. Such a “qualitative” limitation of the candidate members of the Board of Directors, on the basis of statutory provisions, is basically dictated by the corporate interest. It seems reasonable to require, sometimes, special knowledge, skills, experience and qualifications that must be present in the person of the board members. The nature and corporate purpose may warrant it. And practical reasons may require the introduction of statutory provisions regarding conditions of eligibility related to the residence of the board members (e.g. in the country of the headquarters or in the place of exercise of the administration). And this, despite the use of technology and the expansion of teleconferences often makes physical presence at the meetings of the individual bodies – the Board of Directors included- unnecessary.

    It should be noted, however, that relevant statutory restrictions cannot be tolerated if they lead to the circumvention of the compulsory legal provisions for SAs. To limit, e.g., the number of persons eligible for election to such an extent that the possibility of electing members of the Board of Directors from the General Assembly is practically abolished. Also, to result in discrimination due to gender, religion or other protected characteristics (see related, Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 83).

     

    Legal Consequences of Lack/Loss of Eligibility

    Election or appointment of a member of the Board of Directors without the required legal capacity is invalid (art. 83§ 2).

    But: since the loss of legal capacity is a consequence of the election/appointment of the member of the Board of Directors, the disqualification from the specific position of the member of the Board of Directors occurs automatically. This, of course, applies prospectively. The validity of the member’s actions, before they lose their status, is not affected: there are no retroactive consequences.

    If a member of the Board of Directors is elected as such, in violation of an irreconcilable provision established by law, their election should not be considered invalid because of its opposition to a special provision of law. The members of the Board of Directors will, in this case, be subject to administrative or other sanctions in accordance with what, as the case may be, the specific legislation stipulates. Subsequent appearance of irreconcilable circumstances, however, is argued to result in automatic disqualification.

    However, in the event of non-compliance with the statutory eligibility conditions at the time of obtaining the membership status, the relevant decision of the General Assembly will be invalid. The subsequent appearance of a statute incompatible with the person of a member of the Board of Directors should lead, here as well, to their automatic dismissal.

    It should be noted, however, that the existence of reasons that make the election or appointment of the members of the Board of Directors-representatives of the company defective are not brought against bona fide third parties. It is sufficient that the publicity formalities prescribed by law have been observed. However, in addition, the (bona fide) third parties must be unaware of the relevant (internal) defect (art. 84 – more detail on those, however, will be found in our next article).

     

    The only (general) eligibility condition for the position of a member of the Board of Directors (besides the special ones imposed by special provisions) is the existence of legal capacity in the person of the candidate. The Board of Directors, however, is not (should not be) a decorative body of the SA but an administrative and, above all, strategy-making body. If this specific admission coincides with the choices of the shareholders of the SA, it would be desirable to impose (by the articles of association and/or apart from them) the existence of minimum, specific qualifications for someone to occupy such a position. The utilization of the most useful persons for the SA in its Board of Directors can only work positively for the pursuit of the corporate objectives. If, however, the intention of the shareholders is to (according to the formalities-only) fill the positions of the specific body and the management of the SA on the basis of the “one man principle”, it is advisable to choose those who will adequately support it.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (December 24th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Exceptions to the Rule of Election of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly

    Exceptions to the Rule of Election of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly

    In a previous article, we were concerned with the election of the members of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly (: rule). We pointed out, however, that this specific rule is not without exceptions. On those exceptions: the present article.

     

    Appointment of the First Board of Directors in the Initial Articles of Association

    An exception to the rule of the election of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly is, first of all, the case of the appointment of the first Board of Directors in the initial statute of the SA (in essence, by the founders of the SA – art. 78 §2, section a’ and §117 2 c. c.). Its term of office will last until the first regular General Assembly, unless otherwise (and specifically) provided for by the statute. The first Board of Directors can also be elected by a universal and without an invitation to the shareholders General Assembly (art. 121 §5, as expressly provided for in art. 78 §2 section b), by signing the minutes of the General Assembly without a meeting (art. 136) or by court decision (art. 69 of the Civil Code, as expressly provided in art. 78 §2 ed. b’).

     

    Direct Appointment of Member(s) by Shareholder

    An exception to the rule of election of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly is (also) the personal right to directly appoint a member/members of the Board of Directors. The specific right can be granted to one or more shareholders of the SA (art. 79) – by way of derogation from the principle of equality of shareholders (art. 36 §2). In this case, the representation of the minority in the management of the SA is guaranteed. Also, possibility aids in attracting investors: the participants in the Board of Directors have, moreover, a wider right to information than that of the minority shareholders (see art. 141 §§6 & 7 and art. 142 §4). Said right is non-transferable and non-inheritable-unless otherwise provided by the articles of association; it also is waivable.

    Prerequisites

    A necessary condition for the granting of the right to directly appoint a member/members of the Board of Directors is (apart from the shareholder status) the relevant statutory provision. It is possible for the articles of association to specify by name the bearer of the relevant right or the qualities or characteristics they must bear (e.g. a minimum percentage of participation in the share capital). It is necessary, in general, to determine the conditions for its exercise; in particular, with regard to the percentage of participation of the shareholder in the capital and the declaration of appointment (art. 79 §1 in fine).

    This right can be granted individually to a shareholder(s) or, jointly, to several of them. In the latter case, a joint act of the beneficiaries is required for the appointment of a member/members of the Board of Directors-obviously the same goes for their revocation (art. 79 §5).

    The relevant statutory provision may be initial or consequential. In the latter case, an increased quorum and a majority is required at the General Assembly that will decide it (similar to the case of preferred shares – art. 36 §6). According to others, unanimity is required (invoking the proportional application of art. 89, sec. b΄ of the Civil Code)

    In any case: this right cannot be revoked without the consent of its beneficiary.

    Restrictions

    The number of members of the Board of Directors that can be appointed directly, individually or jointly, by a shareholder/shareholders cannot exceed 2/5 of the total number of members of the Board of Directors (art. 79 §1, section a). According to the articles of association, the relevant ratio is maintained even in the event of a change in the number of members of the Board of Directors (art. 79 §4). The other members of the Board of Directors are elected by the General Assembly.

    Mode of Exercise

    The exercise of said right by the beneficiary-shareholder takes place before the election of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly. The latter, in case of direct appointment, is limited to the election of the remaining members. Shareholder(s) who exercise the right in question shall notify the appointment of the members of the Board of Directors in the company at least three full days before the meeting of the said General Assembly; and, in fact, they do not participate in the election of the rest of the Board of Directors (art. 79 §2). Their shares, respectively, are not counted in the formation of quorum and majority.

    There is no legislative provision for the cases of the General Assembly conducted without a formal invitation of the shareholders (art. 121 §5) and the signing of the minutes of the General Assembly (art. 136). However, the non-observance of the above three-day deadline in these cases should be accepted. Also, the simple, relevant, declaration of the beneficiary-shareholder immediately before the election of the Board of Directors.

    The shareholder-holder of the right to directly appoint a member of the Board of Directors may not exercise their specific right. In this case they will normally participate in the General Assembly for the election of the Board of Directors.

    Revocation

    The directly appointed members of the Board of Directors are also freely revoked – at any time – by the holder of the relevant right (art. 79 §3). The latter, in fact, may appoint a new member to replace the revoked one. If they fail or are late to do so, the Board normally operates with its other members – as long as there are not less than three.

    If there is a serious reason on the person of the appointed member regarding their incompetence (e.g. non-fulfillment of their duties), shareholders (other than those who appointed them) may legally request their revocation. A necessary prerequisite is that they represent at least 1/10 of the paid-up capital. The relevant judicial process is developed in the framework of the ‘ex parte’ proceedings.

     

    Replacement of (Incomplete) BoD

    Another exception to the rule of election of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly is (also) that of the election of a member, by the Board itself, in case of an incomplete (“stump”) Board (art. 82 §1 and 117 §2, para. d)). If there is resignation or death or in any other way loss of the status of a member or of members of the Board, the latter may elect their replacement for the remainder of their term. A relevant statutory provision is not required (see Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 82). Any powers of the replaced are not automatically transferred to their replacement.

    Prerequisites

    For this election on its part, the following are required (cumulatively): (a) Loss of Member Status, (b) Absence (:non-election) of Substitute Members by the General Assembly (according to article 81) and (c) Legal Composition of the Board (: its remaining members not to be less than three)

    Publicity & Notice of Decision

    The decision of the election, on the one hand, is submitted to the Business Registry in a declaratory manner (art. 82 §1 in fine) on the other hand, it should be announced at the next General Assembly. The GA can replace the elected member/members, even if there is no relevant item on the agenda (art. 82 §1 in fine).

    Incomplete Board Continuation Clause of the Articles of Association

    According to the law, a statutory provision for the continuation of the operation of the Board of Directors without replacement of its missing members is permissible (art. 82 §2). As long as the remaining members are more than half of those elected/appointed and not less than three.

    Convocation of General Assembly by Incomplete Board of Directors

    The members of the incomplete Board of Directors are, however, able to convene a General Assembly with the sole purpose of electing a new Board of Directors – even if they are less than three (art. 82 §3).

     

    Judicial Appointment of the Board of Directors

    The last exception to the rule of the election of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly is their appointment by court decision. In addition, the law on SAs refers to the relevant possibility, in case the first board of directors is not defined by the articles of association (art. 78 §2, sec. b΄).

    Appointment of temporary administration by virtue of a court decision is imposed (art. 69 CC) as a last resort, in case of “lack of management”; specifically, when: (a) the persons required for the administration of the legal entity are missing or (b) interests conflict between the administration and the counterparts of the legal entity.

    Such an appointment can be decided by the court following the application of anyone with a legal interest – during the process of ‘ex parte’ proceedings (art. 786 of the Code of Civil Procedure).

    Regarding, in particular, the aforementioned prerequisites:

    (a) Case of Absence of Management: It occurs in cases where no members of the Board of Directors are appointed or they have resigned or a member is absent (e.g. due to death or illness). In the cases, also, of the election of the Board of Directors with an invalid decision as well as (in the right opinion) when there is a fictitious lack of management (e.g. refusal to exercise duties by the members).

    The appointment of a temporary administration by a court decision is significantly limited, given the provisions of the law on SAs. And this is because, before the legal action, it is possible: to replace the missing members (art. 81) or to elect others from the Board itself (art. 82 §2). Also, the continuation of the operation of the incomplete Board of Directors in the context of the relevant statutory provision (art. 82 §2). It is possible, in any case, to convene a General Assembly by the remaining members of the Board of Directors for the purpose of electing a new Board of Directors (art. 82 §3).

    If a request for appointment is made on the basis of one of the above-mentioned cases, the court appoints all the members of the temporary Board of Directors – even if only some of its members have dropped out. Consequently, a mixed temporary Board of Directors, already existing of the judicially appointed members, is not formed. The temporary Board of Directors must proceed, based on what the court decision will determine, to immediately convene a General Assembly for the election of a new Board of Directors.

    (b) Case of Conflict of Interests: Occurs in cases where the individual interests of the member of the Board of Directors are contrary to those of the SA. Or takes advantage of business opportunities for their own benefit or the benefit of a third party at the expense of the SA.

    In this case, judicial involvement is significantly limited (according to article 69 CC) – given the provisions of the law on SAs: In the context of the duty of loyalty, a member of the board of directors is not entitled to vote on matters in which there is a conflict of interest with their company of the same or related persons (97 §3). It is also possible for the member in question to be replaced (provided this is provided for in the act of election or appointment of the replacement – art. 81 §2).

    However, once a relevant application for appointment has taken place, the court appoints (in the most correct opinion) as many members of the Board of Directors as are prevented by the conflict of interest from performing their duties. The temporary administration, in this case, carries out those acts for the performance of which the members being replaced are prevented and/or those, specifically, designated by the court.

     

    The (well-known) rule of electing the Board of Directors by the SA’s General Assembly has particularly interesting exceptions: the appointment of the first Board of Directors (usually by the articles of association), the direct appointment of member(s) by a shareholder or/shareholders, the replacement of absent members by the (“stump”) Board, the appointment of a temporary Board based on a court order. However, the specific exceptions are (in addition to being interesting, also) particularly important – potentially, in fact, problematic: they do not only ensure the smooth operation of the SA, but they also may, under certain conditions, overturn important balances in the management of the company – possibly also the shareholders balances. Therefore, we should all be particularly careful when managing them.

    Important issues arise (also) regarding the eligibility and defects in the appointment of the members of the Board of Directors. We will look into them, however, due to their extent and seriousness, in our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (December 18th, 2022).

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Election of the Board of Directors and Alternate Members

    Election of the Board of Directors and Alternate Members

    In our previous article, we looked into the Board of Directors of the SA. Specifically: their operation, authority, members and term of office. However, as its members are not elected only by the General Assembly, interesting issues arise regarding the manner of their election. In the present article we will explore the rule (:election by the General Assembly). In the next article we will explore its exceptions.

     

    The election of the Board of Directors from the G.A.

    The rule

    As mentioned in the introduction, the members of the Board of Directors are elected (: rule) by the General Assembly – subject to a different regulation in the law, (art. 78 §1, Law 4548/2018 – Memorandum to Law 4548/2018 on Art. 78). We find a similar provision in the provisions concerning the exclusive competence of the General Assembly (art. 117 §1, para. b). The principle of autonomy and self-governance of the SA is served through the election of the BoD by the General Assembly. Its owners (shareholders) have a say and participate in the management of the latter.

    The relative competence of the General Assembly cannot be delegated (neither by the General Assembly or the statute) to another body of the SA or a third party. The General Assembly takes the decision to elect the Board of Directors with a simple quorum and majority (art. 130 §1 and 132 §2, respectively). Subject, of course, to the fact that the statute does not require, in this case, greater quorum and majority rates (art. 130 §5 and 132 §3, respectively). It is possible, however, for the statute to require unanimity.

    The Exceptions

    The rule of electing the board by the General Assembly, however, is not without exceptions. The exceptions established by law (for which see our next article)- are summarized in the following: (a) In the appointment of the first Board of Directors in the initial statute of the SA (art. 78 130 §2). (b) In the direct appointment of a member/members of the Board of Directors by a shareholder (art. 79). (c) In the election of members by the Board of Directors, in case of an incomplete Board of Directors (art. 82 130 §1). (d) In the appointment of a (temporary) Board of Directors pursuant to a court decision (art. 69 of the Civil Code).

     

    Election of the Board of Directors based on lists

    In General

    The election of the Board of Directors by the General Assembly usually takes place on the basis of the majority system: those who receive the most votes are elected. However, another way of election is also provided for (art. 80 §1): the possibility, specifically, of electing members of the Board of Directors based on lists (: ballots). This is a possibility that was introduced in 2007 (law 3604/2007) in order to remove previous doubts set forth by the legal theory.

    In the context of the specific system, it is provided that, subject to a relevant statutory provision, the candidates for election as members of the Board of Directors are proposed to the General Assembly based on lists. The General Assembly elects from among them as members of the Board of Directors according to the proportion of the votes received by each list (art. 80 §1 paragraph a’).

    Through this regulation, the proportional election system by the General Assembly is introduced. As a result, there is a more proportional representation of the shareholders in the management of the SA; with a particular interest, of course, for the minorities. Proportional representation in the management of the SA carries, however, risks for the possibility of decision-making by the Board of Directors. Especially for those that (on the basis of a statutory provision or the law) require an increased quorum and majority. The members of the Board of Directors coming from the minority shareholders will be entitled (and it is probable), in this case, that they will vote against.

    It is argued (and rightly so) that proportional and majority systems can coexist: a certain number of board members can be elected on the basis of the majority system and the remaining on the basis of lists.

    Conditions

    (a) Statutory Provision: As we have already mentioned, the election based on lists requires a relevant statutory provision (: positive prerequisite).

    The articles of association, however, should specify the procedure to be followed for the election of the members of the Board of Directors based on lists, in order to avoid any disputes. Election methods using list election vary. In fact, it is possible to have only one list. The need for detail concerns (in particular) the way seats are allocated.

    Depending on the relevant statutory provisions, from each list are elected: either the persons who received the most votes or those who precede in the order of the list. The rest are considered alternates (art. 80 §1, ed. c and d), who are considered, by law, as substitute members (art. 81 §1, ed. b).

    Such a statutory provision may be provided for in the initial statute of the SA. However, it can be introduced and/or abolished by decision of the General Assembly. The relevant decision is taken by a simple quorum and majority, unless the articles of association require higher percentages (art. 80 §1 in fine).

    (b) Absence of Statutory Provision for Direct Appointment: In order for the election of Board members to take place on the basis of lists, the absence of a statutory provision for the direct appointment of a Board member/members by a shareholder is assumed (: negative condition) (art. 80 §2). This seems reasonable, as (: Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 80) the two possibilities serve the same purpose: the representation of the minority on the Board.

     

    Alternate Members

    Definitive Replacement

    In addition to the (in any way elected) members of the Board of Directors, any substitutes may be called upon to play an important role. As such are meant those that are (basically) elected or appointed with the purpose of replacing a member/members in the event of their loss of status.

    The possibility of electing or appointing substitute members (art. 81) is intended to deal with the case of a “stump”, as it is called, of the Board. By extension, to prevent legal action for the appointment of a temporary administration (69 CC) , which must be opted for in exceptional cases only. Indeed, given the relevant legislative provision, a corresponding statutory provision is not required (Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 81).

    The person who elects or appoints the Board of Directors (or its members) may also elect or appoint substitute members in the event of the resignation or death of the persons elected or appointed by them; also those who, for any other reason, have lost their status of member case of election of members of the Board of Directors based on lists (art. 80), the runners-up are considered as alternate members.

    Contrary to the previous regime, the relative possibility of replacement is provided in all cases of election or appointment of the Board of Directors (Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 81). Therefore: not only in case of election by the General Assembly. In turn, the alternate members: (a) will either be elected by the General Assembly and designated in the election decision of the Board of Directors, (b) or will be notified to the SA together with the member appointed, directly, by a shareholder, (c) or the runners-up will be considered as such, in case of election based on lists.

    Appointment of substitute members is not, however, possible to take place (as accepted) in the original statute of the SA.

    The election or appointment of an alternate member may concern the replacement of a specific member or any of them – depending, of course, on the act of election or appointment of the alternate members. If no relevant reference is made, any replacement may occur for any existing member.

    Furthermore, it is required that the appointment of substitute members be published (art. 81 §1 in fine).

    Temporary Replacement Due to Conflict of Interests

    The replacement of a member of the Board of Directors takes place for the remainder of their term. Any replacement cannot take place due to the temporary unavailability of an existing member.

    A deviation from the above, by virtue of a more specific regulation, is introduced in the case of a conflict of interests of a member of the Board of Directors with those of the SA (art. 97 & 81 §2). A necessary condition is that this is provided for in the deed of election or appointment of the substitute member. As expressly stated, in this case the replacement is temporary and concerns the acts for which the conflict exists.

    Presence of Substitute Members at Board Meetings

    The law provides (art. 81 §3) the possibility of representation of the substitute members at the meetings of the Board of Directors – before they replace a (regular) member. This option is considered necessary, in order for the substitute members to be informed about corporate issues; to be able, consequently, to assume their duties, in case there is a reason for replacement.

    In the said meetings, the substitute members do not have the right to vote nor is it necessary for them to be invited to the meetings (Memorandum to law 4548/2018 on art. 81). It is, however, possible for them to take the floor and express their opinion – at the discretion of the president. It is also possible for them to represent another member of the Board of Directors at the meetings (art. 92 §4).

     

    It is common knowledge that (most of the time) the members of the board of an SA are elected by its General Assembly. The latter elects the members of the Board either on the basis of individual nominations or nominations included in lists-ballots. The latter would be a beneficial option for the minority shareholders, but problematic (and therefore is avoided) for the majority. However, the selection of alternate members of the Board of Directors is optimal in order to deal with (potentially) problematic situations (e.g. incomplete composition of the Board of Directors or conflict of interests of its members). Eligible, also, in some cases (and not unusual, and sometimes, in fact, necessary) is the election/appointment of members of the Board of Directors-outside the General Assembly. About them, however, see our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (December 11th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • The Board of Directors of the SA: Operation, Authority, Members

    The Board of Directors of the SA: Operation, Authority, Members

    One of the most important bodies of the SA is its Board of Directors. It is the body through which exercises the management and representation of the SA; through which the SA expresses its will and manifests its action both internally and to the outside world. The important role of the Board of Directors, as well as issues regarding its members and their term of office will be the approached in the present article.

     

    The Role of the Board of Directors – The Management Task

    As expressly provided for in the law on SAs (law. 4548/2018), the company is managed by the BoD (art. 77 §1, section a’, law 4548/2018). The administration of the SA includes: (a) management and (b) its judicial and extrajudicial representation (art. 77 §1 sec. b’).

    The law, therefore, generates a range of powers (and responsibility) of the BoD, which are distinguished from the corresponding ones of the General Assembly. The latter, moreover, is the one that decides on structural changes concerning the SA.

    The SA acts through its BoD. Its existence therefore becomes mandatory. This obligation does not mean, however, that in case the Board of Directors disappears (e.g. due to the resignation of its members) the SA ceases to exist. Its existence, in this case, is not disputed. It is necessary, however, to ensure its operation through the election of a new Board of Directors by the General Assembly or the judicial appointment of its temporary administration (69 Civil Code).

    The obligation of the BoD for exercising management is not limited to the management and representation of the SA. It generally includes all actions of administration. In this context: the determination-coordination of the business policy and strategy and ensuring its compliance. Although the law on SAs adheres to the traditional way of governing the SA through the Board of Directors, it also provides for its (potential) substitute: the “executive committee” (art. 87 §4). The latter, once its appointment is chosen, can make decisions for the daily administration of the SA; the rest of the Board of Directors will, in this case, exercise supervisory duties (see Explanatory Report of law 4548/2018 on the 6th section).

    A question arises regarding the content of the corporate interest at the promotion of which the Board of Directors should aim, while exercising the duty of administration. In one view, the corporate interest of the SA is identified with the aspirations of its shareholders for the long-term profitability of the SA and, by extension, an increase in the shareholding value (: monist theory). On the other hand, not only the interests of the shareholders should be taken into account, but also those of e.g. the SA workers and even the environment (: pluralist theory). In any case, however, and through the serving of such interests by the Board of Directors, for example of the interests of the employees, the interests of the shareholders are served in the end.

     

    Legal Relationship Between Board Members & SA

    The members of the Board of Directors are linked by a legal relationship (: organic) with the SA. This legal relationship may or may not be in exchange for a numeration.

    It is possible that a member of the Board of Directors provides the SA, in addition, with services that go beyond the narrow limits of its administration. These services are provided in the context of a “special relationship” (art. 109 §3). The specific, special, relationship can include, indicatively, the type of employment contract, project, independent services or mandate (e.g. a member of the Board of Directors provides, at the same time, legal or accounting services to the SA).

     

    Principle Of Autonomy

    The members of the Board act independently. Therefore, they are not subject to instructions and orders, e.g. of the General Assembly or the majority shareholder of the SA. The only obligation of the members of the Board of Directors towards the shareholders (in the context, mainly, of the General Assembly) is the obligation of provision of information (: art. 141).

    The members of the BoD have (against the SA – only) an obligation of loyalty and diligence when fulfilling their duties – in the context of the organic relationship between them (and this regardless of any underlying relationship – e.g., contract of mandate or of independent services).

    Except in the case where the BoD itself requests it, no consent/approval of the GA is required in the making of management decisions by the BoD. Statutory clauses for approval of the decisions of the Board by the General Assembly will therefore be void. However, the possibility of the latter to elect, at any time, a new Board of Directors, undoubtedly works in the direction of the compliance of its members with the directions (formal or informal, explicit or implicit) of the majority shareholders.

    Finally, it should be noted that, even more so, not even the Board of Directors of a subsidiary company is obliged to carry out the orders of the parent company (regardless, of course, that in practice it will be aligned with its orders).

     

    Management Authority: Content, Scope & Responsibility

    Content

    The Board of Directors is competent to decide on every act concerning the administration of the SA, the management of its property and, in general, the pursuit of its corporate objectives (art. 86).

    Extent

    The Authority of the Board of Directors is limited: the Board of Directors does not have the right to carry out actions in excess of the corporate objectives as well as actions that are prohibited by the articles of association or contrary to decisions of the General Assembly. It is, however, possible to further limit its authority by the statute or by decisions of the General Assembly.

    Responsibility

    Any actions in excess of the management authority of a member of the Board of Directors gives rise to an obligation to compensate. However, the relevant act is evaluated as valid and carries legal consequences, as long as the potential third party is in good faith.

     

    Representation: Content, Scope & Liabilities

    Content

    The Board of Directors, as a collective body of the SA, represents the latter judicially and extrajudicially. Exceptions are found in special cases – e.g.: (a) at the stage of establishment of the SA (: when neither a legal entity exists nor, much less, a BoD), (b) at the stage of liquidation (: when representatives are the liquidators), (c) at the stage of bankruptcy (when the liquidator acts as a representative).

    In the context of the out-of-court representation of the SA by the BoD fall the execution of legal transactions and the conclusion of contracts with third parties. Also, the acts of a corporate nature towards the shareholders (e.g. the approval of the transfer of reserved shares).

    In the context of legal representation, the Board of Directors represents the SA legally, as the SA, as a legal entity, has the capacity to be a party and appear before any court.

    Scope

    The scope of the board’s representation authority is unlimited: the SA is bound to bona fide third parties (who did not know or could not have known of the relevant excess of exercise of power) – even if the board acts beyond the corporate objectives.

    The extent of the power of representation of the Board of Directors is (also) unlimited: Any limitations of it by the statute or the General Assembly cannot be opposed against third parties (art. 86 §3). Even if these have been made public.

    Limitations, however, on the Authority of the Board of Directors may be set by law. Such cases constitute the transactions of the SA with members of the Board of Directors (art. 99 et seq.). Also, the cases in which the function of representation is exercised by the Board of Directors, but the consent of the General Assembly is required (e.g. transactions with related parties – art. 100 §3).

    Liabilities

    The consequences and actions of the members of the Board of Directors are attributed to the SA itself. Liability, therefore, arises at the expense of the latter for (unjust, mainly) actions or omissions of the members of the Board of Directors (art. 71 CC). It gives rise, however, at the same time, on the joint responsibility of the guilty persons.

     

    Principle Of Collective Action

    The Board of Directors when exercising its powers but taking its decisions (art. 92 par. 2) acts, in principle, collectively (art. 77 §2 sub. b’). It is therefore important that the members of the Board of Directors participate in the collective proceedings. On the contrary, it is not required that all members participate in every act of representation.

    Permissible, however, are specific statutory deviations, such as e.g. the assignment of representation for one or more issues to specific, only, members or member of the Board of Directors. Also, the sovereignty of the president’s vote in the event of a tie (art. 92 par. 2 sec. b’). As well as the appointment of a substitute body, which acts in parallel with the Board of Directors (art. 87).

     

    The Members of the Board of Directors; In particular

    Election & Possibility of Re-election

    The methods of electing the members (shareholders or non-shareholders) of the BoD are expressly provided for in the law (art. 77 §2 section a’, with reference to art. 78-80). Specifically, these methods include: (a) election by the General Assembly (art. 78), (b) direct appointment by a shareholder (art. 79) and (c) election based on lists (art. 80).

    The members of the Board of Directors remain, at all times, eligible for re-election (even before the expiry of their term – article 77, §2, section b’). In this way, the need – often – for unity and continuity in the administration of the SA is met. Any statutory clause prohibiting re-election will be considered invalid (art. 77 §2 section b’).

    The Free Revocation

    The members of the Board of Directors can be revoked freely – at any time (art. 77 §2 sec. b’). Their tenure, therefore, is always subject to their recall.

    Revocation takes place, basically, by decision of the General Assembly (by simple quorum and majority). If, however, a member was appointed by direct appointment, by the shareholder who appointed them (or they were appointed judicially, if 1/10 of the paid-up share capital made such a request and there is a great reason).

    The revocation of the members of the Board of Directors-consultants usually expresses the lack of confidence in them or, in general, the disapproval of the management they exercise. Statutory clauses that remove or limit the right of revocation are void.

    The act of revocation is subject to (declarative) publicity.

    Number

    The number of members of the Board of Directors is determined by the articles of association. Alternatively by the General Assembly, within the limits provided by the articles of association. However, it cannot (art. 77 §3) be less than three (3) or exceed fifteen (15) members. Failure to comply with these limits renders the composition of the Board of Directors illegal.

    A Legal Entity as a Board Member

    As long as there is an express statutory provision, it is possible for any legal entity to become a member of a Board of Directors. (art. 77 §4).

    The legal entity-member is obliged, within 15 days from its designation as a member of the Board, to indicate, a natural person as its representative. The latter will exercise all the responsibilities with which the member of the Board of Directors is charged. The natural person in question is revoked/replaced at any time by the legal person-member. However both the legal entity and its representative have full liability vis-à-vis SA in terms of corporate management operations.

    The Tenure

    The status of a member of the Board is related to the duration its his term – unless the member resigns (expressly or implicitly) before its expiration. The term of office is determined, in particular, by the statute and cannot, in any case, exceed six years. In the event that the election or appointment is made for a longer period, then they apply for a maximum of six years (art. 85 §1 sec. a’ & b’). A minimum term, however, is not foreseen – it is not common, however, for it to fall short of a year.

    It is within the competence of the General Assembly to specify the term of office, since the statutes simply set its limits (e.g. “between one and five years”). As an exception, in fact, it can elect a Board of Directors with a shorter (statutory) term. However, if both the statute and the General Assembly do not address its duration, it is assumed that the term of office of the members is six years.

    A legal extension of the term of office of the BoD – the duration of which has expired – is provided for, until a decision is taken to elect a new one in the context of the regular General Assembly of Art. 119 (art. 85 §1 ed. c΄). In this way, phenomena of the SA’s lack of governance are avoided.

    It is, however, possible that there is a provision for extending the term of office of the Board either in the statute or in the decision of the General Assembly for the election of the Board. Implied extension is not accepted.

    Finally, it is allowed, by law, to make a decision – optional or statutory mandatory – on behalf of the General Assembly for partial renewal of the members of the Board of Directors. Also, the provision of differentiated, among the members, expiry times of their term of office (: staggered BoD) – under the terms of the law (art. 85 §2).

     

    The SA’s Board of Directors is not its most powerful body (the power of the General Assembly always prevails), but it is the most important one. And this is because the Board of Directors is responsible for the internal management and external bounding and representation of the SA. It is the one to which every failure will be attributed (but also every success will be credited) in the effort to fulfill the corporate objectives and serve the interest of the shareholders. The BoD is a collective body (and is treated as such by the law and the statutes of the SA), but in practice one or, at best, only a few of its members are responsible for the day-to-day management of the SA. In this context (according to Thucydides, Historiai, 2.65.9): “Thus the state was ostensibly a democracy, while in reality it was ruled by one citizen”. And so happens in the SA. And rightly so. The rules, however, are there. Their compliance is supervised and their circumvention (even if it is deliberate) is controlled. And rightly so.

    However, the interesting issues of the election of the members of the Board of Directors will concern us in our next article.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (December 4th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Founders’ Shares: Common & Extraordinary

    Founders’ Shares: Common & Extraordinary

    Shareholding status (the corporate, that is, participation in the SA) presupposes the possession of shares. However, it is possible for the SA to issue, in order to serve its interests (for its financing – e.g.) other securities besides shares. Among the other securities are also the founders’ (: common or extraordinary), which serve the SA, the shareholders and also their owners on many levels. About the common and extraordinary titles, but also their particularities, the present.

     

    Concept & Definitions

    The possibility of issuing ordinary and extraordinary founders’ shares on behalf of the SA is expressly regulated in Law 4548/2018 (art. 75 and 76 respectively). This is basically a regulation similar to that of art. 15 of the previous law 2190/1920.

    The issuance of these securities is intended to reward or attract the founders of the SA or third parties (e.g. employees, executives or members of its management), for specific actions beneficial to it, or, simply, synergies with it.

    The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary founders’ shares is based on: (a) the nature of the benefit for which they are issued and (b) the time of their issuance. Particularly:

    Common Founders’ Shares: These specific securities are issued by the SA at the time of its incorporation; their issuance at a later time is excluded (in the context, e.g., of any increase in its share capital). These titles are granted as an exchange/reward for services provided either by the founding shareholders or by third parties during the stage of the establishment of the SA (art. 75 §1). These services include actions that cannot be valued in money (e.g. providing work during the establishment of the company).

    Extraordinary Founders’ Shares: Unlike ordinary founders’ shares, extraordinary founders’ shares can be issued at any time – both during the formation of the SA and during its operation. In addition to their time of issue, extraordinary founders’ shares are also distinguished from ordinary founders’ shares in terms of the nature of the benefit against which they are granted. The extraordinary founders’ shares constitute a reward of the shareholder or the third party for benefits in kind to the SA- valuators, however in money (art. 76 §1). In this case, it is enough to simply grant the object to the SA – the transfer of ownership, i.e., is not required. An object in kind does not, therefore, mean the payment of money nor benefits not valued in money (e.g. the provision of work – given the reference of art. 76 §2 to art. 17 on contributions in kind).

     

    Rights

    Both common and extraordinary charters have no par value. Their monetary value does not, therefore, correspond to a part of the company’s share capital; they do not provide share rights to their beneficiaries. Their holder does not have the right to participate in the administration and management of the company, nor in the product of its liquidation (art. 75 §2 and art. 76 §1 sub. b).

    The only right they provide to their holders is the (limited) right to participate in the SA’s profits. The reward, in other words, of their owners presupposes a profitable, only, course of the SA – with which they are closely related.

    The right to withdrawals in the extraordinary founders’ shares is limited in amount, based on what the statutes of the SA and also the law (art. 76 §3 & 159) define for the distribution of amounts to the shareholders. With regard to the common founders’ shares, an additional, quantitative, limitation is set (art. 75 §3): the amounts distributed to them cannot exceed ¼ of the net profits of the SA, after deducting the amounts for the formation of the ordinary reserve (art. 158) as well as the amount for the distribution of the minimum dividend to the company’s shareholders (art. 161). Therefore, payments against the above are illegal.

    In order to ensure their right, which is exclusively of a property nature, the beneficiaries have, in addition, the right to attend the meetings of the General Assembly – without, however, the right to vote in them. They are also entitled to be informed about the property status of the SA, without, however, having a claim to see the corporate books.

     

    Common Founders’ Shares

    Conditions for Issuance

    The exclusive reason/purpose of issuing the common founders’ shares, as pointed out above, may be the reward of the founder-shareholders or third parties for services provided during the establishment of the company. However, a relevant statutory provision is required, which should be detailed in terms of their beneficiaries (founders of the SA or third parties) and the services that are rewarded. It should also make an explicit reference to the number of founders’ shares issued, which cannot exceed 1/10 of the number of shares – calculated of any type (e.g. common or preferred shares) – (art. 75 §1). Finally, their duration, which may be indefinite, should also be determined; i.e. it should be identified with the duration of the SA itself – subject to their redemption.

    The Redemption Right of the SA

    As the common founders’ shares aim to reward their owners for their actions at the time of formation of the SA, it is reasonable for their rights to exist for a limited time. In this context, the -issuer of the founders’ shares- SA itself is entitled to purchase them. The redemption takes place after ten years have passed since their issuance; however, it is possible for the SA to redeem them even earlier, as long as there is a relevant statutory provision (art. 75 §4). The relevant provision of the law confirmed the already formed position of the legal theory, which accepted the possibility of redemption in a shorter period of time (see in relation Explanatory Report of law 4548/2018 on article 75).

    The (statutory) right, and not obligation, to redeem the founders’ shares on behalf of the SA is formative right and is exercised unilaterally. In fact, the company’s right does not expire after the decade has passed, nor can it be limited or abolished.

    The taking of the decision to redeem the common founders’ shares can belong to the General Assembly (preferable – as it is related to the property rights of the shareholders); however, it is also possible to assign it to the Board of Directors.

    The purpose of the redemption is the cancellation of the founders’ shares against the payment of a consideration to their beneficiaries. The redemption consideration must be determined by the company’s articles of association and cannot exceed what the law stipulates (art. 159) for the distribution of amounts to shareholders. The exchange/price of the redemption may vary for each beneficiary. However, it is not allowed, under any circumstances, to exceed ten times the average annual dividend received in total by the beneficiaries of the founders’ shares during the last five years before the redemption (art. 75 §5).

     

    Extraordinary Founders’ Shares

    Competence of the General Assembly

    As pointed out above, the extraordinary founders’ shares can be issued by the SA during its operation. The relevant decision, which amends its statutes, is taken by the General Assembly, with an increased quorum and majority (76 §2).

    This decision of the General Assembly must be based (art. 76 §2) on a valuation report of the objects in kind that can be evaluated. Their valuation takes place with the corresponding application of what is provided for the valuation of contributions in kind (art. 17 and 18). In this way, the protection of the minority shareholders is achieved, as well as the control of any abuse of the relevant decision of the General Assembly. It should be clarified here, in any case, that the objects granted do not constitute contributions in kind and, consequently, do not form part of share capital of the SA.

    The Free Of Terms

    Contrary to what the law stipulates for common founders’ shares, the terms referring to extraordinary founders’ shares are freely determined (art. 76 §3). Depending on the time of issuance of the extraordinary founders’ shares (at the time of the formation of the SA or later), their terms will be determined either by its original articles of association or by a subsequent amendment thereof.

    A maximum on the amount that can be paid to the beneficiaries of the extraordinary founders’ shares is what the law prescribes (art. 159) for the distribution of amounts to the shareholders. It is therefore valid to determine the participation in the profits of the holders of the founders’ shares, preferentially, before the distribution of the minimum dividend to the shareholders.

    It should be noted here that the duration of the extraordinary founders’ shares is independent of the duration of the concession of the objects in kind. In fact, the right to redeem them from the SA is unlimited in time and can be exercised even while the aforementioned concession lasts.

     

    Issuance, Registration & Transfer of the Founders’ shares

    Matters related to the issuance, registration & transfer of common and extraordinary founders’ shares are treated analogically to those applicable to shares (art. 40-42, 75 § 6 and 76 § 4).

    The issuance of the founders’ shares, in paper or accounting form, is optional and declaratory-legitimizing. The founders’ shares, if issued, are exclusively nominal. This is dictated, among other things, by the need for control and secure identification of the beneficiaries of the founders’ shares. The latter, in fact, in order to facilitate their identification, are registered in the special book kept, even electronically, by the SA, according to the standards of the shareholders’ book (of art. 40 § 2).

    The transfer of the founders’ shares (in the context of special or universal succession) is free.

     

    The common and extraordinary founders’ shares are an extraordinary, literally, tool in the hands of the SA, its founding shareholders and its management. They provide a limited right to participate in its profits to the beneficiaries – but without making them shareholders or offering them shareholder rights (e.g. minority, participation in decision-making, in the election of management, etc.). On the other hand: the beneficiaries enjoy, correspondingly, one of the most important equity rights (that of participation in profits), which under other circumstances they would not be entitled to. Consequently, the founders’ shares can be an excellent tool for attracting executives, partners, co-investors, but also for reducing costs for the SA; in the end: maximizing the benefit for its shareholders.-

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (November 27th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

  • Warrants: Exercise of Right to Acquire Shares

    Warrants: Exercise of Right to Acquire Shares

    In our previous article we dealt with the issuance of warrants and their acquisition by the SA that issued them (or by its subsidiary). However, how is the option to acquire the shares resulting from the warrants exercised? Let’s see.

     

    The Exercise of the Right to Acquire Shares

    As we have already established, the one who is entitled to exercise (or not) the right to acquire shares, a right incorporated in the warrants, is their beneficiary. The relevant issues are regulated in the law on SAs (art. 58, law 4548/18).

    The exercise of the specific (formative) right is what initiates the increase of the SA’s share capital.

    It should, of course, be clarified here that the specific right concerns the third-party holders of the warrants: It is not possible for the issuer SA to exercise it, insofar as it concerns the same share acquisition warrants or shares acquisition warrants of its parent company, which it may own (No. 58 §1 in fine).

     

    Legal Exercise – Conditions

    Manner And Type

    The exercise of the option of the warrant is similar to the exercise of the convertible bond conversion right (see also Explanatory Memorandum of Law 4548/2018- art. 58). It is carried out with an explicit (unilateral and addressable) declaration of the beneficiary of the warrants to the SA (art. 58 §1 paragraph a’). Specific formalities are not required by law, however, in transactional practice, the document is chosen. In the case of listed warrants, the procedure specifically provided for should be followed.

    At the same time, however, with this particular declaration, the payment of the consideration already agreed, at the time of issuance, by the beneficiary is also required. The SA does not need to take any other action in order to increase the share capital by issuing new shares. The relevant decisions have already been taken by the time the warrants are made available. The SA, for its part, has already committed itself. It is now up to the relevant decision of the beneficiary to exercise their related rights.

    Terms and Conditions

    The exercise of the right by the beneficiary of the warrants is not, however, completely free of terms and conditions. It is reasonable for the warrants to provide for various, relevant, commitments and procedures (referring, for example, to the procedure for submitting the relevant declaration, the deadline and the price for acquiring the shares attributable). It is also possible to provide for special rights of the issuing company, which will potentially limit, in time or quantity, the corresponding ones of the beneficiary of the warrants (the time-limited, e.g., right of the SA to suspend or block the exercise of the option right).

    The Payment of Consideration

    The acquisition of the shares by the beneficiary of the warrants does not automatically occur with their relevant declaration. A prerequisite is, of course, the full payment of the (pre-agreed and predetermined) price of the shares to be issued (art. 58 § 1 sub. a’). Partial payment is not an option.

    If the beneficiary of the warrants fails to pay the agreed price in full, they will not acquire the shares corresponding to their option (in contrast to what applies in the case of a share subscription agreement). Unless the contrary has been expressly agreed during the issuance of the warrants.

    The Irrevocable of the Declaration

    The declaration of the beneficiary of the warrants for the acquisition of the shares corresponding to them is, first of all, irrevocable. This is consistent with the character of the option as formative. However, it is possible for the parties involved to agree on a right of withdrawal on the part of the beneficiary (under specific conditions and within strict time limits). In this way, risks and doubts regarding the timing of changes in the capital of the SA will be mitigated. The non-payment, however, of the price by the beneficiary of the warrants – when this is mandatory – can only be deduced (at a practical level, in fact) the revocation of the declaration for the exercise of the right to acquire the shares.

    The Delivery Of The Title

    As long as the warrants are incorporated into a paper security, their beneficiary is obliged to deliver it to its issuer.

     

    Consequences of the Declaration of Exercise of the Option

    The declaration of exercise of the option by the beneficiary of the warrants finally removes the uncertainty status of the SA and also of the existing shareholders. The decision for corporate participation is solemnly manifested and, subject to the payment of the (probably) pre-agreed price, the acquisition of shares and shareholder status by them will immediately follow.

     

    Consequences of the Exercise of the Option

    The Increase Of Share Capital

    The exercise of the option, which derives from the warrants (: relevant declaration and payment of the agreed price) results in: (a) the increase of the share capital of the issuing SA (art. 58 § 3), (b) the (primary) acquisition shares by the holder of the title and (c) the cancellation of the title of the latter in terms of the option – to the extent that it has already been exercised.

    In this particular increase, the time of coverage and payment of the share capital, as a matter of fact, coincide. The amount of the new shareholder’s contribution will consist, cumulatively, of the price they will have paid and the consideration, if any, for the acquisition of the warrants in the past. The latter, in fact, consideration should have been registered in a special reserve “from the issuance of the warrant certificates”.

    The nominal value of the shares issued may not exceed the sum of the two amounts (: price and consideration paid in the past – art. 58 §2). This, moreover, is imposed by the prohibition of issuing shares below par. The latter aims to ensure payment of the entire share capital.

    The beneficiary of the warrants becomes, originally, a shareholder of the SA – without, in fact, the latter’s involvement. Consequently, the existing shareholding balances are changed as no right of preference is recognized in favor of the existing shareholders in the specific share capital increase (art. 58 § 4). These, moreover, used up their relevant right (by exercising it or not) during the stage of issuing the warrants.

    Obligations of the SA

    With the increase of the share capital, the (former owner of the warrants) now shareholder maintains a claim (of a declaratory nature, however) against the company for registration in the shareholders’ book. In addition, however, they have a claim to recieve paper stock certificates – provided, of course, that the SA issues such.

    In the event that the holder of the warrants was granted by the issuer SA the right to partially exercise the options, new warrants must be delivered for their remaining rights and the warrants that will be issued – if there are any.

    Obligations of the Board of Directors

    The time limits for the exercise of the right of the holder of the warrants are what determine the time for the amendment, on behalf of the BoD, of the article of its articles of association regarding the share capital. In any case, the Board of Directors is obliged within two (2) months, from the exercise of said right, to complete its adjustment (art. 58 § 3 ed. b’). It is supported, from a portion of the theory, an obligation of the SA to certify the payment of the relevant increases in the share capital.

     

    Consequences of Not Exercising the Right

    In the event that the expiry time of the warrants (and therefore the built-in option) elapses, on the one hand, the relevant warrants will be canceled and, at the same time, the increase in the share capital will be cancelled.

    The former, now, beneficiary of the warrants will not have a claim for a refund of the price that, possibly, they paid in an earlier time (when they were issued), for their acquisition. This seems reasonable for an additional reason: this amount will have been registered by the SA, in a special reserve that cannot be distributed.

     

    As we have already stated on many levels, the warrants are a means of attracting investment funds and investors for the SA – advantageous, i.e. an option for the same. On the other hand, the holder of the warrants is attracted to their acquisition bearing in mind that at some later point in time, if he himself chooses it and it is an advantageous option for him, he will become its shareholder. In order for the warrants to remain attractive, the exercise of the rights of their beneficiary and the acquisition of his share status should be done easily and quickly. Proceedings: The beneficiary of the warrants, if he so chooses, pays the agreed amount and becomes a shareholder of the SA. Just like that. –

    Stavros Koumentakis
    Managing Partner

     

    P.S. A brief version of this article has been published in MAKEDONIA Newspaper (November 20th, 2022).

     

    Disclaimer: the information provided in this article is not (and is not intended to) constitute legal advice. Legal advice can only be offered by a competent attorney and after the latter takes into consideration all the relevant to your case data that you will provide them with. See here for more details.

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